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Preface 
 The purpose of this work, first and foremost, was the to gain an understanding of how 
an iconic institution such as the United States Marine Corps operates in the current 
environment of warfare as it is used to project force on behalf of our nation’s security. This 
force projection also encompasses non-war instances of providing worldwide humanitarian 
assistance in times of horrific disasters, natural or man-made. It became evident that the 
Marine Corps was different from the other branches of military service in America. And in all 
honesty I wanted to know why it was different, and how this difference had manifested itself. 
I came to the above realization because of a business relationship with the Marine 
Corps that developed during both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. This business relationship allowed me to develop both a professional insight, and a 
humanitarian understanding for the Marines who have either paid the ultimate price of giving 
their lives for the nation, and or possibly a higher price in lost limbs and mental anguish - Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder - as they returned home to re-enter the American mainstream.  
Having said this I need to acknowledge the roles that Colonel Pat Garvey, General Al 
Gray, General Peter Pace, General Jim Jones, General James Conway, Captain Dick Torykian, 
Sargent Major Pete Haas and Sargent Eddie Ryan have played in this story. All are “retired” 
Marines, and yes as the cliché states: There are no former Marines, just Marines! Garvey, 
Gray, Hass and Torykian became my mentors in business and in studying the Marine Corps 
itself. Torykian, Haas, Conway, Pace and Jones led me down the path of providing 
humanitarian support for those Marines who had been killed while on duty, or returned from 
their deployments severely wounded like Sgt. Ryan a Marine sniper. In particular I am 
referring to The Semper Fi Fund and the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation; both 
are 5 Star charities that I am pleased to be a part of.  
As to the specific work of this thesis Al Gray and Pat Garvey are front and center. On 
a plane trip with Al Gray we discussed this topic of maneuver warfare, both as a warfighting 
tool as well as a business tool. I drank the proverbial “Kool Aide” and learned OODA Loop 
and how to apply it in my life. Little did I know that Pat Garvey was an early “evolutionist?” 
The more I read Robert Coram’s Boyd (a gift from Pat Garvey, because “I was the guy with as 
fast an OODA as Boyd”) the more I wanted to get the rest of the story. The hook was set, and 
here I am writing the real history of an evolution in Marine Corps warfighting. 
In closing this Preface, there are two important things to remember that will always be 
with me, one from General Gray and one from Colonel Garvey. Gray first – If you want a new 
idea, read an old book! I’ve read many old books to complete this work; and Garvey next – 
There is no such thing as coincidence; it is God’s way of remaining anonymous! Little did I 
know how these two Marines would contribute to my education and my life! 
Respectfully submitted and Semper Fidelis, 
A. J. “Tony” Piscitelli 
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Introduction:  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS WAY OF WAR 
An initial definition for maneuver warfare is offered by Robert M. Citino of the University of 
North Texas so as to provide a frame of reference for this work. This definition will be modified as 
required by the adaptation of maneuver warfare by the United States Marine Corps: 
“..The Germans called it Bewegungskrieg – the war of movement on the operational level. The 
term did not refer to tactical mobility or ground speed in miles per hour. Instead, it meant the 
maneuver of large units to strike an enemy a sharp, even annihilating blow as rapidly as 
possible. It could be a surprise assault on an unprotected flank or, better yet, both flanks – or 
even better than that, his rear. Such a vigorous operational posture implied certain other 
characteristics, as we shall see: an army with an extremely high level of battlefield aggression, 
an officer corps that tended to launch attacks no matter what the odds, and a flexible system of 
command that left a great deal of initiative, sometimes too much, in the hands of lower 
ranking commanders… Thus the Germans evolved a certain pattern of war making from their 
culture and traditions.. ”1 
  Robert M. Citino: The German Way of War. 
This dissertation will focus on the development of a Marine Corps Way of War 
(MCWW) both externally and internally during the post-Vietnam period to the present era of 
warfare in southwest Asia. It must be noted though that both the United States Army as well 
as the United States Marine Corps were simultaneously exposed to the efforts of the 
“Congressional Reformers” from the mid 1970’s through to the mid 1980’s.2 The United 
States Marine Corps was able to further embrace maneuver warfare and its doctrine, strategy 
and tactics fully. The United States Army is just starting to investigate the potentials of 
maneuver warfare almost thirty years later. In the Army’s defense their tardiness in adopting 
maneuver warfare can be explained in its cautiousness in developing new military trends, 
coupled with its primary mission during the Cold War of keeping the Warsaw Pact nations 
from overrunning Western Europe using the defensive – offensive attritional way of war that 
had in essence won World War II for the Allies. Add in technological military one-up man-
ship in battlefield development to counter the superior numbers of the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. 
Army did not really have the time or the needs to change its doctrine, strategy and tactics to 
                                                          
              
1
Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), xiv. 
 
2
 United States Military Academy Seminar Conference XX, June 1982 and follow on Break-Out 
meetings report summary unauthored, pages 35 -81. 
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incorporate a German style maneuver warfare, during the Cold War period.
3
 At best, the 
Army’s Special Forces light infantry posture can be considered a somewhat maneuver warfare 
element practiced within the U.S. Army. This work will cover the early 1970’s through to 
2010. 
Maneuver warfare suited the numerically smaller U.S. Marine Corps force both from 
an intellectual as well as a practical basis. The United States Marine Corps has been unique 
from its beginnings due to its small numbers in comparison to the larger United States Army. 
One can almost equate it to the Prussian armies of Frederick the Great’s small forces which 
found success on the battlefields of Western Europe in similar doctrinal situations to today’s 
U.S. Marine Corps, partly because of their adoption of a form of maneuver warfare.
4
 Although 
the United States Marine Corps had acquitted itself extremely well in the battle spaces of 
World War I and II, and in the Cold War engagements of Korea and Vietnam, it remained 
mired to a large extent in the traditional American or French option of attritional defensive-
offensive warfare. It is costly in treasure and in most instances resulting in very high human 
losses.
5
 In the years prior to the demise of the Cold War a perceived if not conscious 
transformation within the United States Marine Corps occurred. This transformation was 
described as a true Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that set the stage for the current 
means of prosecuting warfare by the United States Marine Corps. My thesis is that no such 
RMA occurred. What took place was the evolution and institutionalization of a doctrinal 
approach that relied on modern maneuver warfare. It also incorporated the Boydian military 
philosophy, and the reliance on the Marine Corps own former strategies and tactics found in 
its “Small Wars” DNA. This work will focus on how this perceived “Revolution in Military 
Affairs” came about, and the ongoing progress of its application as the Marine Corps Way of 
War (MCWW) today.  
 American history and United States foreign relations helped to forge the United States 
Marine Corps into a military institution that has the unique make up of having been water 
borne - land and sea warriors in the American military experience; this can be seen in the very 
                                                          
3
 United States Military Academy Seminar Conference XX, June 1982 General Myers (US Army) 
closing speech recorded side 14. 
 
4
John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, 2
nd
 ed. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 
63. 
 
5
 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1973), 199. 
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DNA of the United States Marine Corps from its inception, and its concomitant history. In 
military actions, both bellicose as well as pacific / humanitarian actions fought by the United 
States Marine Corps, from the American Revolution to its present participation in the Global 
War on Terrorism the Marine Corps has transformed itself into a force in readiness capable of 
using a maneuver warfare way of war (MCWW), casting the attritional-defensive - offensive 
way of war aside. It also must be noted though that this may not always be the case when joint 
forces are deployed. Given the opportunity, the United States Marine Corps will utilize what 
will be termed a Marine Corps Way of War (MCWW). This transformation did not happen by 
coincidence or serendipitous encounters. The expeditionary nature of the United States Marine 
Corps history coupled with its participation in every major, and most “Small Wars,” has 
created a unique and agile fighting force as a department within the United States Navy. The 
Marine Corps Way of War (MCWW) is the product of thoughtful and deliberate development 
by certain vibrant, forward thinking and forceful leaders. Also there were a handful of 
politicians, civilians and other non-Marine members of the military that had seen in maneuver 
warfare a solution to the problems endemic in attritional-defensive offensive warfare for the 
United States. The adoption of a Marine Corps Way of War (MCWW) has led to the present 
success in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 Here, I refer to a band of these mislabeled “Reformers” both in and out of the U.S. 
Marine Corps in the latter part of the twentieth century. This work also will focus on the 
efforts of all of the recent commandants of the Marine Corps along with certain field grade 
generals and their subordinates. It will examine how their leadership and initiatives have 
affected the United States Marine Corps over the last twenty two years, in particular 
surrounding the adoption of maneuver warfare and its application to a MCWW. Since General 
Gray the follow-on commandants and battlefield commanders have carried this vision and the 
intent of a MCWW into the future. It is a testament to all the “so called Reformers” 
(evolutionists or maneuverists) validity, timeliness, adaptability and foresight that maneuver 
warfare has added to the battlefield success’ of the Marine Corps.  
General Gray has characterized this evolutionary development as follows:  
“..You have to understand Maneuver Warfare is really a thought process ….. so it was much 
more of an impact and it is probably not even a good name but that’s what we gave it, but the 
point is, it was all about empowering people and letting people do what they think they had to 
do, letting people make mistakes and so on, so they learn and all that kind of thing so that was 
15 
 
one of the big leadership parts of the maneuver thought process. The empowerment of people, 
empowerment with an “E” not an “I” and the idea that the de-centralization, in other words, 
maybe decentralizing operations and all that and the very idea that intent has to be understand 
to which two echelons up, and two echelons down all that type of thing. So that thought 
process is very, very important I think that we in essence, we turned the Marine Corp loose. 
So the Marine Corp really did it. I just let them do it..”6 
 The work of these “Reformers” can be seen in the following areas: first, educational 
reforms that broadened United States Marines knowledge base to support a MCWW; second, 
the development of political agility within a governmental system that traditionally shunned 
the concept of standing armies, while at the same time it had created a political bureaucracy 
that wallows in its political maneuverings and intrigue; third, external and internal training 
designed to place the United States Marine Corps in the forefront of military action and live 
up to its reputation of being the “First to Fight;” fourth, maneuver warfare and the advantages 
derived from this type of engagement by a small, amphibious fighting force such as the United 
States Marine Corps; and its redefinition of doctrine, strategy and tactics for the United States 
Marine Corps that has adopted, defined and redefined maneuver warfare on all levels of battle 
as it applies to the United States Marine Corps; and fifth, the development of leadership skills 
to accomplish the successes in the preceding areas as it applies to a MCWW.  
As stated above, this study concentrates on military leadership within the U.S. Marine 
Corps, both of which have not only withstood the rigors of warfare but also the warfare within 
the United States political system. The Marine Corps has survived and triumphed in both 
battle spaces simultaneously.
7
 It must be realized that the United States Marine Corps is not an 
independent branch of service within the United States Department of Defense; but a 
department within the United States Navy. Yet, because of calculated, wise and determined 
leadership and in some instances outside guidance, the U.S. Marine Corps has been able to 
stand on equal footing with the four other independent military branches (United States Army, 
United States Navy, United States Air Force and United States Coast Guard). The focus of this 
work also revolves around the so called “Reformers” and the implementation of maneuver 
                                                          
6
 General Alfred M. Gray USMC (ret.), in person interview by author. May 20, 2011. 
 
7
 Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here (Washington, D.C: 
The Brookings Institution, 1976),  66. 
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warfare into a MCWW; along with the follow on commandants that have refined, 
implemented and further utilized the MCWW successfully on today’s battlefields.8 
This U.S. Marine Corps leadership cadre as it relates to the political aspects of the 
Marine Corps leadership program is the reason for both internal and external successes. The 
Marine Corps leadership, has to rely on congressional efforts to maintain the Marine Corps 
reason d’être, of being an amphibious and seaborne provider of power projection -a “Force in 
Readiness.” The Marine Corps must be able to secure a land position as the logical 
termination of a line of communication- pre, during and in all cases post military or civil 
action, so as to secure its place in the current United States military environment.  
This was amplified by General James Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps 
in November of 2011 at Camp Lawton, Herat, Afghanistan, when he stated that: 
“.. while the Marines, willing and able to operate from dug in positions [attritional 
defensive - offensive doctrine] are uniquely equipped and trained to do much more: they can 
get to any crisis on land, sea or in the air, on a moment’s notice … [Commandant Amos] is 
eager to see the Iraqi and Afghanistan missions completed so that the Marines can return to 
their traditional role as [the] expeditionary force in readiness..”9  
Military education is a major part of this evolution into a MCWW. In order for the 
MCWW to take hold there was a need for militarily educated warriors; it has become standard 
practice for all United States Marines to become readers.
10
 And, these required readings 
encompassed all of the Marine Corps from the General Officer level, on down to newly 
minted Marine privates leaving the recruit depots of Paris Island and San Diego. Not only was 
reading now a fundamental aspect of being a Marine, it also became a socialization process 
within the Marine Corps itself, as these readings led to formal and informal discussion groups 
focusing on various aspects of military history, doctrine, strategy and tactics. This in part grew 
out of the “Reformers” ad hoc meetings for this MCWW development so as to get its center of 
gravity embedded within the Marine Corps.
11
 Along with the academic benefits derived from 
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having Marines become readers at all levels, it must also be noted that future Marines would 
no longer be accepted into the Marine Corps if they did not have at least a high school 
diploma.
12
 This benchmark requirement in effect would have a far reaching and positive spin 
on the men and women who would become future enlisted U.S. Marines. This in conjunction 
with college level and post graduate education, and the development of the Marine Corps 
University program per se has benefited the Marine Corps. Thus the internal development, 
and creation of a United States Marine by all standards, puts into the arena a warrior-scholar-
practitioner of the modern art of maneuver warfare or a Marine Corps Way of War.  
 Starting with Commandant Gray’s leadership of the Marine Corps, rather than 
stewardship, Gray changed how this military organization of sea borne soldiers operated in a 
post-Cold War world. These changes carried over into the current world which is now locked 
in battle with terrorism and irregular warfare, (4
th
 / 5
th
 Generation Warfare).
13
  From the 
outset, General Gray’s objectives were first and foremost meant to take care of his Marines on 
and off the battle field. The United States Marine Corps needed, in General Gray’s mind, to 
change how it would do business on this new battle field.
14
 The impetus behind this initiative 
can be found in the post-Vietnam analysis of the effectiveness of the American campaign in 
Southeast Asia. Couple this with the bombing of the Marine 24th Amphibious Unit, Battalion 
Landing Team, HQ Barracks, Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, serious and immediate battle space 
changes needed to be implemented.
15
  
The first to voice a critical note was Jim Webb, a highly decorated Marine Corps 
officer who served in Southeast Asia.
16
 Vietnam was the “preverbal straw” that finally forced 
the need to seek change in Marine Corps thinking as it related to doctrine, strategy and tactics. 
The irregular and attritional action taken against the Marine Corps coupled with the previous 
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heavy battlefield losses of Korea and the Pacific campaigns of World War II emphasized the 
heavy human carnage suffered by the Marine Corps in both Killed In Action and Wounded In 
Action. These KIA’s and WIA’s were no longer an acceptable price to pay in human assets for 
the United States, and in particular the U.S. Marine Corps.
17
  
Joined by General Gray’s leadership and direction as provided by the so called 
“Reformers”, the Marine Corps was better able to meet the threats of the 1990’s into the 21st 
Century. Without the impetus provided by Bill Lind, Col John Boyd (USAF), Col. Mike Wyly 
(USMC) and Commandant Gray as well as the many others who were involved in dealing 
with the Congressional Caucus for Military Reform in the early 1980’s.18 The question 
remains is the Marine Corps in a better position today for success in the battle space, as 
compared to Beirut, Vietnam, Korea, World War II and World War I because of this 
maneuver warfare evolution that became doctrine, strategy and tactics of a Marine Corps Way 
of War?  
The complexion of warfare and its complimentary carnage, at least for those in the 
Marine Corps was part of the history of the United States Marine Corps; it would not be a part 
of its future willingly if a MCWW was to be successful.
19
 Does MCWW give the Marine 
Corps the ability to adapt into the warriors of today who fight smarter, and, lose less Marines 
while fighting for the same ideals of all Marines since their inception in 1776? Answering this 
question is the thrust of this dissertation.  
The concept of Reform in Military Affairs (RMA) should be a broad brush stroke 
approach for this dissertation, although the United States Marine Corps on the whole does not 
accept the “Reform” wording. As stated by Col. Pat Garvey “the Marine Corps has “evolved” 
into a MCWW.”20 On the surface this evolutionary work centered on maneuver warfare as 
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developed by the German army during the inter war years of the 1920’s and 1930’s.21 This 
fine point of word craft is elemental to understanding both the Marine Corps and those whose 
efforts led to bringing the United States Marine Corps into its future, with the implementation 
of its own variant of maneuver warfare.
22
  
Referring again to the DNA of the Marine Corps’ long history, the role of “Small 
Wars” and their prosecution by the Marine Corps brings the concepts of maneuver warfare 
full circle to the current conditions of irregular warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan today.
23
 
Keeping this in mind, changes that may appear minor are, in the most part major paradigm 
shifts within such an iconoclastic and ethos bound institution such as the Marine Corps in the 
post-World War II environment.  
The Cold War world changed the stakes but not the methodologies of warfare. Ground 
warfare was limited for the most part to surrogates; the mind set was still attritional and 
defensive offensive actions.
24
 Changes were required in the face of large actions versus small 
military response to irregular warfare (4
th
 GW)
25
 within these larger military campaigns. This 
has always been a strong suit for the United States Marine Corps as it prosecuted its history of 
“Small Wars.” Of the almost two hundred small military actions that the United States has 
participated in over the course of the Marine Corps history, the Marine Corps has been the 
primary American military arm in over one hundred and seventy interventions or eighty five 
percent of U. S. military deployments.
26
 From aggressive military actions, to peace keeping, to 
military stabilization and on to humanitarian assistance, the Marine Corps “Force in 
Readiness” has excelled in these areas time and again. This was the impetus reflected in 
moving away from the former attritional mind sets of World War I to Gulf War I. This move 
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away from the attritional side of battle was to be the frame of reference for the adoption of 
maneuver warfare as proffered by the “Reformer / Evolutionist” or “Maneuverists.” It was 
officially implemented and institutionalized by the United States Marine Corps in 1987.
27
  
Prior to Gulf War I, the rescue of Americans in Grenada and the Invasion of Panama 
were to two major actions where the Marine Corps would begin to integrate maneuver warfare 
tenets. The Panama campaign, Just Cause may have been the last invasion of the attritional 
type; or the second real opportunity to insert some of the lessons of maneuver warfare into 
practice on a limited basis.
28
 Operation Urgent Fury utilized pre institutionalized concepts of 
maneuver warfare early in the Marine Corps’ move into its’ future warfighting paradigm.29 
Prior to his becoming the 29th Commandant, General Gray was a key part of the 
vanguard that accepted the move to incorporate the lessons of Fredrick the Great, von 
Clausewitz, von Manstein and the German school of military strategy that developed during 
the interwar period of the 1920’s / 1930’s.30 Future Commandant Gray should be considered 
as one of the prime movers of the “Reformers.” He entered this warfighting “evolution” 
officially a short time after the Beirut Bombing.  
Here it must be noted that other non-Marine practitioners of this methodology or way 
of thinking volunteered or were recruited to help make this evolution become reality for the 
United States Marine Corps; in particular William (Bill) Lind and Col. John R. Boyd, USAF 
(ret). Boyd and Lind were just two of the maneuver warfare proponents tasked with this 
development and evolution as it moved into the maneuver warfare of the Marine Corps.
31
 The 
“Reformers” also saw that the lessons of Sun Tzu, introduced by both Col. John Boyd and 
General Gray, and other Asian military strategists as a way of supporting and enhancing these 
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aspects of a Marine Corps Way of War (MCWW).
32
 Asian war philosophy had permeated the 
past history of the Marine Corps from the World War II usage of Gung Ho as a unifying 
unofficial motto for “Can Do.” It is similar to the more modern Marine Corps aphorism of 
Improvise, Adapt and Overcome.
33
 General Jones incorporated the Asian hand to hand combat 
school during his commandancy further embedding Asian warfare attributes for all Marines.
34
 
 The areas in which specific and significant change for the Marine Corps can be noted 
are as follows:  
1. Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 
2. Command and Control, 
3. Training and Education, 
4. Leadership and Style of Leadership, 
5. Operations.
35
  
These five major areas are manipulated by the forces of bureaucracy and politics, 
within both the Marine Corps, as well as governmental politics. There is also internal 
jockeying within the U.S. Defense Department, and in the macro, the ongoing war efforts in 
Southwest Asia, as it affects the Marine Corps today since its inception of maneuver warfare.  
 The MCWW’s maneuver warfare and its subsequent legacy has positioned the Marine 
Corps and its warriors / scholars, into its future as the “Force in Readiness” for the nation, 
worldwide. No other branch of service in the United States can make that claim. More than lip 
service has been paid to a transition to Boyd’s maneuver warfare and the advantages derived 
from this type of engagement by a small, amphibious fighting force. The MCWW’s 
redefinition of doctrine, strategy and tactics that has adopted, defined and redefined maneuver 
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warfare on all levels are evident in Marine Corps battle posture today. In retrospect, the 
success of the German Army of the late 1930’s, as it rolled up victory upon victory is the 
general back drop for this evolution for the Marine Corps. It is not the end point for Marine 
Corps doctrine.
36
 The convergence of thought on maneuver warfare and combined arms are 
coupled with the fact that the Marine Corps leadership cadre became one of its strongest 
proponents that opened up the future to fighting better, more economically and smarter. It 
must also be noted that this was not to be an easy adaptation within the Marine Corps for 
numerous reasons, the strongest external perception being; “that this was not the way that the 
Marine Corps had fought in the past.” The Marine Corps DNA though offers a very strong 
counter indication.
37
  
The misnamed “Reformers, etal” appeared to be misguided with this methodology, 
prior to General Gray’s advancement into the commandancy in 1987. Yet, even before this 
time as stated above, he was convinced that this would give Marines a new and utile tool to 
engage their enemies in a most efficient way, while achieving quicker and a more devastating 
success in the battle space.
38
 The second major military action during the Gray commandancy 
took the Marine Corps to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. The U.S. Marine Corps was 
responsible for liberating Kuwait during the First Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm (1990–
1991). Their role in this action was based upon the primary use of the Marine Corps concepts 
of maneuver warfare (MCWW) as developed prior to, and refined during this period in the 
Amphibious Warfighting School by Colonel Mike Wyly and Colonel John Boyd.
39
 In the 
course of developing these plans for this offensive the traditional form of attritional warfare 
was not used. Attritional warfare's other features included pitting strength against strength, 
massed and accurate fires, ponderous movement, and centralized control with an emphasis on 
procedures.
40
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As attrition warfare was superseded by the Marine Corps development of maneuver 
warfare in the late 1980s, there was much discussion within the Marine Corps as to what 
actually constituted maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare and its follow on characteristics 
included attacking weak points by strength, reconnaissance pulls, a high tempo of operations, 
and decentralized control with the object to shatter the enemy's cohesion, organization, 
command and psychological balance. Further, MCWW’s maneuver warfare required a higher 
level of military judgment and was riskier than attrition warfare.
41
In the course of developing 
these plans for this offensive posture, the Marine Corps’ leadership sought to shorten their 
own force's cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action, (the "OODA Loop” of 
Captain John Boyd),
42
 to one that was faster than that of the Iraqi Army during Desert Storm; 
therefore giving the decided advantage to the U.S. Marine Corps.  
The decision making vehicle for this was intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
along the lines of Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict.43 This system and doctrine provided an easily 
grasped series of milestone decisions as the battle progressed. In addition, the Marine Corps 
strategy planners under the able leadership of Lt. General Walt Boomer wanted to deceive and 
confound the enemy's command and control system so that the Iraqis would not be able to 
form an accurate picture of what was happening on the battlefield, and therefore would not be 
able to respond in a satisfactory way to Marine Corps actions.
44
 Both Generals Bill Keyes (II 
MEF) and Mike Myatt (I MEF), by assaulting the Iraqi forces at their weakest points, had 
hoped to minimize their own casualties, and avoid the possibilities of chemical weapons being 
used against the Marines.
45
 The Marine Corps, in the best example of lessons learned from 
maneuver warfare, would go quickly and violently, and with a rapid tempo of movement 
being maintained.
46
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The question becomes: was this going to be the future of the United States Marine 
Corps development of (MCWW)? In the main, the MCWW’s maneuver warfare suited the 
Marine Corps’ ethos on and off the battlefield. As the “maneuverists” anticipated this 
evolution into maneuver warfare would take the terrible sting of attritional warfare’s human 
carnage out of the Marine Corps DNA, while still keeping the ethos of the Marine Corps’ 
fierce fighters in its hallowed place.
47
 Semper Fidelis now had added a new wrinkle to its 
meaning. The other issue of Desert Storm and the Marine Corps as they fought in support of 
the U.S. Army and other coalition forces to liberate Kuwait brought the Marine Corps Way of 
War even more to the forefront as they shortened the overall mission by two and a half days, 
while successfully meeting their maneuver warfare mission objectives.
48
 
The seeds of this development can be found in six different settings that eventually 
united in this evolutionary effort. The perceived Revolution in Military Affairs within the 
Marine Corps did not take place. The reasons for each independent evolutionary development 
will be further discussed in-depth and will provide new primary source information based 
upon interviews with each developer as previously mentioned. To further set the frame of 
reference it must be noted that non-Marine Corps sources for the use of maneuver warfare 
grew out of the political need to fund the military in general. And the other of these aspects 
was the follow on of downsizing of the Marine Corps in a negatively charged post-Vietnam 
economic, political and social environment.
49
  
William (Bill) Lind must be credited with initially bringing the modern German Way 
of Warfare into the equation as a non-military subject matter expert. Lind, an academic with 
Ivy League credentials in European history, joined the Senator Taft staff in 1973 and 
proceeded to enmesh Senator Taft in military affairs. According to Lind:  
“.. The economics of downsizing would not weaken the overall military strength of the 
country if maneuver warfare were to be adopted..” 
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It is here where Lind begins his push for a change.
50
 At the same time that Lind had 
established himself in the fight to cut military spending while not lessening America’s military 
abilities, Jeffery Record and Martin Binkin had published the Brookings Institute’s Where 
Does the Marine Corps Go from Here: Studies in Defense Policy Report (1976).
51
 It was less 
than hopeful for keeping a Marine Corps in America’s future. Record later was to become 
Senator Nunn’s military staffer along with Lind. Jeff Record was at this juncture a strong 
advocate of maneuver warfare.
52
  
Col. John Boyd’s (USAF ret.) long history of questioning U.S. Air Force military and 
spending practices came to the forefront of the economic-military debate in 1980. This debate 
played into this general scenario as the means necessary to affect the complete overhaul 
within the Department of Defense starting with fiscal responsibility and new weapons 
purchases. Boyd had advanced his evolutionary OODA Loop logic and warfighting 
philosophy into his fourteen hour lecture called Patterns of Conflict that was steeped in 
maneuver warfare with added emphasis on the philosophy of Sun Tzu.
53
 Although the U.S. 
Army did not acknowledge maneuver warfare there were a small number of “Reformers” to 
be found that were trying to advocate for Army regeneration in this venue. Among them were 
Steven Canby (U.S. Army and West Point Graduate) and his civilian partner Ed Litwak, and 
their consultant / military historian from Israel, Martin vanCreveld. Colonel Huba Wass de 
Czege (U.S. Army and West Point Graduate) was also an advocate from within the Army War 
College. Maneuver warfare never took hold with the U.S. Army at this time.
54
 
Internally, the Marine Corps completes this circle of prime movers when John Boyd is 
introduced to Col. Mike Wyly by Bill Lind.
55
 Col. Wyly knew that regardless of the reports, 
the Marine Corps was in need of new doctrine, strategy and tactics after his two tours of duty 
in Vietnam. Col. Wyly dedicated his career to finding a better way for the Marine Corps to 
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fight and win on its future battle fields. This center of gravity for Marine Corps maneuver 
warfare also includes some other key Marines that fostered this effort before the entry of the 
commandant’s cadre and its future acceptance as Marine Corps Doctrine. Here we see 
Marines such as Major General Bernard Trainor, Capt. Jim Webb (Sec. of the Navy and later 
Senator from Virginia), and Col. Patrick Garvey (USMC Res) and the New York State liaison 
for military matters to Congress. In 1982, the issues concerning maneuver warfare were 
moving down the path that now included the Congressional Caucus for Military Reform 
which hosted a three day conference at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. 
In Senior Conference XX, this three day review and discussion on maneuver warfare by all 
those previously mentioned, maneuver warfare found its initial place within the Marine Corps, 
not the U.S. Army.
56
  
In doing the necessary research on this topic, relatively little has been done on the 
history of maneuver warfare and its adoption by the United States Marine Corps into its own 
unique way of fighting wars. The bits and pieces that are written have either looked at the 
success of maneuver warfare as practiced in Gulf War I by Generals Boomer, Keyes and 
Myatt, or some master’s thesis work on the overall education of Marines. Furthermore there 
are virtually no official records for its adoption by the U.S. Army to date. The Army has went 
in the traditional mode of Air-Land-Battle systems that concentrate on a preset bombing 
component with mass force projection of superior numbers and a linear attritional offensive-
defensive, doctrine. The Army opted for Netcentrics capabilities overlaid on the Cold War 
model.
57
 
My research will focus on the oral history model as used by the United States Marine 
Corps’ History Division. Those to be interviewed will provide their actual contributions, and 
efforts that they personally performed in the development of a Marine Corps Way of War. 
These oral histories will go beyond the materials that have been archived at the Marine Corps 
University and the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center at Headquarters, Quantico, 
Virginia. The following in alphabetical order were interviewed either in person, by telephone 
or via email:
58
 General James Conway USMC 34
th
 CMC, ret. [in person], 2
nd
 Lieutenant Russ 
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Cox USMC [phone and email], Colonel Patrick Garvey USMCR ret.[in person] General 
Alfred M. Gray USMC 29th
th
 CMC, ret. [in person] Captain Bruce Gudmundsson USMC 
ret.[by phone and email] General Jim Jones USMC 32
nd
 CMC, ret.[in person], General John 
Kelly USMC CG Southern Command [in person], Lieutenant General Bill Keys USMC ret 
[by phone and in person] General Charles Krulak, USMC 31st CMC, ret.[by email], Mr. Bill 
Lind [in person], General Robert Magnus, USMC ACMC ret. [by phone and email], General 
James Mattis USMC ret. [by phone and email], Major General Mike Myatt USMC ret. [in 
person], Mr. Damien O’Connor [in person, by phone and email], Captain John Schmidt, 
USMC ret. [by email], Captain John Schmitt, USMC ret. [by emails], Major General Ray 
Smith USMC ret. [by phone and email], Colonel Greg Thiele USMC, [by email], Lieutenant 
General Mick Trainor USMC ret. [by email], Colonel G I Wilson USMCR ret. [in person and 
by phone and email], Colonel Bill Woods USMC ret. [in person and by email] and Colonel 
Mike Wyly USMC ret. [in person, by phone and by email]. 
I will also have access to the personal and private papers of all those who will provide 
these oral recollections. Along with these major sources I have been granted full use of the U. 
S. Marine Corps’ archives on maneuver warfare also housed at the General Alfred M. Gray 
Research Center at Headquarters, Quantico Virginia. Lastly, my secondary research will 
encompass all written as well as electronically published works on this topic. The Boyd 
family, Col. Mike Wyly, and Col. Pat Garvey as well as Col. Gary (GI) Wilson have also 
made their private papers, as well as Col. John Boyd’s available for this dissertation. It must 
be noted that the above group’s responses totaled more than 450,000 words in total 
contribution to this work. 
This topic of U.S. Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare has not been written about since 
the publication of Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies by Captain Terry C. Pierce, U.S. 
Navy in 2004.
59
 An additional work Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John 
Boyd, written about Colonel John Boyd was completed by Frans P.B. Osinga in 2007.
60
  The 
latest academic advance on Marine Corps maneuver warfare was a Master’s Thesis written by 
Fideleon Damian in 2008. Damian’s, (a student at Kansas State University), work focuses on 
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the 1979 to 1989 time period and looks at maneuverists’ arguments as presented in the Marine 
Corps Gazette and FMFM-1.
61
 There have been sporadic articles, blogs and internet 
discussions on the topic of 4
th
 and 5
th
 Generation Warfare, which have spurred the debate of 
maneuver warfare in dealing with irregular warfare today. The bulk of the materials written 
still remains in the near past of the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
What this work has achieved as a research product is the history of the development of 
a specific and institutionalized Marine Corps Way of War. This Marine Corps Way of War is 
a unique application of maneuver warfare and other pertinent militaristic philosophical 
thought that make the Marine Corps’ warfighting applications uniquely their doctrinal, 
strategic and tactical variant in the operational art of war. As a sub-theme it acknowledges the 
effects that one Marine officer, Colonel Mike Wyly, was able to affect Marine Corps wide as 
a result of his experiences during the Vietnam War. The serendipitous meeting of this cast of 
“evolutionists” centered on Col. Mike Wyly’s idea that there had to be better solutions in the 
Marine Corps’ warfare going forward, that eventually created the Marine Corps Way of War. 
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Chapter 1: Belleau Wood to Beirut 
From World War I on into the later part of the twentieth century the Marine Corps was 
involved in fifteen engagements on two military levels; major national warfare initiatives 
(four) and minor or “Small War” deployments (eleven). The four major involvements were 
World War I, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The eleven “Small War” 
actions during this period took place in Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, China, the 
Dominican Republic, Panama, Iran, Grenada and Lebanon.
62
  
The national doctrine, strategy and tactics that were employed were that of traditional 
American Way of War (offensive - defensive methodology of warfare with synchronization as 
practiced by the French).
63
 There are some possible exceptions that must be noted in the 
“Small Wars” category and which were codified in United States Marine Corps publication 
Small Wars Manual, 1940.
64
 However this, did not play a major role in how America or the 
Marine Corps went about the business of warfare. It did however set the stage for the Marine 
Corps future evolution into a Marine variant of maneuver warfare and its misnamed 
“revolution” beginning in the early 1980’s. Of importance for this work is the frame of 
reference created by the utilization of what developed into an American Way of War.  
The setting for the prosecution of war, by the United States during this period, was in 
essence the validation of the efforts utilized by General Ulysses S. Grant in successfully 
bringing the Civil War to a close with victory for the Union Army and the follow on 
reunification of the United States.  
The educational undercurrent that can be seen in the influencing of men such as 
General Grant was inculcated at the US Military Academy in West Point, New York. General 
Grant’s early influence was centered on the Jominian study of the Napoleonic period as taught 
at West Point while General Grant was a cadet there. Jomini’s basic tenant of strategy 
according to Russell F. Weigley is a simple one:  
“..the necessity to bring the maximum possible force to bear against the decisive point 
in the theater of operations while the enemy can muster only an inferior part of his strength 
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there. To be able to bring superior [strength] against inferior strength [weakness] depends 
upon the proper ordering of one’s lines of communication in relation to the enemies..”65  
 
The reasons associated with Napoleonic warfare had considerable gravitas during the 
period. Napoleon had only lost two battles, while winning forty-eight, thus a perceived model 
for emulation. With this noted though, General Grant was not a totally committed adherent to 
this common line of military thought as it applied to his experiences during the American 
Civil War.
66
 A number of factors can be seen in what eventually shaped General Grant’s 
strategy and tactics that led to his victory. It became the seeds of an American Way of War 
that in some regards is still prevalent today. In preparing for the eventual defeat of the 
Confederacy, General Grant moved away from the concentration of winning battles. His 
strategy centered on what it would take in the long view to achieve a complete victory. His 
focus was now directed at a strategy of annihilation based upon the principle of concentration 
of mass, hitting the main Confederate armies with the concentrated thrust of massive Federal 
forces until the Confederate armies were smashed into impotence. The “offensive” became 
everything for the Union Army under the leadership of Grant regardless of winning battles. He 
understood the attritional disadvantage that had taken its toll on his adversaries; he had split 
the territorial Confederate battlefield and, now with assets beyond that of his enemies 
proceeded to engage them on his terms. Grant utilized a relentless pursuit that decimated the 
opposing forces regardless of the fact that some battles may be lost while winning in the long 
run being his only raison d’etre.67 He extended this concept of battle until the battle became 
literally synonymous with the whole campaign. He would fight at all times, every day, 
keeping the Confederate army always within his own army’s grip. Not allowing the enemy the 
opportunity for deceptive maneuver; always pounding away until his own superior resources 
permitted the Federal armies to survive while the enemy army disintegrated.
68
 Carnage on the 
battlefield for both sides was to be an accepted price that had to be paid as long as the enemy 
was still able to fight or even resist. General Grant had the advantage of troop replenishment 
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as he pursued Generals Lee and Johnston, although the Confederacy may have been 
“winning” battles, attritionally, they were losing its human and material resources, that 
eventually could not be replaced.
69
 
Ancillary to this doctrinal shift at the end of the Civil War, General Grant added a 
second dimension with the incorporation of destroying the Confederates means of supplying 
their war efforts. Behind the lines now were to be treated as prime battlefield targets. The 
home front was now exposed to the same ravages of war as the frontlines were. Generals 
Sheridan and Sherman were to destroy the economic life blood of the Confederacy thereby 
eliminating support to those armies now being pursued to annihilation by General Grant. 
General Grant now became the prophet of a strategy of annihilation in new dimensions, 
seeking the literal destruction of the enemy’s armies, its means of logistical supply and the 
psychological denigration of its non-combatant people as the means to an undeniable victory, 
in a word total war.
70
  
Along with these tenets of warfare was the acceptance of large numbers of Killed in 
Action (KIA) and Wounded in Action (WIA). This annihilational approach was further 
exploited in America’s Indian Wars of the late 1800’s, with the same devastating effects that 
were evidenced in the final days of the Civil War. Lastly, the dynamics of war had been 
altered by a number of technological and industrial advances. The telegraph, the advances in 
weapons production and refinement of explosives, the use of motorized transportation, the 
railroads and steam ships added to the complexities of warfare on all levels. The effects of 
these advancements would be realized more in the near future of warfare. It must be 
acknowledged at this stage as a critical turning point in the evolution of warfare and its 
corresponding trinity of Grant’s doctrine, strategy and tactics.  
The United States entered the twentieth century as a budding world power. Its military 
was now shaped by the successes evidenced on the final battlefields in the Confederacy and in 
the territorial Indian Wars. This legacy of General Ulysses S. Grant would shape the twentieth 
century’s American Way of War. It was now a model for total war that is an attritional, 
offensive-defensive concentration of force on force, seeking complete annihilation in an 
unrelenting manner. It takes place on a battlefield which now extends to all aspects of the 
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home front. This is the modus operandi that the American military brought to Europe when it 
entered World War I.  
United States Marine Corps 1918: 
World War I provides the venue for the U.S. Marine Corps to enter into the larger 
picture of warfare as it will be played out in the twentieth century. World War I provided the 
Marine Corps the opportunity to live up to their raisons d’etre as an expeditionary fighting 
force. The Marine Corps’ “soldiers of the sea” become the equals of the U.S. Army in all 
aspects of this warfare during World War I. The one exception for this is the size of Marine 
Corps enlistment numbers and the number of Marines sent to Europe. Of special note is the 
fact that this interservice equality extends into the doctrine, strategy and tactics of the way 
American warfare was conducted at this time. 
71
 
Jomini’s principles of “lines of communication” coupled with the gravitas of General 
Grant’s indelible marks in this methodology of warfare are reinforced by Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s seminal works: The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890); 
The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 (1892); and 
Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812 (1905).
72
 This trilogy’s main focus further 
supports and validates the doctrine, strategy and tactics of concentration of force upon force. It 
is unrelenting and dogged as can be achieved only by an offensive fighting force; that seeks 
annihilation of the enemy in total war that is attritional, economic, and psychological. The 
American military was willing to accept high losses of men and material. Although Mahan’s 
work is directed at naval warfare, it is the same as that of land warfare in all its Jominian and 
Grant type aspects.
73
 Thus an American Way of Warfare pervades the national character and 
is exemplified on the battlefields that the Marine Corps fought on during World War I.  
The Marine Corps distinguished itself at Verdun, Chateau-Thierry, Belleau Wood, 
Saint-Mihiel, Blanc Mont, Saint-Etienne and Meuse–Argonne. In all of these battles the 
national military psyche that pervaded warfare at the time can be evidenced in how the Marine 
Corps fought. Belleau Wood, a prime example, brings these principles of warfare to full view. 
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As an offensive action to uproot the German forces which held their position at Belleau 
Wood, the Marines stepped off seeking to annihilate, at all costs, an enemy in a well-protected 
defensive position. And further, this force on force concentration in the best traditions of 
Grant military philosophy and the perfection of it by the Marine Corps was able to achieve 
this end result by its unrelenting, persistent and tenacious Marine Corps fighting ethic of these 
times, albeit carnage intensive almost to a fault.  
On the attack with bayonets fixed, facing artillery as well as automatic machine guns,
74
 
the 5
th
 and 6
th
 Marines did not stop until the battle was won. The cost at Belleau Wood 
involved Killed in Action (1,750; or 71% of all KIA’s for the Marine Corps during World War 
I), as well as Wounded in Action (3,450; or 39% of all WIA’s for the Marine Corps during 
World War I) was close to 5,200 Marines.
75
  
The following quote captures the price of this American Way of War at Belleau Wood 
for the Marine Corps:  
 “..I have only two men out of my company and 20 out of some other company. We need 
support, but it is almost suicide to try to get it here as we are swept by machine gun fire and a 
constant barrage is on us. I have no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold.. ” 
[Sent by Marine 2
nd
 Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates, 96th Co. U.S. 2
nd
 Division (Regular), 19 July 
1918, 10:45 a.m.]
76
  
 
Belleau Wood was a military success, yet the costs were extremely high in carnage. 
The die was cast. This action sets the tone for the Marines and their future of warfighting! 
United States Marine Corps 1941: 
World War II provided a similar backdrop for the Marine Corps, where the tried and 
true Grant trinity of doctrine, strategy and tactics were concerned. The “offensive” was still 
paramount states Maurice Matloff.
77
 The “offensive” of Grant, Jomini, Mahan and Pershing’s 
protégés who are now running the American military has not changed in theory. And it is 
enhanced by further technological advances offered by airpower, the tank and other armored 
mechanized vehicles, support technology and vast industrial developments that affect all 
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aspects of warfare.
78
 Airpower, as applied to warfighting, of the time returned to the doctrine 
of total war, this time from bombers and fighter planes capable of destroying the enemy’s 
means of production and morale; where Sherman and Sheridan left off; Douhet, Hart, 
Mitchell, Goering and Arnold fought their parts of total war on the social, economic and 
industrial fronts.
79
 Airpower had an ancillary role in the area of combined arms being applied 
on the battlefield. Close air support for infantry and the new cavalry- the tanks and other 
armored vehicles, enhanced and extended the “offense” in its quest for rapid and decisive 
victory.  
The interwar years found the Marine Corps preparing for its role as an expeditionary 
and amphibious fighting force in the Pacific basin. The lessons learned by the British at 
Gallipoli were corrected by the success of the Germans at Albion. New tactics were developed 
to insure that beach invasions would not turn into American Gallipoli’s in the future.80 To 
further advance this seaborne capability of the Marine Corps a suitable landing craft had to be 
developed to get these Marines onto the islands that were to be invaded. It was through the 
efforts of then Lieutenant Victor Krulak that these issues were resolved. While stationed in 
China during the Japanese occupation Lieutenant Krulak had the opportunity to see the 
innovations and designs of the Japanese landing craft. Their designs and structure afforded the 
Japanese vessels the ease of getting to the beach as well as disembarking their forces and 
equipment in a more utilitarian way. Lieutenant Krulak studied and then stole the designs 
necessary for the Marine Corps’ landing craft development. In conjunction with Higgins Boat 
Company of Louisiana, they provided the Marine Corps with their “bridge to the beach.”81 
Coming back to the Marine Corps in World War II, this two front war for the United 
States gave the Marine Corps the opportunity to conduct the major effort in defeating the 
Japanese in the sea-land-air war conducted in the Pacific theater. Nothing had changed in 
respect to the dictums of General Grant for the American military in general and the Marine 
Corps in particular. The trinity of American doctrine, strategy and tactics for the Marine Corps 
                                                          
78
 John Shy, “Jomini” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter 
Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 182. 
 
79
Ibid., 183. 
 
80
 Robert Coram, Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U. S. Marine (New York: Little and Brown, 2010), 
67.  
 
81
 Ibid., 103, 60-103. 
 
35 
 
can be best expressed by a quote from Lt. Gen. H. M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith in support of the 
American Way of War:  
“..Since I first joined the Marines, I have advocated aggressiveness in the field and 
constant offensive action. Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no 
rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you..”82 
 
Lt. Gen H. M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith was the Commanding General, Expeditionary 
Troops: Iwo Jima.  
The Marine Corps’ war in the Pacific would be just like Belleau Wood in terms of 
KIA and WIA at places that were mere dots in the Pacific Ocean. This apparently would also 
provide other watershed events in the history of the Marine Corps fighting ethos and the 
American Way of War in general. Guadalcanal, Makin Island, Mananikau, New Georgia, 
Bougainville, Cape Gloucester, Tarawa, The Marshalls, Eniwetok, The Marianas, Guam, 
Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa provided the beaches that saw the Marines leave the 
sea and fight the American Way of War on land. This time, the cost for the Marine Corps at 
Iwo Jima involved Killed in Action (5,931; or 8% of the 71,245 Marines who had gone 
ashore), as well as Wounded in Action (17,372; or 24% of all WIA’s for the Marine Corps at 
Iwo Jima). All in all, of the 485,053 United States Marines deployed during World War II at 
total of 86,940, or 18% were KIA and WIA 19%. The costs again, for the Marine Corps were 
high as compared to the other services.
83
  
United States Marine Corps 1950:  
The war in the Pacific theater during World War II did see a strategic change that also 
carried over to the Cold War Korean Conflict. Under the leadership of General Douglas 
MacArthur, contact with the enemy was not as encompassing as that experienced in the 
European theaters of operation. General MacArthur bypassed numerous enemy strongholds to 
bring the war effort directly to the Japanese mainland as soon as possible.  
This strategic maneuvering came into play again in the Korean Conflict. The 
amphibious landing at Inchon had bypassed the underestimated North Korean forces that had 
gained the upper hand in the initial fighting for Korea. Prior to the Inchon landing, the U.S. 
Army had been pushed back to Pusan. The 5
th
 Marines were sent in to hold a defensive line. 
Instead the Marines went on the attack and were able to regain the territory that the Army had 
yielded to the North Korean forces recent advances. Once in motion, the American Way of 
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War took hold and the Marines led the way in its bellicose delivery to the enemy. After the 
initial landing at Inchon, the Marine Corps continued on the offensive driving deep into what 
is now North Korea. General MacArthur had underestimated the enemy and its support from 
there Chinese Communist allies. As Coram states, concerning the Battle of the Chosin 
Reservoir: 
 “.. [The Marines] for their actions during the breakout, and the survivors of that battle, 
the “Chosin Few,” stand with those Marines who fought at the ‘Canal and at Belleau 
Wood..”84  
 
The Marines, completely outnumbered, brought out their wounded, most of their dead, 
all of their weapons and equipment. Along the way the Marines inflicted at least 37,500 
casualties on the Chinese Communist Army while suffering 4,418 casualties themselves, as 
they reversed direction and left the Chosin Reservoir. The Marine Corps tenacity was only 
matched by their ability to carry the tenets of Ulysses Grant to another enemy with unlimited 
human assets, who were willing to die for a geopolitical belief. The Marine Corps would give 
them the opportunity to die in battle at Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, Wonsan, the Chosin Reservoir, 
Hagaru-ri, and Yudam to Hungnam. This added to the next chapter in the history of The 
Marine Corps and the American Way of War. Of the 74,279 Marine Corps deployed during 
Korean Conflict a total of 26,043 or 35% were KIA and WIA. The costs again, for the Marine 
Corps were high as compared to the other services.
85
  
United States Marine Corps 1962:  
The use of military force underwent considerable scrutiny because of the Cold War. 
Fears of nuclear Armageddon, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), coupled with the 
proliferation of these nuclear devices and their possible deployment changed the stakes of 
conventional warfare at the doctrinal level. The strategies of deterrence coupled with limited 
warfare and surrogates fighting in the name of host superpowers did not alter the actual 
battlefields per se.
86
 Vietnam was in some respects a continuation of the Korean War. The loss 
of the French to the Viet Min forces at Diem Bien Phu questioned the validity of conventional 
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total warfare in this high stakes game of geopolitics. Limited war and flexible response 
became the strategy to limit the growth and spread of communism for the west.  
The Marine Corps was still guided by the tenets of the American Way of War for the 
most part in Vietnam. All out Marine Corps warfare is an attritional, offensive-defensive 
concentration of force on force. It still seeks complete annihilation in an unrelenting manner 
on the battlefield and the home front. To now temper these aspects of an American Way of 
War, General Maxwell Taylor incorporated the following: 
 “..an enhanced readiness to fight limited wars and a … [added] strategy of flexible 
response..”87  
 
The Marine Corps adopted these aspects of Cold War warfare as well, and initially 
their entry into the Vietnam War was to stop the guerrilla warfare being conducted by Ho Chi 
Min in South Vietnam. The Marine Corps “flexible response” came in the form of advisors 
and the Combined Action Program squads inserted into a large number (90) of villages.
88
 Lt. 
Gen. Cushman viewed the Viet Cong insurgent forces as North Vietnam's operational center 
of gravity. He identified the South Vietnamese support of the Communists as the critical 
vulnerability to attack. Accordingly, he focused on small unit pacification efforts in the 
villages, believing that only the people of South Vietnam themselves could truly expel the 
Communists and eliminate the threat in the long term. The celebrated CAP program was a 
product of this approach. It was an outgrowth of the Marine Corps DNA in prosecuting the 
“Small Wars” strategy learned in the Caribbean and Central America.89 
As conditions escalated, the Marine Corps returned to the more conventional 
battlefields in South Vietnam when and where the enemy would try to engage the Marines. 
The American Way of War in Vietnam according to Russell Weigley:  
“..had given no place to static defense in American military doctrine if the means for a 
more active campaign existed; this fact goes far to explain the shift of the Marines’ role at Da 
Nang from defense of the airport to mobile counter insurgency within a fifty mile radius..”90  
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In my interview with General Gray he spoke about a maneuver warfare experience he 
created while on duty in Quang Tri / Cồn Tiên with the 12th Marines in 1967. Because of his 
prior experiences in the Far East, hill commander Maj. Gray experimented with an 
unauthorized application of maneuver warfare that proved successful at the time: 
“..So the Maneuver Warfare idea of course is not new per se and generally over time 
when you read about war and conflict and think about it and the like and every professional of 
course understands it and all that in Europe and how that grew it and in the 1800’s how we 
built tactical capabilities around the infantry regiment and all the countries adopted it all and 
that kind of thing, that’s a part of your schoolhouse along the way.  
And so we came up with a concept that every night I would move the whole unit. I 
generally was more of a believer in the Eastern philosophy of warfare and strategy and 
thinking and how I spent a lot of time out in the Far East and so I was more of a Sun Tzu kind 
of guy and all that, and the way they [the Chinese] did it and of course I had my experiences 
in Korea and so on and the use of intelligence through recon before I got commissioned.  
In Vietnam for example when I was a Commander at Gio Linh We were getting 
shelled every day up there Anyway, in April and May for example we took about 150 
casualties each month with all this incoming and I made them dig down and all that..  
You know I always believed that we could move as well at night as they [the North 
Vietnamese] could.  Of course my orders were that I couldn’t leave Gio Linh we had to stay 
right there and protect Gio Linh and so I really didn’t follow these orders because I think we 
had a better chance to protect Gio Linh if we are not killed or wounded, 
Except myself and a few people out of Gio Linh and I’d formed a mechanized task 
force and I put a different Marine Officer in charge and I’d give them the mission of going out 
between Gio Linh and here and there and move them around disrupting things if you will and 
setting up and continuing to fire all these counter-battery missions and counter-artillery 
missions in the southern part of North Vietnam militarized zone.   
So we did that throughout the month of June and we continued of course to get all this 
incoming into Gio Linh. I was there myself and a couple of people and so in June we only had 
4 slightly wounded and so I did that in June and early July.  So I kept that in mind, it had a 
little bit to do with the new thought process, moving around and all that kind of thing 
I didn’t call it that and didn’t realize that but I was actually using mission-type orders 
and stuff like that even then, go out there and tell what to do and not how we do it and all that 
kind of thing I was telling everyone underneath what they were doing and what to do if 
something went wrong and all that kind of thing and you have to understand for example on 
the 8 of May before we did this in 1967 We got severely attacked and we were basically the 
only outpost that could reach them [the North Vietnamese] it really well with artillery and 
direct support artillery and this and that and we fired about almost 4,000 rounds to help us 
survive that night.  I had some very strong feelings about these kinds of things..”91 
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Returning to its base wartime beliefs at such places as Da Nang, Operation Starlite, 
Nine Village Program, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Harvest Moon, Double Eagle, Operation Hastings, 
Operation Prairie, Operation Union, Tet Offensive, Khe Sanh I & II, Dong Ha, Con Thien and 
Hue City the United States Marine Corps became firmly re-ensconced in seek and destroy 
missions, offensive actions and concentration of force upon force efforts whenever the enemy 
chose to fight.  
As serious in nature as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima and the Chosin 
Reservoir, the battle for Hue City was the longest and bloodiest of the Tet Offensive for the 
Marine Corps. The battle lasted twenty eight days and a total of three Marine battalions and 
eleven ARVN battalions were eventually committed to retaking the city. The Marines lost 216 
killed and 1,364 wounded in action, while the ARVN lost 384 killed and 1,830 wounded. 
Heavy street fighting followed the Marines all the way through the city for more than three 
weeks. Marines of the 1
st
 an 5
th
 Regiments fighting alongside the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam’s 1st Division, and also supported by U.S. Army 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments 
drove the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces out of Huế City taking the city back one 
block at a time. 
Many of the Marines of Task Force X-Ray had little or no urban combat experience, 
nor were they also trained for urban close-quarters combat. And since it was monsoon season 
it was virtually impossible for the Marine Corps forces to use air support and combined arms 
methodology. Again, attrition took its toll as Marines fought building to building and block to 
block to eliminate the dug-in Vietcong invaders in the Tet Offensive of 1968.
92
  
The following two citations for the award of the Navy Cross are testament to the 
intensity of the fighting for Hue City:  
Cheatham, Ernest C., Jr. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps 
Commanding Officer, 2
nd
 Battalion, 5
th
 Marines, 1
st
 Marine Division (Rein.) FMF 
Date of Action:  February 3 - March 3, 1968 
Citation: 
The Navy Cross is presented to Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, 
for extraordinary heroism while serving as Commanding Officer of the Second Battalion, 
Fifth Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in the Republic of 
Vietnam from 3 February to 3 March 1968. During Operation Hue City, Colonel (then 
Lieutenant Colonel) Cheatham led his battalion in extremely heavy house-to- house fighting 
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against a numerically superior North Vietnamese Army force. Advancing through the city on 
4 February to assault the well-fortified Treasury Building/Post Office complex, his unit came 
under intense fire from concealed enemy positions. The enemy resistance halted the Marines' 
advance during two days of bitter fighting. Nevertheless, Colonel Cheatham remained 
steadfast in his determination to secure the enemy stronghold. Skillfully deploying a 106-mm. 
recoilless rifle squad into advantageous firing positions, he personally pinpointed the targets 
with M-16 tracer rounds and directed accurate fire on the enemy, which significantly reduced 
the pressure on his assaulting force. Completely disregarding his own safety, he joined the 
assaulting unit and aggressively led his men in routing the North Vietnamese from their 
entrenched positions. While proceeding through the city on 6 February, he organized his 
battalion for an assault on the enemy-held Provincial Headquarters Building. Ignoring the 
hostile fire all around him, he directed his men to covered positions while he fearlessly 
advanced to an exposed position from which he could locate the sources of enemy fire. 
Calling an Ontos forward, he directed effective suppressive fire on the enemy and then 
courageously led his unit as it continued the assault. Colonel Cheatham's dynamic and heroic 
leadership and his unflagging example inspired all who observed him and contributed greatly 
to the defeat of the enemy and to their subsequent withdrawal from the city. His dauntless 
courage and unfaltering devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps 
and the United States Naval Service. 
CHRISTMAS, GEORGE R. CAPTAIN, U.S. MARINE CORPS 
Company H, 2
nd
 Battalion, 5
th
 Marines, 1
st
 Marine Division (Rein.) FMF 
Date of Action:  February 5, 1968 
Citation: 
The Navy Cross is presented to George R. Christmas, Captain, U.S. Marine Corps, for 
extraordinary heroism while serving as the Commanding Officer of Company H, Second 
Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in 
connection with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On the afternoon of 
5 February 1968 during Operation HUE CITY, Company H was attacking a complex of 
buildings known to be an enemy strong point consisting of mutually supporting bunkers, 
fighting holes, and trench lines. During the ensuing fire fight, two platoons seized the corner 
building of a city block, but intense hostile small-arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rocket 
fire temporarily halted the advance. Realizing the seriousness of the situation and the urgent 
need to sustain the momentum of the attack, Captain Christmas, undaunted by the heavy 
volume of enemy fire, completely disregarded his own safety as he moved across thirty-five 
meters of open area to join the lead element and assess the situation. Returning across the fire-
swept area, he rejoined the remaining platoon, issued an attack order, and then ran seventy 
meters across open terrain, ignoring automatic weapons fire, hand grenades, and satchel 
charges striking around him to reach a tank he had requested. Braving enemy fire and two B-
40 rockets that hit the tank, he fearlessly stood atop the vehicle to direct accurate fire against 
the hostile positions until the intensity of enemy fire diminished. Immediately realizing the 
tactical advantage, he jumped from the tank, and directed his company in an aggressive 
assault on the hostile positions, personally leading his men in room- to-room fighting until the 
building complex was secured. In a large measure due to his bold initiative and courageous 
actions, he provided the impetus which inspired his men to aggressive action and enabled 
them to successfully accomplish the mission. By his dynamic leadership, unfaltering 
determination and selfless devotion to duty in the face of extreme personal danger, Captain 
41 
 
Christmas upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval 
Service.
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As in other conflicts mentioned, the Marine Corps paid a heavy price in terms of KIA 
and WIA during the Vietnam campaign. Of the 317,400 Marines to cycle through Vietnam, 
32% were casualties, with 12,962 KIA and 88,542 WIA.  
Vietnam is where the seeds were sown that grew into the evolution which eventually 
became the Marine Corps Way of War. It was here in Vietnam that Wyly, Webb and Gray 
were to begin the thought process of finding a “smarter way” for Marines to fight.  
United States Marine Corps 1983: 
In the years leading up to Iran Hostage Rescue, Lebanon and Grenada, the Marine 
Corps spent most of its time in reorganization and internal development restructuring and 
downsizing for the peace. Operation Eagle Claw, Lebanon and Grenada were the warning 
bells going off that affirmed that the Marine Corps was not ready on many levels to be the 
force in readiness or the first to fight for the United States and its interests abroad.  
While the Marine Corps was rebuilding, outside of the Corps there was a core element 
of disparate forces working in most cases unbeknownst to each other. In the long view these 
actors would aid in bringing about the institutionalization that would transform the Marine 
Corps into its maneuver warfare doctrine. 
In closing this chapter a point made by the 31
st
 Commandant, General Krulak captures 
the force majore of the maneuver warfare evolution. It is here ultimately that the successes in 
this area can be attributed: 
 “..Marines, of course, have always shone most brightly when the stakes were highest. 
The NCO's that led the bloody assaults on the German machine-gun positions at Belleau 
Wood intuitively understood the importance of their role.  
The Marines of 2
nd
 Battalion, 28
th
 Marines, who scaled the fire swept heights of Mount 
Suribachi, needed no one to emphasize the necessity of initiative.  
The Marines of the Chosin Reservoir, of Hue City, and of countless other battles 
through the years did not wait to be reminded of their individual responsibilities. They 
behaved as Marines always have, and as we expect today's Marines and those of the future to 
behave, with courage, with aggressiveness, and with resolve. The future battlefields on which 
Marines fight will be increasingly hostile, lethal, and chaotic. Our success will hinge, as it 
always has, on the leadership of our junior Marines. We must ensure that they are 
prepared..”94  
 
                                                          
93
 http://valor.defense.gov/Recipients/MarineCorpsNavyCrossRecipients.aspx. (Accessed April 2, 2014). 
94
 Charles Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," Marines Magazine, January 
1999,  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. (Accessed  December 20, 2013).  
42 
 
KIA / WIA Statistics for the USMC 1917 to 1991 
WAR 
TOTAL 
FORCE KIA % WIA % 
TOTAL 
CASUALTIES % 
WW I 
       US ARMY 4,057,101 50,510 1% 193,663 5% 24,4173 6% 
USMC 78,839 2,461 3% 9,520 12% 11,981 15% 
* USMC Combat 32,000 2,459 8% 8,907 28% 11,366 36% 
WW II 
       US ARMY 11,260,000 23,4874 2% 565,861 5% 800,735 7% 
USMC 669,100 19,733 3% 67,207 10% 86,940 13% 
* USMC Combat 485,053 19,733 4% 67,207 14% 86,940 18% 
KOREA   
      US ARMY 2,834,000 27,731 1% 77,569 3% 105,300 4% 
USMC 424,000 4,267 1% 23,744 6% 28,011 7% 
* USMC Combat 74,279 4,262 6% 26,043 35% 30,305 41% 
VIETNAM 
       US ARMY 4,368,000 30,963 0.7% 104,723 2% 135,686 3% 
USMC 794,000 13,039 2% 37,202 5% 50,241 6% 
* USMC Combat 317,400 12,926 4% 88,542 28% 101,468 32% 
DESERT 
STORM 
       US ARMY 782,000 98 0.01% 354 0.0% 452 0.1% 
USMC 213,000 24 0.01% 92 0.0% 116 0.1% 
* USMC Combat 92,000 24 0.03% 92 0.1% 116 0.1% 
CHART.
95
 * Note the two sources cited below are not in agreement due to the Total Force calculations. The 
Chart reflects worldwide forces CONUS and OCONUS during these wars in lighter print. Bold italic print 
represents all USMC forces in combat conditions only. 
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Chapter 2:  
The Congress, the Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare Doctrine: 
“..All the forces in the world are not as powerful as an idea whose time has come..” 
         Victor Hugo 
96
  
This chapter will focus on the beginnings of what some have incorrectly termed a 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); and its early introduction by this disparate group of 
“Reformers” coming from inside and outside of the Marine Corps. The term “Reformer” is 
ambiguous at best, but suffice it to say that we should keep the concept in place at this point of 
the dissertation simply as a general frame of reference. The term “Reform” had been applied 
by the media during this post war period. It was carried over concerning maneuver warfare in 
general; as well as for the Marine Corps during this time period. This time frame will run from 
the early 1970’s to 1986 and will cover the unofficial doctrinal, strategic and tactical 
implementation by the Marine Corps’ II MEF at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.97 
The concepts of maneuver warfare and its possible implementation by the U.S. 
military can be traced to four or five independent and somewhat unrelated sources working 
initially blind of each other’s efforts. All of these efforts were not from inside the military. On 
the contrary, the civilian sector can be credited with providing much of the initiative at first. In 
retrospect, a good analogy as to the birth of this reform or evolution into maneuver warfare is 
offered by the “prime mover,” Col. Michael Wyly (USMC, ret.) when he stated in this 
interview with the author that:  
“..The beginnings maneuverism were akin to a 20 gauge shot gun blast of 000 
buckshot hitting these targets of potential change..”98  
Each significant and compelling projectile sought out the center of the target that 
would in effect give birth to this perceived Revolution in Military Affairs within the Marine 
Corps. Rather than debate the “chicken or the egg” conundrum, suffice it to say that the Wyly 
shot gun blast of maneuver warfare projectiles each may have had different terminal 
velocities, yet they all hit the target dead center and in a fairly close time frame for this 
advancement of the use of maneuver warfare by the Marine Corps. There would be no 
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“Maggie’s Draws” on this target. The primary movers are Bill Lind, Colonel John Boyd - 
USAF, Brigadier General Al Gray- USMC and Colonel Mike Wyly- USMC. 
Starting with William (Bill) Lind, (working for Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft, and later 
working on the Senator Hart staff), Colonel John Boyd, USAF, Brigadier General Al Gray (at 
the time the Commander of the II MEF), and Colonel Mike Wyly (a Gray and Trainor 
confidant and instructor at the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School) were the 
independent and driving forces. They were aided by a cadre of Marine Corps officers who 
were considered the “Free Thinkers” that helped to start this mislabeled Revolution in Military 
Affairs.
99
 John Boyd, of whom it must be noted, was usually ignored or discounted in his 
scholarship within the U.S. Air Force as well as the Department of Defense when he ventured 
away from his specialty of fighter jet design and tactics. His biographer Robert Coram 
characterizes Col. Boyd as: 
 “..the founder, leader and spiritual center of this guerrilla movement within the 
Pentagon..” 100  
They all have different reasons that will be illustrated, but the end result is that it 
reintroduces, a German type way of maneuver warfare in general to both the U.S. Army and 
the Marine Corps. I use the term “reintroduce German maneuver warfare” because the fact is 
that the American military had a firsthand knowledge of these tactics, strategies and doctrine 
garnered by intelligence, and being under direct fire as the American military faced the Third 
Reich’s German army in both North Africa and Europe during World War II.101 
The military / political climate within the United States at this time reflected the 
somberness of the perceived yet unwarranted perceptions of the U.S. military failures of the 
Vietnam War. This initiative was joined with the economic responsibility of also rebuilding 
the Defense Department at this time. Ancillary to this and with the need to create a peace time 
military, Congress had the fiscal responsibility associated with this draw-down of strength 
levels to accommodate the American postwar practices of shrinking all branches to prewar 
levels or lower. It became the magnet that would attract the “revolutionists or maneuverists.” 
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The use of the term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not applicable as its original 
connotations did not really offer anything new in this development of general military history. 
And it would not pass the Michael Howard or Geoffrey Parker litmus tests for a true RMA. 
The term received significant traction and further general usage because of the press generated 
by the actions of the conservative Congressional Caucus and their need to move the country 
and its military back to a non-war footing socially, politically and economically.
102
  
William (Bill) Lind is the first of the five major actors in this development. It must be 
noted that he more than any other civilian in this effort contributed not only to the political 
aspects but to a somewhat lesser degree the historical military foundations of maneuver 
warfare. I also offer the fact that a protagonist like Bill Lind needed to justify his role as a 
Senate staffer in downsizing the military at this time. Lind latched onto this concept of 
rebuilding and downsizing the military and made it his raison d’etre during this period. 
Eventually Lind over stayed his welcome during the Krulak commandancy.
103
  
Lind did bring his knowledge of German military strategy and tactics to this debate. 
He also enhanced the concepts that would eventually become the modus operandi of this 
“maneuverist” usage; and the eventual doctrinal changes institutionalized by the Marine 
Corps. This should not be taken to mean that Lind was not altruistically motivated, nor was 
his ultimate intentions of self-promotion his only driving force. As the earliest public non-
military proponent, Lind’s transformational work helped set this in motion.104  
Upon his graduation from Princeton University, with a Master’s Degree in German 
history, Bill Lind finds work in the office of Senator Howard Taft III, as a staffer in 1973. 
Once ensconced into this powerful advisory role, Lind was able to get the attention of the 
Marine Corps. Lind parlayed the need for the Marine Corps to be responsive to this 
Congressional call for downsizing while maintaining its distinct role as soldiers from the sea. 
However, Lind did not have the same traction with the U.S. Army. As evidenced by the lack 
of the U.S. Army’s acceptance to change its doctrinal perspectives to implement the German 
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style maneuver warfare.
105
 The Marine Corps did not have that luxury. Lind’s pitch was that 
maneuver warfare if properly copied from the German schools would reduce the costs of 
fielding an infantry as well as saving significant human assets by producing fewer casualties. 
It also must be noted that the Marine Corps owed its modern existence to the Congress who on 
more than one instance kept the Marine Corps from being absorbed by its bigger partner in 
warfighting, the US Army. A number of presidents had also tried to disband the Marine Corps 
at various points in American history. Therefore the Marine Corps had to listen to, if not 
accept the fact, that the current direction of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus on the 
subject of military reorganization was paramount to its continued role as a key, stand-alone, 
unique military arm of the nation. Lind insinuated himself into the Marine Corps paradigm 
development playing the “senatorial or congressional” card. Lind’s demeanor and his hubris 
would eventually be the cause of his removal from this Marine Corps maneuver warfare 
development effort. Bill Lind and a few of the original developers (Boydians) to this day are 
the biggest critics of the Marine Corps’ evolutionary maneuver development program. 
The Congressional Caucus for Military Reform petitioned President Ronald Reagan to 
assist in these efforts to downsize the military while maintaining military effectiveness.
106
 
Under the leadership of the Congressional Representative from Georgia, Newt Gingrich, a 
letter was sent to the White House in 1982 outlining the problems facing the nation in this 
effort. In short the letter signed by the entire Caucus affirmed:  
“..Seeking the aid of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor and the 
President in reforming the “Pentagon bureaucracy so that military spending would fall in line 
with the post war downsizing plans of the Congress…” [The letter finally concludes with the 
plea] “…..to implement an action plan to adjust the military budget in spite of the fact that the 
Pentagon is the largest bureaucracy spender while cloaking itself under the banner of national 
survival..”107  
Congress knew its responsibility not only to the nation but also to the military in 
resolving this fiscal dilemma. The politics of this situation would eventually play out in favor 
of the military industrial complex in the macro; while bringing a codified and 
institutionalization of maneuver warfare into the micro world of the Marine Corps. 
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Prior to this missive to President Reagan a three day seminar was held at the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point New York. In June of 1982, Senior Conference XX took on 
The “Military Reform” Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment through the 
remainder of the Century. This conference focused primarily on how to downsize the Defense 
Department per the congressional mandate, while offering maneuver warfare thinking as a 
way to get a less expensive and lighter and more effective military for the Cold War. The 
attendees were representative of the factions that were in play that wanted, and or, did not 
want to adopt maneuver warfare while lessening the effects of attritional warfare on the armed 
forces. Of importance to this maneuver warfare work was the Marine Corps contingent that 
was in attendance, along with the Boydians and the likes of conservatives Newt Gingrich, Bill 
Lind and the other Congressional maneuver warfare advocates. The three day session 
concluded with a pronouncement by attritionist Gen. Edward C. Meyers. During his tenure he 
prosecuted an Army-wide modernization program with emphasis on quality over quantity. 
Meyers stressed the need for a long-term investment in land force materiel, and launched a 
unit-manning system to reduce personnel turbulence and enhance readiness. He was clear that 
the U.S. Army was not about to go in the direction of the maneuverist Marine Corps.
108
 The 
Marine Corps on the other hand, was well down the path to this sought after institutional 
change in their doctrine, strategy and tactics for its future role in warfare. The maneuverists’ 
efforts on all fronts then turned to the Marine Corps and its perceived move into maneuver 
warfare as an operational art. 
 While the wheels were moving politically on the congressional level to reposition the 
American military in general, others were working in the same direction and with the same 
perceived solutions during this time frame to recast the Marine Corps. General Gray, as 
mentioned, previously, had throughout his Marine Corps career been a student of military 
history with a penchant for the work of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu as it applied to 
military strategy and tactics. Foremost in his mind was the concept of keeping Marines on the 
tip of the spear while limiting the carnage and costs that was evidenced from the attritionist’s 
results of World War I, World War II, the Korea Conflict, Vietnam and the recent attack 
launched upon the Marines’ United Nations peace keeping forces in Beirut.109 
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During this time frame, the American Way of Warfighting doctrine was an emulation 
of the French synchronization model and the American penchant to pit might against might 
until an enemy was beaten into total submission and total unconditional defeat leading to 
surrender.
110
 General Gray came from a different perspective knowing that the Marine Corps 
had applied maneuver warfare in its “Small Wars” encounters successfully and also in the 
CAP program in Vietnam. It also had the disadvantage of being a smaller force in nature, as 
compared to the exceedingly larger U.S. Army. The Marines future role during the Cold War 
would pit it against the Soviet Union’s massive numbers in what would amount to a force on 
force attritionist meeting someplace in northwestern Europe.
111
 The Marine Corps needed to 
find a better way for General Gray’s outnumbered Marines to fight. General Gray was looking 
for the formula for future warfighting for a Marine Corps success in a possible Cold War large 
scale encounter. 
 Colonel John Boyd was another prime catalyst that provided the recipe for this 
formative development of maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps. Boyd was a formidable 
thinker, if not a profound military philosopher in his own right. Through a Socratic process of 
understanding success on the battlefield, Col. Boyd was able to bring to bear the concepts of 
his personal combat successes in what he termed his OODA Loop (Observe –Orient- Decide-
Act process).
112
 The OODA opened up the doors for understanding and how to apply 
maneuver warfare in combat. OODA went hand in glove with the German aspects of 
maneuver warfare, especially at the tactical level. The key element for Boyd as well as the 
others in the movement was not the academic knowledge garnered from the study, but rather a 
transformation of the practitioner’s thought process in applying the tenets embodied in and by 
maneuver warfare.
113
  
This would lead to the fluid adaptation of actions that would create the dynamics of 
pitting strength against weakness in tactical situations for the Marine Corps. The rate of speed 
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in which one cycles through the OODA, as opposed to his adversary will determine a 
successful outcome for the warrior using OODA Loop.  This was done by creating disruptions 
or mismatches within the opponent’s chain of command that became exploitable chinks in 
their armor. By rapidly cycling through the OODA process these mismatches enabled the user 
to pit his strength against an enemy weakness; especially if the enemy was seeking attritional 
warfare. Boyd’s work went further and deeper in this understanding as he developed other 
theses of this philosophy. Boyd took the OODA from a personal expression as a Korean War 
jet fighter ace into a universal warfighting treatise when he applied the theories of the OODA 
Loop to significant battles throughout western military history in his Patterns of Conflict.
114
  
This seminal work, Patterns of Conflict became the pivotal seminar that John Boyd 
would give over the years, to those interested in the fine points of maneuver warfare. Boyd 
had moved outside the box even before the cliché of “thinking outside the box” was put into 
the American lexicon. Eventually, General Gray heard the presentation. In fact before acting 
on it General Gray heard the presentation three or four times. With each presentation General 
Gray saw the values of this process of learning. Gray got nuance after nuance that reinforced 
the concepts of maneuver warfare and Sun Tzu. It was Col. Mike Wyly who introduced Col. 
John Boyd to General Al Gray.
115
 
 During this period Col. Mike Wyly was the Officer in Charge running the Amphibious 
War Fighting School at Quantico, VA. This was a key assignment for the movement’s growth 
and development. Here is where Col. Wyly permeated his maneuver warfare methodology at 
the captaincy level; here was his fertile ground.
116
 He was highly motivated by his two tours 
served in Vietnam. More than anything, Col. Wyly’s efforts were focused on making the 
Marine Corps more proficient at its job of warfighting, while offering Marines a better 
military toolbox for survival and success in combat. Col. Wyly confided in an interview with 
me that if he was ever given the chance to better the abilities of his Marines in combat he 
would be on the front lines of this effort. He would: 
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 “..Stand up and be counted….as he put it!..”117  
Colonel Wyly was deeply influenced by the death of one of his Lieutenants, Chip Pilkington.  
As stated by Colonel Wyly: 
 “..For this change I know what I don’t want and I will find a better way for the Marine 
Corps..”  
Col. Mike Wyly was given this opportunity.  
Although approaching the end of his career as a Colonel of Marines, and with no 
apparent support from his immediate senior officers, he began what became known as the 
“basement seminars.”118  It was made up of independent or “free thinkers” within the Marine 
Corps. In Wyly’s mind, he knew what was wrong with the current Marine Corps Way of War. 
He wasn’t sure what would make it better though until he discovered the precepts of the 
German Way of War; mixed with the Boydians philosophical tenets applied to maneuver 
warfare. Something needed to be done and the philosophical aspects that gave the German 
military the proverbial leg up and early success’ in World War II warranted further study, with 
possible adaption by the U.S. Marine Corps, according to Col. Wyly.
119
  Colonel Wyly’s 
academic foundation was also in the area of European history with a focus on the German 
military. 
The real work of making this a practical reality can be found in the younger Marine 
officer cadre of this post-Vietnam era who gravitated to Colonel Wyly. Here I refer to the 
other would be “free thinkers” within the Marine Corps. They looked at themselves as 
independent thinkers who were looking for better ways to be successful on the battlefield. Per 
Mike Wyly:  
 “..It was not [Gen.] Gray getting ideas and feeding them down. It was Gray having the 
wisdom to listen and encouraging his "troops" to think for themselves, [and to] have ideas, 
and send them up. We did just that. Gray learned from us. Not the other way around. And 
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that's the beauty of his [Gray’s] leadership. I doubt that he himself can explain it. I can. I was 
there..”120  
This in effect is the beginnings of this monumental work that mushroomed into a 
synthization from the Marine Corps past, into its future as smarter warfighters of a Cold War 
tomorrow. The “free thinkers” were the writers of articles, the compilers of lessons learned 
and the real gravitas that brought the concepts of maneuver warfare to the forefront that 
General Gray and Colonel Wyly envisioned. This bottom up approach taken by General Gray 
has its roots in the fact that General Gray started as an enlisted Marine when the Korean War 
broke out. In all of my observations of General Gray this fact has always been a constant. 
General Gray was a bottom up Marine – a “Mustang” who became the 29th Commandant of 
the Marine Corps. A Marine who takes care of other Marines: 
“..As many as you can for as long as you can..”121 This is still to this day an Al Gray 
mantra!  
Col. Wyly has recalled that the following was the exact chronology of how the process 
of bringing a new thought process into the Marine Corps developed around, and by the 
support for the “Al Gray Bubbas” as they came to be disparagingly recognized. They were 
Marine captains, majors and colonels. Both Col. G. I. Wilson and Col. Bill Woods concur 
with Col. Mike Wyly that they were at the center of this early development emphasizing the 
use of maneuver warfare applications as then young Marine captains.
122
  
Wyly stated the following to me in an e-mail: 
 “..I think as I already told you how it came about. I will repeat here the story in brief, 
perhaps with a couple of details I did not relay to you first iteration: 
1. Gen. Gray, when he was a 1-star, [was] already known as a clear-thinker with an 
open mind, heard out the John Boyd brief.  
  
2. Gen. Gray gets [his] second star and takes command of 2ndMarDiv. 
 
3. One of my young maneuver warfare zealots in my “Den” (Conference Group) at the 
Amphibious Warfare School, then Captain W.A. “Bill” Woods, receives orders to 
report to 2
nd
 MarDiv on graduation from AWS. 
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4. Woods and I see enormous opportunity for putting maneuver warfare into practice. 
Our plan: Woods to go to Gray in person when he gets down to Camp Lejeune. 
 
5. Woods goes to Lejeune and allies himself with then Capt. G.I. Wilson, USMCR, 
long-time friend of Woods and already discovering maneuver warfare via Woods. 
 
6. Woods and Wilson prepare an after-work “ambush”, [at the] Camp Lejeune O Club 
and close in on Gen. Gray when he walks into the bar. They sit down together and 
talk Maneuver Warfare [with him]. 
 
7. Subsequently Gray establishes the “2nd Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Board,” 
Woods and Wilson are prominent members. 
 
8. Maneuver Warfare concepts are tested via 2ndMarDiv field exercises. Wilson and 
Woods are key scribes. Gray, in typical “one of the Marines” fashion, is never 
bashful about inserting his own words in the draft [Gray’s Maneuver Warfare 
Manual]. 
 
9. Then 3-star CG, FMFLant (I can’t remember his name) comes to lecture at AWS 
while then Lt. Col. Mike Wyly (me) is still Head of Tactics. Via a question from a 
captain / student about maneuver warfare, the 3-star quips about it, is honest enough 
to say he doesn’t really understand it, leaves room for students to think it’s a bunch 
of nutty ideas if they want to, and finishes his response by saying “I’ve got a 
division commander down there [Lejeune] who says he’s doing it.” (Laughter from 
students). 
 
10. I’m thinking “This is serious”. So, I contact Gen. Gray and make all the 
arrangements to get him up to AWS as guest speaker. My goal: to make captains 
realize this is something that is really happening out in the real Marine FMF. 
 
11. Gray comes, raises the ire of my boss by coming straight to my little office on the 
2
nd
 deck, bypassing the corner-office of my boss on the 1
st
 deck, Col. Don Hodgen. 
Then he (Gen Gray), from the platform before all the students, makes it clear to the 
captains, this is happening and this is serious. I continued to invite Gen Gray to 
speak at AWS which he does. 
 
12. Maneuver warfare exercises continue at CLNC as long as Gray is CG and via after 
actions and notes, the Maneuver Warfare Manual takes form. 
 
13. Gray takes over FMFLant – meets Jim Webb then SECNAV [Webb had served 
under Wyly in Vietnam. Wyly writes Webb up for the Medal of Honor which gets 
knocked down to a Navy Cross. Webb a firm believer in Wyly’s judgment is guided 
by Wyly’s perceived USMC changes in warfighting. Webb wants the USMC to be 
led by a “warrior.” Wyly confirms that fact that Al Gray is a warrior.]  
 
14. Al Gray is appointed the 29th Commandant. The rest is history..”123 
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The 2
nd
 Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Manual was compiled by members of 
what Gen. Gray dubbed the “Maneuver Warfare Board”, which, before presenting itself to 
Gray called itself the “Maneuver Warfare Study Group.” Bill Woods, G. I. Wilson, John 
Schmidt and other key members, all officers ranging from captain through lieutenant colonel, 
decided on their own to start compiling their ideas in writing.
124
 This initiative was not Gen. 
Gray’s but theirs. What they appreciated greatly was the “long leash” that Gen. Gray gave 
them. Gen. Gray, himself, often referred to what was going on as “free thinking.”125 Gen. 
Gray was not tied to the term “Maneuver Warfare” though he did name the Board that. But 
what he wanted them to do was think freely! And they did. Bill Woods when interviewed told 
me how Gen. Gray used the term “free thinking tactics” more than he did “maneuver warfare 
tactics.” Woods also affirmed that neither John Boyd nor I [Woods] were enamored with the 
maneuver warfare term, either.
126
 Bill Lind coined it and used it consistently; it must be noted 
that the negative connotations associated with “maneuver warfare” were more directed at the 
messenger and not the content.
127
 Lind had managed to alienate most of the senior leadership 
within the Marine Corps because of his caustic and abusive behavior of those he lectured at 
while introducing the principles of maneuver warfare.
128
 Suffice to say that Bill Lind was his 
own worst enemy in selling these ideas to most of the professional warfighters. Lind, having 
never been in the military at all; and was perceived to have no standing in this arena.
129
 Other 
academics such as Martin van Creveld fared better at acceptance because of their less than 
condescending approach.
130
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The maneuver warfare notes, which were to eventually be referred to as a “manual”, 
were written by MW Board members, according to their MOS’s. Bill Woods wrote both the 
infantry part and the recon part. In addition, there was an artillery part, a tank part, a logistics 
part (by Captain Denny Long), etc. Bill Woods served in the Division and on the Board from 
June 1981 through October 1982. When he left he considered the “manual” to be an 
unfinished product. 
In October 1982 the project was passed to his successors. General Gray never wrote 
any of the parts nor did he edit or oversee them. After all, he wanted “free thinking” and that’s 
what he got. The book was the brain child of the “evolutionist” captains.131 The work is 
seminal and far exceeds anything that was published by the Marine Corps. The work was to be 
a mind opener and expander for understanding how to implement maneuver warfare. The 
emphasis was that there are many actual tactics and the choice of implementation is guided by 
the commander’s intent (Mission Orders).132 When combined with John Boyd’s Patterns of 
Conflict and, with the proviso that there are no set formulae, the captains and majors must 
make choices that are bracketed by the fluid situations in front of them so as to achieve 
success in regards to the commander’s intent.133 
Very early in the formative days of Marine Corps maneuver warfare and just after the 
somewhat institutionalization of it by the 2
nd
 MARDIV under then Brigadier General Al Gray 
an international incident prompted President Ronald Reagan to use military force to quell a 
Caribbean insurgency. The situation required the rescue of one thousand American citizens 
who were caught in the middle of a Grenadian coup d’état. Operation Urgent Fury was 
launched just two days after the Marines suffered its highest one day death toll since World 
War II in Beirut, Lebanon. Of significance is that the Marine Corps Commanding Officer for 
this operation, Major General Ray Smith was an early supporter of maneuver warfare. The 
then Lt Col. Smith’s beliefs in regards to maneuver warfare were:  
“..To me, at least, the real issue [of Maneuver warfare] was that your mindset should be 
to know as much as you can about the enemy and to, as much as possible, attack him where he 
weakest not where he is strongest….I personally came to the deep conviction that attack of the 
enemy in his weakness and in his mind as much as much as in his body…. Less waste of your 
own resources for sure, less carnage on your own part and less carnage to them….. The greater 
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likelihood of prisoners versus KIA's or surrender versus slaughter is without question the root of 
the argument in support of the maneuver argument.. ”134  
 
This would be a joint operation  shared by the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne and the Marine 
Corps Battalion Landing Team 2/8, 22 Marine Amphibious Unit, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic. At 
this point in the history of the American military, the U.S. Army was still deeply entrenched in 
attritionist doctrine. The Marine units from Camp Lejeune had begun to invest itself into the 
concepts of maneuver warfare. A single quote is offered as to the overall differences that were 
experienced by both the Army and Marine attacking forces in Grenada: 
 "..We've got 6,000 soldiers sitting on their ass in the airport, two companies of Marines 
running rampant over two-thirds of the island. What the [expletive deleted] is going on?.."
135
  
 
This was the first inkling that the use of maneuver warfare offered much more to the 
American warfighter in general than the attritional doctrines of the past.  
In my interview with Maj. Gen. Smith I asked if he was following mission type orders, 
his reply was: 
 “..Answer is I didn't have any commander's intent from anyone above me.  No one above 
me had adopted or utilized the commander's intent concept at that time. I had commander's intent 
in my orders.  But I didn't have commander's intent [i. e. maneuver warfare].  It was my 
command's intent, not anybody above me..”136  
 
Smith had the chance to put into practice the first modern maneuver warfare application 
for the Marine Corps under what appeared to be hostile conditions. Further Smith offers:  
 “.. So my premise was that we would achieve complete surprise in terms of operational 
[art], it would be a complete surprise.  We may not [have] achieved tactical surprise but we 
deployed with complete surprise and that the faster we could overwhelm the terrain and the 
people on it, the better it would be.  So my commander's intent was to have at last a fire team on 
every intersection in our zone within the first twenty-four hours.  Get there fast.  Straight out get 
there fast because we were going ….. Be a complete surprise and once we were there, we would 
dominate them, which we did…… the secret to our rapid success was the fact that we went in 
with the idea that speed alone would make all the difference..”137 
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The U.S. Army was doomed in this operation from the start doctrinally as Smith 
explained: 
 “..The 82nd Airborne which was the most agile, mobile element of the United States 
Army at that time was gathered on the airfield and getting organized for two brigades ….. A 
frontal attack on the highest piece of ground in Grenada with two brigades abreast. They spent a 
couple of days prepping to do that in spite of the fact that we [Marines 2/8 BLT] were already 
there and in place. ….. The 82nd were building up and preparing for two brigades abreast attack 
on a piece of high ground….already owned by the Marine Corps..”138  
For all concerned it must be noted that intelligence was nonexistent at best and or 
imaginary and completely false at worst.
139
 While Smith had deployed his assets he began 
working with the local populace to garner intelligence. In the best spirit of Marine Corps “Small 
Wars” he was able to identify those members of the local militia who had posed the real threat to 
Grenada. His chief source of intelligence was a local woman named “Mama.” She and some of 
the other Grenadians [Keith Carter and Biko Renwick] began to identify the militia, and Smith 
began to capture them.  
“Mama” eventually stated:  
“..These thugs,"….. They all referred to the battalion that was the [Grenadian] active 
army which was also the [political] party, it was everything.  They called them the "thugs."  All 
of the locals called them the "thugs.."  
140
 
 
She said: "..These thugs are put on their civilian clothes and they're walking right through 
you guys and when you leave, they will come back out and we will all pay the price for that.  
You need to get these people and get them off our island.. "
141
 
Smith asked if she would identify them and “Mama” agreed.  
In the process, the 2/8 BLT was able to capture Major Gillespie. He was the operations 
office-(J3) for the People's Revolutionary Army [the thugs]. Gillespie was well educated, well 
trained, and had a diplomatic tour as the Grenadian Defense Attaché in Cuba. In debriefing Major 
Gillespie it was found that he had actually had a map with him that was the Grenadian 
military/militia field dispositions. Under questioning he updated it to the man. General Smith 
later recalled that by the time he ended up going into the second island Carricou at the end, he 
[Gen Smith] had a list of the names of all of the PRA members on both islands. It identified 
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which ones were also members of the party down to the detail of fire team breakdowns. We had 
complete freedom of maneuver in our zone. We even had the locals deliver the militia’s weapons 
to the 2/8 BLT staging area at the “race track.”  
Then as Major Gillespie started getting more cooperative he (Gen. Smith) told me: 
 "..We did not expect you to land at Pearls. We thought you would land at Grand Ance 
Beach which is where the university was. Grand Ance Beach is the curve of beach that is 
between the city of St. George and Salinas Airfield.  The main campus of that medical school is 
the Grand Ance Campus. It was right there that's where they thought we would land, and 
according to Gillespie, their operations officer: "We thought if you did anything you would land 
at Grand Ance Beach and we were prepared to fight you there." “And I suspect they would have.  
"We did not expect you to land at Pearl and then we were unprepared for the speed of your 
movement, and you appeared at places we did not expect you to be and others.  And as I told my 
high command last night, we had no choice but to go into hiding until you left. And that's what 
Major Gillespie told me of the Grenadian reactions to 2/8 BLT’s maneuver warfare actions..” 
  Major General Smith went on:  “..Obviously the heart and soul of what we called 
maneuver warfare is trust in your subordinates.  It's supporting you.  If you're really going to 
exploit somebody's success, one, that junior officer has got to tell you and two, you've got to 
believe him and have enough trust in him to connect your forces to follow him. That's almost the 
heart of the maneuver warfare idea or as I interpreted it.  That to me, the real essence of 
maneuver warfare is the commander gets a call from an unexpected subordinate saying, "Christ, 
I'm behind “xyz” I've got a wide open gap to go past “xyz”…..And the essence of maneuver 
warfare is for the commander to one, get that report, two, believe in it, and three, commit his 
main effort behind it.  You can't do that if you don't have a cohesive unit that you have trust and 
confidence in each other Unit cohesiveness is absolutely essential if you're going to exercise 
maneuver warfare. Period!  If you don't have cohesive units, then maneuver warfare is not a 
viable operational philosophy. And from 1980 to 1984, three plus of those four years, three plus 
of those four years was I was in the 2/8 BLT..”142 
 It is at this point that one must recognize the simple aspects of commander’s intent, 
mission orders, subordinated trust, recce pull against gaps, rapid tempo and unit cohesion are the 
building blocks of Marine Corps maneuver warfare prosecuted by then Lt. Col Smith. 
 Bill Lind went on to praise Major General Ray Smith. Lind stated that:   ".. in which 
they [the Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team 2/8, 22 Marine Amphibious Unit, Fleet Marine 
Force Atlantic] did not follow a rigid plan but rather adapted swiftly to the circumstances as they 
changed.  The speed with which the Marines acted and moved decisively, for example the 
surrender of the Grenadian platoon that surrendered rather than fight because your forces appear 
where they were not expected, this convinced the Grenadian high command that resistance was 
hopeless.  Therefore, this is the best possible outcome of winning [using the tenets of maneuver 
warfare] without a fight..”143  
According to Smith, the Lind quote is in essence a paraphrase of what their operations officer 
told him.  
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Chapter 3: USMC in Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
             The new Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare played a role in the success of 
both Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The major issues concerning the use of the newly 
institutionalized maneuver warfare doctrine for the Marine Corps focused on the key tenets 
found in FMFM 1 Warfighting
144
 and FMFM 1-1 Campaigning.
145
 In particular the following 
areas were the main focus of efforts (Schwerpunkt) for these Marine Corps’ inaugural 
maneuver warfare applications: 
              1. Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships, 
              2. Shaping the battlefield; 
   A. Electronically, 
 B. Physically, 
 C. Psychologically. 
              3. Faints that identified gaps and surfaces, 
              4. Maneuver warfare logistical support. 
 
As a frame of reference for the U.S. Marine Corps’ actions in Gulf War I the following 
chronology hits the milestones that were significant in the overall operational aspects of the 
mission orders as they unfolded on the battlefields in Kuwait and Iraq: 
 
Chronology of major events and milestones for Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990:
146
 
2 August: the elite Iraqi Republican Guard crossed into Kuwait and began to converge on the 
capital Kuwait City with their special operations division. This was a two pronged action to 
gain control of the tiny oil rich kingdom of Kuwait. The Iraqi Republican Guard divisions 
eventually crossed the Kuwaiti border and began to converge on the capital Kuwait City; 
                                                          
144
 United States Marine Corps, Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1(FMFM 1) PCN 139 000050 
00, 6 March 1989. 
 
145
 United States Marine Corps, Campaigning, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1 (FMFM1-1) PCN 139 
000060 00, 25 January 1990. 
 
146 There are multiple sources used for the facts and details of specific battles and action taken by the 
US Marine Corps: Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 164, 
174-175, 271, 355-374,346-350, Edwin Simmons, US Marines: A History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2003), 286-311. Also ” U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991” With the 1st Marine Division in Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/gulf.txt. (Accessed, 15 May 2014). 
 
59 
 
coordinating their movement with helicopter and their special-operations division of the elite 
Iraqi Republican Guards units. The forces linked up and by nightfall the Iraqi forces had fully 
captured Kuwait and its capital, Kuwait City. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had been making 
numerous threats against Kuwait but this actual invasion and the magnitude of the invasion 
caught the world by surprise. For the United States the first priority became the defense of 
Saudi Arabia. Also, the disruption of Kuwaiti oil supplies were inflicting losses to the global 
economy and the disruption of Saudi oil supplies threatened to be disastrous for all the 
western nations. The Saudis concurred with President Bush (41) and their leadership 
overcame an established national antipathy by allowing foreign troops into the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
7 August: President Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia as part of a 
multinational force to defend that country against possible Iraqi invasion. A major 
deployment, the largest since the Vietnam War, was started for Operation Desert Shield that 
included major units from all four services. The U.S. Marine Corps forces rapidly began to 
move into Saudi Arabia. The initial forces had two F–15 squadrons that included: the 
Maritime Pre-positioned Squadrons 2 and 3, which were based on the islands of Diego Garcia 
and Guam; the two carrier battle groups; a brigade of the 82
nd
 Airborne Division and the 
Marine Corps I MEF; as well as an airborne warning and control system unit. The Secretary of 
Defense at the time, Richard B. Cheney, with the direction of President Bush, unleashed the 
most concentrated and complex projection of the American military power since World War 
II. Prior to full U.S. deployment Cheney sought the council of John Boyd to formulate the 
overall war plans. Boyd had three to four classified sessions with Cheney which in the 
estimate of Robert Coram set the tone for the use of maneuver warfare for Gulf War I.
147
 The 
initial missions of these forces were aimed at protecting Saudi Arabia as a whole, and also the 
Saudi oil fields from Iraq as well as to prevent further Iraqi aggression in other parts of the 
region. This eventually led to the removal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Here for the first time, the 
U.S. Marine Corps’ institutionalized maneuver warfare doctrine was put to its first real test in 
the modern battle-space against what appeared to be a battle hardened Iraqi army of half a 
million soldiers.  
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8 August: Major General Walter E. Boomer was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general 
and assigned as Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force. 
 
15 August: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps announced the commitment of 45,000 troops to 
the Persian Gulf area.  This deployment consisted of elements of the I Marine Expeditionary 
Force including units from 1
st
 Marine Division and 1
st
 Force Service Support Group (FSSG), 
3
rd
 Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and 7
th
 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Also 
enroute were elements of the 4
th
 MEB including units from 2
nd
 Marine Division, 2
nd
 FSSG, 
and the 2
nd
 Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). The Maritime Pre-Positioning Ship Squadron 2 
(MPS-2), dispatched from its normal anchorage at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean with 
enough supplies to sustain the 16,500-military force for 30 days. 
 
31 August: By this date the U.S. Marine Corps had deployed approximately half of the 
required 92,000 Marines to the Southwest Asia. At full strength, this would include 21 
helicopter squadrons, 24 infantry battalions, 19 fixed-wing and the associated command 
elements, combat forces, combat service support organizations and combat support. These 
forces were required to support a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) afloat in the Persian Gulf 
and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) ashore on the Arabian Peninsula, and two Marine 
Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) consisted of 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Marine Divisions (MarDivs), the 3
rd
 
Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and the 1
st
 Force Service Support Group (FSSG) that was 
ashore in Saudi Arabia. Also afloat with the Marine forces were the 4
th
 MEB, the 5
th
 MEB 
with the 11
th
 MEU embedded, and the 13
th
 MEU. The buildup of the Marine forces validated 
the Marines' maritime force (MPF) concept, with the Marines falling in on the equipment 
from the three maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS).
148
 In this regard, it provided the first 
credible ground defense capability in that area after the invasion of Kuwait. The idea of 
prepositioning military assets by the Marine Corps is a vital aspect of maneuver warfare in 
that the logistical tail required supplying, as well as supporting ground forces and aids in the 
shaping of the battlefield prior to any engagement. 
 
26 September: General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, addressed a 
detachment of Marines in Saudi Arabia while touring Marine positions there and meeting with 
                                                          
148
  Hopkins, ”U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991,” 22. 
  
61 
 
officials from Persian Gulf nations. He talked about a variety of topics ranging from relations 
with Arab countries to unit rotations, and challenged Marines to continue to do their jobs in 
the best way they knew how. It was the first visit to Southwest Asia during Operation Desert 
Shield for the Commandant. 
 
8 November: President Bush announced that he planned to add more than 200,000 U.S. troops 
to those already deployed in Operation Desert Shield in the Persian Gulf area.  When 
completed, this deployment doubled the number of Marines in the objective area, adding II 
Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) units from the Corps’ east coast bases and the 5th 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade from California. 
 
15-21 November: About 100 miles south of the Kuwait border, American and Saudi  
Arabian military forces participated in Exercise Imminent Thunder. The exercise included an 
amphibious landing by more than 1,000 Marines of the 4
th
 Marine Expeditionary Brigade and 
tested the military's ability to command, control, and coordinate air and ground forces. It 
included air-to-air mock fighter combat and close air support of ground forces. At the same 
time, only 25 miles south of Kuwait, another 1,000 Marines from the 1
st
 Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade conducted field exercises ashore. 
 
10 December: More than 24,000 Marines of the II Marine Expeditionary Force mustered on 
the parade ground at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for a pre-deployment review by the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet in the largest 
formation of Marines in modern history.  
1991 
 
12 January: After three days of debate, Congress voted President Bush the authority to go to 
war against Iraq. 
 
15 January: The V Marine Expeditionary Force (V MEF) was activated to assume missions 
and tasks assigned to I MEF prior to its deployment to Southwest Asia. V MEF was to form, 
train, and deploy units to reinforce and replace those employed in the Persian Gulf area. 
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16 January-Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm as forces of the allied 
coalition launched an all-out air assault against targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait in an 
effort to liberate Kuwait and enforce the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.   
 
29 January: The first serious ground fighting of Operation Desert Storm broke out when Iraqi 
troops mounted an attack into Saudi Arabia along a 40-mile front. Company and battalion-
sized Iraqi units centered their efforts on Khafji, a deserted port city, six miles south of the 
border. Saudi and Qatari troops, supported by artillery and attack helicopters from the 1
st
 
Marine Division and aircraft from the anti-Iraq coalition recaptured the town two days later.  
This, the Battle of Khafji, was a major ground combat action of the Gulf War  
 
5 February: The Secretary of the Navy authorized the involuntary recall of up to 2,000 retired 
Marines who had completed at least 20 years of active duty and who were under the age of 60.  
The retirees were to be retained on active duty for as long as deemed necessary. 
 
13 February: As of this date, the allied air forces had flown more than 65,000 sorties in Iraq 
and Kuwait, with a total of 28 planes lost in combat-19 from the United States and nine from 
allied forces. Of the 19 U.S. planes, four were Marine Corps aircraft-three AV-8B Harriers 
and 1 OV-10 Bronco. Marine artillery units, using 155mm towed and 8-inch self-propelled 
howitzers staged a series of nighttime artillery raids over the heavily defended border of 
Kuwait. 
 
15 February: Allied commanders estimated that 30 percent of Iraq's armor, 35 percent of its 
artillery, and 27 percent of its other armored vehicles in the Kuwaiti theater of operations had 
been destroyed by this date. 
 
24 February: The I Marine Expeditionary Force and coalition forces began a ground assault on 
Iraqi defenses in the final chapter of Operation Desert Storm. Located just south of the 
Kuwaiti border along the Persian Gulf, the 1
st
 Marine Division and the 2
nd
 Marine Division 
with its four main task forces-Ripper, Papa Bear, Taro, and Grizzly-stormed into the teeth of 
Iraqi defenses and convinced the defenders that it was the main effort of attack. Meanwhile, 
heavily armored allied forces attacked the Iraqi defenses in Iraq from behind. At the same 
time, Marine units of the 4
th
 and 5
th
 Marine Expeditionary Brigades afloat in the Persian Gulf 
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pinned down large numbers of Iraqi troops who expected an amphibious assault. In just less 
than 100 hours, U.S. and allied forces defeated the Iraqi Army.
149
 
 
28 February-Operation Desert Storm ended when the cease-fire declared by President George 
Bush went into effect. I Marine Expeditionary Force had strength of 92,990 making Operation 
Desert Storm the largest Marine Corps Operation in history.   
 
            In understanding the Marine Corps initial indoctrination of maneuver warfare the 
following two quotes help in this understanding of the mindset that was created by the  
“evolutionists” responsible for maneuver warfare’s institutionalization: 
“.. Remember maneuver warfare to me is a way of life….. And if you think that way, 
you're always [ready] it’s a six hour planning cycle.  It's the anticipating.  It's we're going 
to be ready to go.  And I think that's the strength of the Marine Corps..”150 
 
And; 
  “..War is not about physics, or pounds of steel, or targets. It's mental… It is two 
opponents trying to out-think each other.  He's [General Gray] said to me something that 
I've never forgotten is that it's good to trick the enemy….  There's nothing against the law 
about tricking your opponent…..And the whole idea of deception.  And every time you 
think of your opponent -- he actually talked about "the dark alley warrior”.…..Have you 
ever been in a dark alley and not known who's there but you got somebody behind you 
that makes you uncomfortable?....The dark alley warrior is always thinking about making 
his opponent uncomfortable and if you can make him or her so uncomfortable that they 
quit the battlefield without firing a shot, that's kind of what Sun Tzu said.  So always 
think how you're going to make your opponent -- …..Like in wrestling…..we talk about 
certain leverage to put your opponent at a disadvantage.  Little guys sometimes can pin 
much larger guys because they're good at that and that's how General Gray thought.  He 
called it…"fighting smarter.”.  And he says we really need to be thinking rather than just 
fighting.  The most valuable weapon we have is the brain.  The thinking warrior is always 
trying to figure out how you're going to trick the enemy, how you're going to put your 
opponent at a disadvantage, the dark alley warrior, makes him uncomfortable..” 
Major General Mike Myatt.
151
 
According to the U.S. Marine Corps’ FMFM-1 Warfighting152 manual, 
maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy which seeks to shatter the enemy's 
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cohesion through a sequence of rapid, unexpected, and violent actions which create a 
rapidly deteriorating and turbulent situation for the enemy with which they cannot 
cope. Therefore, it is more than evident that all of the Marine Corps actions during the 
Persian Gulf conflict fit this definition in every major and minor action. In essence 
there are four separate aspects that exemplified the new doctrine first begun fifteen 
years before this massive Marine Corps military action.  
The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), II Marine Expeditionary Force (II 
MEF), and the amphibious forces poised to launch a beach landing and the logistic tail 
all deceived the Iraqis with regard to the place of attack as well as its psychological 
operations that affected the enemy's will to resist. The coalition elements moved 
quicker against the Iraqi army than they had expected. The Iraqis were caught off-
balance with no opportunity to respond effectively to the Marine Corps’ subsequent 
actions in the Kuwaiti Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR). By the use of rapid 
maneuver and superior firepower support, the division had threatened the Iraqi 
commanders with encirclement of Kuwait City and Al Jahrah. When the Iraqis tried to 
escape, their fleeing movement was turned into a rout by the Marine Corps’ timely and 
decisive actions. 
It is now more than twenty years since the events that surrounded the invasion 
of Kuwait by forces of Saddam Hussein in August 1990; as well as the subsequent 
U.S.-led coalition that eventually ejected the Iraqis from this small oil producing 
nation. It was the first time the United State was openly and directly involved in 
sending major land forces to the Persian Gulf region. The success of those endeavors, 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, renewed the assertiveness and the 
confidence of the United States military and its projected foreign policy in the Near 
East. At first, Desert Shield entailed containing a resurgent Saddam Hussein and then 
eventually in Desert Storm dealt with the aftermath of driving the Iraqis back into their 
own country. The U.S. Marine Corps played a significant role in both operations and 
as evidenced by its exclusive use of maneuver warfare to shape its battle space, which 
would in effect, become the Marine Corps Way of War. 
  
The United States established a coalition of nations to defend Saudi Arabia from 
further Iraqi aggression as well as to rid Kuwait of the Iraqi military takeover. These 
operations were later christened “Gulf War I.” The mission was twofold: to protect Saudi 
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Arabia - Operation Desert Shield, as well as to expel the Iraqi military forces from Kuwait – 
Desert Storm. This was the largest deployment of U.S Marines since the Vietnam War. The 
Marines of the 7
th
 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) had begun arriving in Saudi Arabia 
by late August, accompanied by equipment and other personnel of I Marine Expeditionary 
Force (I MEF): the First Force Service Support Group; the 3
rd
 Marine Aircraft Wing; and the 
1
st
 Marine Division. The Marines were reinforced by units from the III MEF as well as the 4
th
 
MAW and 4
th
 MarDiv (reservists) and other individual augmenters and Marine Reserve 
elements.  
 In less than 100 hours, the allied forces and the U.S. military defeated the Iraqi Army 
in Kuwait and at home. This culminated in what was to become a decisive victory with very 
few American casualties. The United States Marine Corps accomplished its missions in hours 
not the expected days. The unit commanders of the I MARDIV and II MARDIV attribute their 
rapid success to the tenets found and utilized in FMFM-1 Warfighting.
153
 This operation for 
the Marine Corps provided a medium to study and improve the abilities of its Marines to 
integrate combined arms with the other services in various joint operations while utilizing its 
new, or in reality, codified and institutional “renewed” doctrine of a Marine Corps’ maneuver 
warfare applications.  
Operation Desert Storm began 16 January 1991 and was marked by the initiation of 
the air campaign that was launched against the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait. By the end of 
August 1990, the U.S. Marine Corps had deployed approximately half of the 92,000 Marines 
to Southwest Asia. At full strength, this would include 21 helicopter squadrons, 24 infantry 
battalions, 19 fixed-wing and the associated command elements, combat service support 
organizations and combat support. These forces were required to support a Marine 
expeditionary unit (MEU) afloat in the Persian Gulf and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
ashore on the Arabian Peninsula, and two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) consisted of 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 Marine Divisions (MarDivs), the 3
rd
 Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and the 1
st
 
Force Service Support Group (FSSG) that was ashore in Saudi Arabia. Also afloat with the 
Marine Corps forces were the 4
th
 MEB, the 5
th
 MEB with the 11
th
 MEU embedded, and the 
13
th
 MEU in reserve. The buildup of the Marine forces validated the Marines' Maritime Force 
(MPF) concept, with the Marines falling in on the equipment from the three maritime 
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prepositioning squadrons (MPS).
154
 The idea of prepositioning military assets is a vital aspect 
of maneuver warfare in that the logistical tail required supplying, supporting ground forces 
and aids in the shaping of the battlefield prior to any engagement.
155
  
On 15 January 1991, the Marine forces were preparing for combat. The reinforcement 
numbers that had been directed by the President had been long accomplished with the closure 
of the additional forces from the II MEF from North Carolina, as well as the arrival of the 5
th
 
MEB from southern California. The I MEF command post had moved to Safaniya and the 1
st
 
MarDiv was then positioned around the northeast portion of the MARCENT AOR.
156
 The 1
st
 
FSSG established forward supply bases at Kibrit and Ra's al Mish'ab while continuing the 
offload at Al Jubayl. The 2
nd
 MarDiv occupied the northwest portion of the AOR. The 3
rd
 
MAW supported I MEF, which provided a 24-hour combat air patrol station F/A-18’s, and it 
was moving its tactical air control facilities to the north to Al Mish'ab.
157
 The 4
th
 MEB afloat 
had completed highly publicized amphibious exercises while in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates, and was strategically located to effect an amphibious invasion of 
Kuwait. I MEF was under the command of Brig. General “Mike” Myatt.  
The Marine Air-Ground Forces (MAGTF) was deployed around the world and was not 
limited to amphibious operations only. They were capable of projecting sustained, as well as 
combined arms combat power that was ashore so as to conduct a wide range of missions. 
MAGTF is essential to the protection of the national security interests; as well as the 
projection of power that may be required in the post-Cold War environment by the Marine 
Corps.
158
 The other card that General Gray played focused on the use of maneuver style 
doctrine and tactics. This in and of itself would play out better than expected. General Myatt 
qualifies this over all thinking of the Marine Corps as it applied to Desert Storm: 
“..An organization that's got decentralized decision making that doesn't have a common 
understanding of the commander's intent can actually come apart at the seams …...  He [Myatt] 
said orientation -- making the decision once after you observe what the enemy is doing, then you 
                                                          
154
  Hopkins,” U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf: 1990-1991,” 22. 
  
155
 Charles C, Krulack, Operational Maneuver from the Sea: A White Paper (Washington, DC: 
HQUSMC, PCN 145 00000100, January, 1996), 12. 
 
156
 Myatt and Keys, Interviews with the author. 
 
157
 Gordon and Trainor, 276. 
 
158
 General Robert Magnus, ACMC USMC (ret.), Telephonic interview with the author, September 27, 
2011. 
 
67 
 
orient yourself, you orient your command, you make the decision to interact as fast as you can.  
The orientation -- you have to have a common understanding of the commander's intent.  So what 
we did in the Gulf War, getting ready to go into Kuwait, is that we spent hours making sure 
everybody understood the commander's intent..”159 
 
 Operation Desert Shield, was executed as planned by the Marine Corps, the 1
th
 and 7
st
 
Marine Expeditionary Brigades which were to be deployed by air, taking virtually nothing 
with them but their individual equipment and arms. It was expected that their heavy supplies 
and equipment would have been brought to the AOR by Maritime Prepositioning Force. Each 
squadron was loaded with 30 days of supplies and most of MEB's combat equipment. Thirteen 
preloaded ships together with civilian crews were eventually dedicated to this deployment. 
These ships were not a substitute for the amphibious ships but rather, they provided an 
enhanced and sustainable assault capability. General Myatt added the following insight which 
puts the MPS in proper perspective:  
  “..The Army lands with about ten rounds of ammunition and three days of 
rations.  They come in in late August, we're [USMC] in mid-August and over here are the 
MEF ships.  All the Marines gear on it, ammunition, fuel, equipment to make water and 
all that.  The Army is back here 82
nd
 Airborne; they're back in the rear.  They were going 
into Jubal the third day there and trying to buy fast food because they were running out of 
food.  They don't have much ammunition.  These MEF stores fed all the Marines, 24
th
 
MEF and the 82
nd
 Airborne and then the 101
st
 when they came in until they could get 
their own logistic chain going.  The MPF ships were the thing that was a godsend..”160 
 
 On the East Coast, the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) which consisted 
essentially of the 2
nd
 Force Service Support Group and the 2
nd
 Marine Division was based at 
Camp Lejeune. The 2
nd
 Marine Aircraft Wing was based at the Marine Corps Air Station, 
Cherry Point in North Carolina. The II MEF called itself the "Carolina MAGTF." They bore 
the imprint of General Gray's time as the Commanding General of the 2
nd
 Marine Division 
from 1981 to 1984, and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT) 
from 1984 to 1987. On 9 December the movement of the fly-in echelon (FIE) began and was 
set to continue until 15 January at the rate of approximately 1,000 Marines per day. There 
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would be two more Marine Expeditionary Brigades together with a special-operations-capable 
Marine Expeditionary Unit that would be afloat thus, offering a very powerful landing force 
for any unexpected amphibious operations if required.
161
  
The 2
nd
 Marine Division had not been operationally deployed since World War II. 
Major General William M. Keys was the Commander of the 2
nd
 Marine Division. When the 
ground offensive started, the Iraqi ground forces had remained in defensive positions in the 
KTO. The Iraqi front line units that included the 14
th
, 7
th
, and 29
th
 Infantry divisions in the I 
MEF zone as well as the 19
th
 Infantry Division offered sporadic resistance. These forces were 
eventually bypassed (the idea of knowing when, or when not to give battle, is a key element in 
maneuver warfare), withdrew or surrendered.
162
  
The Iraqi artillery units fired at the Coalition forces during the ground offensive and 
were not very accurate. The Iraqi army appeared to fire on various known points, but did not 
follow targets. Deserters and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) who crossed the Saudi border 
just before the ground offensive began complaining of poor sanitation, poor morale, the lack 
of water and food.
163
 The Iraqis were disorganized, scattered and by mid-afternoon, the 
number of EPWs had increased significantly.  
This illustrated: 
1. The breakdown of communications with higher headquarters,  
2. The Iraq's weak battlefield intelligence capabilities,  
3. The success of the Marine Corps in achieving maneuver warfare’s element of 
surprise.  
 
On 25 February the second day of ground combat, the I MEF continued to attack on 
zone thus advancing in the face of the moderate resistance. The 1
st
 MarDiv began on a line 
forward of the Burgan oil field. An immediate response to a division artillery time-on-target 
fire mission targeted suspected enemy assembly areas, and enemy armor. Close-quarters battle 
ensued and played out involving all elements of the division. The division finally prepared and 
consolidated to clear the enemy from the Al Jaber airfield. The 1
st
 MarDiv captured more than 
2,000 enemy prisoners of war and destroyed 100 other vehicles as well as 80 enemy tanks.  
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The 2
nd
 MarDiv began south of Al Abdallya and attacked north towards an area called the "Ice 
Cube Tray."
164
 Due to the artillery prep fires, many enemy prisoners of war began streaming 
toward the division lines. 4,500 enemy prisoners which included a brigade commander and an 
Iraqi general officer were captured and 248 tanks were destroyed. The 3
rd
 MAW flew greater 
than 460 sorties which destroyed 52 tanks, striking elements of 6 enemy divisions,6 artillery 
tubes, 9 armored personnel carriers as well as additional FROG and AAA sites. The 1
st
 FSSG 
continued to move prisoners to the rear and push supplies forward to I MEF forces. General 
Charles Krulak who was the driving force of the USMC logistics tail had leap frogged ahead 
of the ground forces and set up a resupply FOB about 45 kilometers into the AOR. He has 
stated that:  
“..the success of maneuver warfare as practiced in the Gulf War I by Generals Boomer, 
Keys, Myatt and myself…maneuver is not just to be focused on the combat forces…what 
enabled I MEF to do what it did was also attributed to the maneuver of the combat support 
and combat service support units. It is a “package deal..”165 
 
The 4
th
 MEB which was aboard Task Force 156 shipping was ordered to demonstrate 
important pre landing activity in the vicinity of Ash Shuaybah in order to support ground 
operations ashore. On 25 February using several deception activities, the naval gunfires from 
the 4
th
 MEB’s helicopters, and an amphibious demonstration was underway. This caused the 
Iraqis to focus their attention to the east and they fired off two Silkworm missiles towards the 
Marines offshore. The Iraqis then directed a few more divisions into positions that were along 
the coast and ordered another division north to provide reinforcements as a response to the 
assumed amphibious assault by the Marine Corps. This faint exposed the strengths of 
maneuver warfare and Marine Corps planned deceptions by creating gaps in the Iraqi defense 
that were easily exploited by both the I MEF and the II MEF.
166
  
Future Commandant James Conway was off shore, he offered the following 
reinforcement on this issue of deception: 
   “..I was part of Keys' division but I was also 4th Brigade.  We deployed on the 
17
th
 of August aboard ship.  So we went to the Gulf War early.  We were there about 
eight or nine months or so total.  But we were the amphibious force at sea that was ready 
to go into Kuwait City or wherever they sent us and essentially we never did land.  So I 
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had a chance to see grown men cry when the war kicked off and we're still out there 
threatening, tying down divisions but not getting ashore and doing any maneuver..” 167 
In reality this diversion was a key element of Maneuver Warfare which enabled the 
Marine ground forces to totally envelop the Iraqis when the hostilities commenced. The off shore 
faint by the 4
th
 Brigade pinned down four Iraqi divisions thinking that this was the Marines Corps 
“storied” main approach. 
After replenishing and refueling during the night into the early morning hours, the I 
MEF continued to attack north on 26 February. Their objectives were the Al-Mutl'a Pass and 
Kuwait International Airport. The I MEF had advanced with the 2
nd
 MARDIV and attacked 
into the northwest towards Al Jahrah while the 1
st
 MARDIV turned towards the Kuwait 
International Airport. As the 1
st
 Marine Division stepped off in the attack on 26th February, it 
immediately ran into Iraqi T-72 tanks. This was the result of a cloud of smoke from the 
burning oil wells restricting their visibility. Bad weather had combined with the oil well fire 
smoke and minimized visibility. From this darkness, there emerged two Marine AH-1Ws that 
flew at ground level. Marine Hellfire missiles had quickly eliminated the threat of these Iraqi 
tanks.
168
  
The 2
nd
 MARDIV began the attack at 1200. The (U.S. Army)Tiger Brigade, 67
th
 
Armor was in the lead and was supported by USMC and USAF aircraft with 3
rd
 Battalion, in 
joint operations smashed its way to the northwest of Al-Jahrah, thus destroying the remaining 
Iraqi resistance as well as cutting off further Iraqi retreat.
169
 On 27 February at 0330, the 1
st
 
MARDIV finally seized Kuwait International Airport. The I MEF reports reflect that more 
than 70 armored vehicles and 250 tanks were destroyed. By 27 February, the I MEF had 
secured all its assigned objectives and now awaited the arrival of JFC-N and JFC-E, which 
was to liberate Kuwait City. The honor of liberating Kuwait City was left to the Arab coalition 
partners once the Marine Corps finished off any Iraqi resistance.
170
  
On 27 February, the 2
nd
 MARDIV in the I MEF sector began the fourth day of the 
ground war. At around 0500, Tiger Brigade troops made contact with the Egyptian units and 
then four hours later, the JFC-N passed through the 2
nd
 Marine Division. The 2
nd
 Marine 
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Division remained on Phase Line Bear and Al-Mutl'a Ridge
171
 until the offensive operations 
ended at 0800 28 February. The final day of the ground offensive found the I MEF in a 
defensive position outside Kuwait City. In 2
nd
 MARDIV, the 8
th
 and 6
th
 Marines spent the 
previous night planning to attack Al-Jahrah in order to seize the Kuwait military bases held by 
the Iraqis which were in the area, as well as secure the northern road. When these offensive 
operations eventually ended, the Marines again remained outside the city so that the Arab 
coalition partners once again were given the credit for the liberation.
172
 
               On 24 February 1991, the 1
st
 Marine Division entered south Kuwait. They began the 
ground offensive aimed at ending the Iraqi occupation. The successful breach of the first 
obstacle belt had triggered a timed sequence of attacks by the coalition forces that were 
arrayed along the northern border of Saudi Arabia. The 1
st
 Marine Division attack followed 38 
days of allied air attacks. The ground offensive swept almost everything in a bloodless 
campaign. As stated above the Marines were given 100 hours for their coalition forces to 
remove the Iraqi army and recapture Kuwait.
173
 Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, 
commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force, selected the 1
st
 Marine Division to lead 
the attack. The division had been in the field since the advent of Operation Desert Shield and 
the units had many months in the desert training and rehearsing for the foreseen ground war 
against the Iraqi Army. The sentiments of Lt. Gen. Boomer are to be found in his step-off 
letter to the 1
st
 MarDiv: 
 After months of preparation, we are on the eve of the liberation of Kuwait, a small, 
peaceful country that was brutally attacked and subsequently pillaged by Iraq. Now we will 
attack into Kuwait, not to conquer, but to drive out the invaders and restore the country to its 
citizens.  In so doing, you not only return a nation to its people, but you will destroy the war 
machine of a ruthless dictator, who fully intended to control this part of the world, thereby 
endangering many other nations, including our own. We will succeed in our mission because 
we are well-trained and well-equipped; because we are U.S. Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and 
Airmen: and because our cause is just.  Your children and grandchildren will read about your 
victory in the years to come and appreciate your sacrifice and courage. America will watch 
her sons and daughters and draw strength from your success.  May the spirit of your Marine 
forefathers ride with you and may God give you the strength to accomplish your mission. 
Semper Fi. Boomer 174 
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The Marines of I MarDiv under the command of Major General Myatt were therefore 
physically, professionally, and psychologically ready. After the start of hostilities, the 1
st
 
Marine Division had the chance to prove its capabilities in the series of deception operations, 
artillery raids, screening operations, and combined arms raids, that finally made the division 
the first unit to bring the ground war to the Iraqi army.
175
 The AOR border provided many 
ambiguous operations and or artillery raids that were designed as part of the Marine Corps 
shaping of the battle field.
176
 The I MEF deception aimed at confusing the Iraqis as to the 
intentions and position of the allied forces. There were 12 combined arms artillery raids. On 
21-22 January 1991 saw the first raid which was an attempt aimed to silence an Iraqi MLRS 
battery that was positioned near Khafji. The subsequent raids happened on the 26th and the 
28th January, and then on 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 19, 20, and finally the 22nd February.  
The preparations of the raids began 24-48 hours prior with a raid force planning cell 
that was formed to develop the support and targeting requirements. The division selected a 
target and then requested air support while the raid force was planning the assembly areas, 
tentative firing positions, routes, and checkpoints. During the raid, the raid force would depart 
in sufficient time for all the elements to be in their firing positions by nightfall. Immediately 
when the raid commander declared "ready to fire!" and the air support and airborne forward 
air controllers were on station, the battery fired on the designated targets and then withdrew 
under the covering fire from the support battery. The Iraqis were confronted by Marine 
defense of the border posts thus they began to retreat back to Kuwait after the dawn 
engagement with Company A which brought the Iraqis under fire.
177
 For a few hours, the 
Marine companies called in artillery and air strikes on the withdrawing Iraqis.  
The Iraqi air force remained grounded, leaving the ground attacks without benefit of 
air cover. The unsupported assaults did not put the Marines under pressure to force the 
division to reveal the tactical deployment of its units. General Keys, General Boomer and 
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General Myatt, saw the attack as a positive event since it influenced the planning for the allied 
offensive.
178
  
The Iraqi soldiers were poorly trained, ill led and unmotivated. The Iraqi defenses 
were not as formidable as the U.S. Marines had originally believed.
179
 The attack showed the 
American commanders that there was a gap in the air surveillance of the battlefield that was 
sufficient enough to allow a sizable armored force to be able to move to the border without 
being detected; and that gap was immediately pressed. The Marine Corps was exposing the 
surfaces and gaps that they would exploit by the use of maneuver warfare.  
General Myatt further discussed the effects of the initial recce pulls and probes prior to 
G-Day:  
“.. What we had was Iraqi Artillery positions …..  Exact coordinates.  There would be a 
battalion of artillery.  They had 1,200 artillery pieces in the Iraqi's front lines facing us and 
combined between the First and Second Division the Marines had 240 artillery pieces.  The 
Marines' heavy artillery is mobile and since we knew where they were at night -- and remember, 
we're still back here closer to Iraq than we were to Kuwait, but we moved up closer and we 
would take a battery of self-propelled artillery -- we still have self-propelled -- the battalion 
commander ... would take the battery of his self-propelled artillery, we gave him a light armored 
infantry company for security in the LAI and in that task force we would have what we called a 
Rat Pack, a pack of techies and that kind of worked as our jammers.  Because when it started, the 
Iraqi's had three different kind of ground surveillance radar.  They could see us and if they could 
see us moving, they would shoot at our positions....  So we would take the  EA6B's and we were 
jamming Iraqi radar, they would move up to some pre-known position, fire artillery, if you know 
exactly where you are and know exactly where the target is, you get almost first round capability 
most of the time. So with GPS you know exactly where you are and the EA6B’s would tell us 
exactly where the Iraqi artillery was.  So we take that battery of artillery up there and we would 
be jamming the radar.  They didn't know where we were.  And then we would fire a battery of six 
on that Iraqi artillery position and then we would tear off in to the night and as the jammer and as 
these people started leaving, the Iraqi's would pick them up on their radar, then the Iraqis would 
start firing at them and we would have an airborne assault... as soon as they saw the Iraqi artillery 
flashes firing at us, they would then eliminate them.  Why is that important?   Because then we 
know the guns were manned.  We did this, I think, six or seven different ways and what we were 
trying to achieve was screwing with their minds that whenever they heard Marine artillery they 
would hunker down rather than return fire….  and it worked..”180 
 
On 21 February (G minus 3), all the elements of the 1
st
 Marine Division had already 
completed their movement to attack positions on the opposite side of the Saudi berm. Each 
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task force began immediate reconnaissance and screening actions upon arrival at their sectors. 
Within hours, the forward observers called in air and artillery strikes on the nearby Iraqi 
units.
181
  
The 2
nd
 Marine Division also conducted a diversion with its LAI battalion. Though 
previously intermittent, the fighting between enemy units and the 1
st
 Marine Division 
continued across the division's front until seizure of the Kuwait International Airport that 
occurred seven days later. To cover their movement, on 21 February, General Myatt had 
requested the 3
rd
 Battalion, 12
th
 Marines, to fire 24 rounds at an Iraqi position near the 
minefield. He felt confident that the earlier weeks of the artillery raids had conditioned the 
Iraqi forward units to expect any harassing fire at uncertain points along their line. The Iraqi 
artillery then responded with a single volley which impacted about 100 meters in front of an 
observation post of the 2
nd
 Battalion, 7
th
 Marines. This appeared to be more a reflex action by 
the Iraqis.
182
  
Task Force Taro was the second task force to be located near the Saudi berm by 21 
February. Before moving to their sites, the battalions threw up several outposts aimed to 
destroy or turn back any Iraqi patrols that could have come into Saudi Arabia. Gen. Myatt 
further moved his antitank platoon HMMWVs along the berm as a precautionary measure 
against any enemy reconnaissance efforts. 
The 2
nd
 Marine division was now close to the Kuwaiti border and ready to begin the 
preliminary offensive operations. On 27 January 1991, several days after arrival of the last 
elements, the division issued Frag Order 007 which ordered an artillery surface raid that was 
intended to destroy the selected targets across the border in the "agricultural area." The 
artillery surface raid was successfully conducted by the 5
th
 Battalion, 10
th
 Marines. Batteries R 
and Q armed with Ml14 8-inch and M109A1 155mm self-propelled howitzers which were 
selected as the firing units. The 2
nd
 LAI Battalion was to provide security and screening.
183
 
The aim of the artillery surface raid was three-fold. It was aimed to first develop an 
offensive spirit in the division's units and secondly to destroy the targets chosen; a truck park 
and logistics site. Third, and most importantly, was to measure the enemy's reactions to the 
raid thus gauging the Iraqi’s ability to detect as well as to counterattack the division. 
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Throughout the fire mission, no attempt had been made by the enemy to return fire.
184
 As a 
result; the 2
nd
 Marine Division began to take the measure of the enemy through the first 
combat mission that gave the impression of Iraqi inability to bring artillery fires against the 
division.
185
  
The division was planning to move into final assembly areas by the end of January, in 
preparation for its role in offensive operations which were assigned by the original MEF 
operational plan. The MEF established a deception unit, Task Force Troy to serve as an 
additional precaution in order to mask the disappearance of the division from its sector and 
had a special deception capacity which emitted the electronic signature of a division. This was 
meant to appear like the 2
nd
 Marine Division was still operating in the original area.  
The division's forward CP personnel led the quartering party and were accompanied by 
representatives of the Tiger Brigade, the 8
th
 and 6
th
 Marines, the 2
nd
 Reconnaissance Battalion, 
the 2
nd
 LAI Battalion, and members of the CP were scouting the division's new zone, Al 
Khanjar. There they met with members of the 1
st
 Marine Division. 24 February 1991 had been 
set for G-Day. In order to have the entire division in its positions to conduct pre-assault 
operations and final maintenance, General Keys ordered the move be completed by 19 
February.
186
 
On 29 January the 2
nd
 Marine division engaged in its first skirmish of the war. Reports 
came to the division's combat operations center (COC) that large groups of Iraqi armored 
vehicles and tanks were moving below the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, heading south. These groups 
were reported at various points along the fronts of 2
nd
 Marine Division, the Eastern Province 
Area Command (EPAC) and 1
st
 Marine Division. Other reports came from the Observation 
Posts 2 and 4 which was located close to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border that the enemy armored 
vehicles were entering the division's zone. Due to the forward movements of the 1
nd
 and 2
st
 
Marine Divisions which were in preparation for the offensive operations, these Observation 
Posts were manned by elements of the 1
st
 Force Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1
st
 Marine 
Division. The Marine Corps forces at OP 2 engaged the enemy first bringing the column 
under TOW missile fire as well as calling in several air strikes.
187
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Company C, the 2
nd
 LAI Battalion had already engaged 29 armored vehicles, and the 
2
nd
 LAI Battalion had reported that it was engaging enemy armored targets as well. This was 
actually the first 2
nd
 Marine Division's ground combat kill during the Operation Desert Storm. 
The 6
th
 Marines, responding to an earlier inquiry by General Keys who was concerned that the 
enemy could break through into the division's zone, stated that it could have a battalion of 
tanks and an infantry battalion ready to move in thirty minutes. The Tiger Brigade that 
consisted of 1
st
 Brigade, 2
nd
 Armored Division was given an order to provide one company in 
order to move forward so as to defend the Marines Direct Support Group.
188
 
Offensive Operations: 189 
The 2
nd
 Marines division's offensive operations had begun several days before G-Day, 
which was the opening day of ground attack by the Marine Corps forces. On 17 February 
1991, 2
nd
 Reconnaissance Battalion moved its teams to the insertion points in the Saudi berm 
which was in preparation for entering Kuwait. The 2
nd
 Reconnaissance battalion was fulfilling 
the division's mission of conducting surveillance and reconnaissance of the area forward of 
current defensive positions which was in preparation for the offensive operations. General 
Keys' intent was aimed at identifying any gaps or weaknesses in the enemy defenses and if 
there were any enemy units south of the breach so as to enhance the Marines breaching 
operation by their absence.
190
  
The battalion moved up to the berm on the night of the 17th and all its units were in 
their assigned positions by the 18
th
. It was also realized that the Marines had to operate in a 
small area of operations that was now occupied by major elements of Iraqi army; they could 
not use current methods such as helicopters for the extraction and insertion of teams, due to 
the strong enemy antiaircraft artillery. Therefore, Keys motorized his companies to be more 
effective in his AOR. Reconnaissance teams had six men of whom three were mounted in a 
High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) which was armed with a .50-caliber 
machine gun. The other three were mounted in a HMMWV with communications gear. On the 
night of 17 February, four reconnaissance teams walked over the berm. They moved to their 
initial positions, and then proceeded into Kuwait on the 18th. Two more teams crossed and 
occupied the positions of the earlier teams so as to act as a radio-relay for the Marines who 
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were farther forward using high frequency radios with limited range. Two teams were set up 
on the berm itself so as to provide an over watch for the operation and were equipped with 
long-range electrical optical systems. The 6
th
 Marines were to provide an extraction force for 
all the reconnaissance teams.  
Another battalion crossed the berm prior to the G-Day. The attack order had assigned 
the 2
nd
 LAI Battalion to screen the division's flanks and front on the Kuwaiti side of the berm 
which was to start on G minus 3 on 21 February. The battalion was tasked to locate another 
breach site for Tiger Brigade in the Northwest and attempt to identify any gaps in the obstacle 
belt. The importance of the alternate breach site was that it would permit the Tiger Brigade to 
move the heavy armored power around the division's flank as well as to help to pull the 
remainder of the division through when required. The 2
nd
 LAI Battalion was in contact with 
the enemy within an hour of beginning its operation. Mortar fire was received, and a 
HMMWV carrying a low-altitude air defense team that was attached to the battalion received 
a direct hit.
191
  
Company C operated on the northwest flank of the battalion and it was preceding the 
other companies in the battalion movement into the Kuwait AOR. The actions of Company C, 
the 2
nd
 LAI Battalion were illustrative of the entire battalion. The company's mission was 
aimed at seizing the key terrain which was overlooking the obstacle belts and the enemy's 
positions. The company's attack was aggressive and violent so as to draw attention to it and 
also away from the division breach sites. The company's attack was expected to draw fire 
from the Iraqi mortars and artillery and to expose them to the counterbattery fire of the 10
th
 
Marines. The attack exceeded expectations. After crossing the border, Company C came under 
considerable mortar fire, artillery, and antitank barrages. Many weapons were firing and 
counterbattery program proved it was inadequate to service the available targets. Company C 
withdrew until the fire support took the desired effect. Shortly thereafter, Company C returned 
to the attack maneuvering to assault the flank of Iraqi forces which were in the minefields. 
Company C advanced under continuing antitank fire and artillery to the edge of the minefield; 
it classified the mines, and also identified a gap for possible use by the Tiger Brigade. 
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Company C maneuvered aggressively and also exploited Iraqi weaknesses for about two 
days.
192
 By 23 February which was G minus 1, Company C had killed numerous infantry with 
supporting and organic arms and destroyed about eight wheeled vehicles and 10 tanks. The 2
nd
 
LAI Battalion reported information on enemy activities, equipment and troops. Operating 
almost continuously under indirect fire, antitank, and rocket, the battalion's companies 
engaged the enemy tanks, troops and artillery, on at least 17 occasions, using close air support, 
organic antitank weapons, and artillery fire from the 10
th
 Marines. During the three days, the 
battalion accounted for numerous enemies KIA, the destruction of 35 tanks with air strikes, a 
further 12 enemy tanks, and the capture of 120 EPWs.  
Of even greater significance was the activity by the LAVs which had the desired effect 
which was drawing the enemy's (Iraqi) attention away from the actual area of the division's 
assault as well as the breach. The 2
nd
 LAI Battalion's operations were also significant because 
the Iraqis began using their artillery against it. The battalion frequently came under heavy 
artillery and mortar fires in a continuous contact with the enemy for three days. The casualties 
from enemy fire were light and the enemy disclosed the locations of batteries to the Marine’s 
counter-battery radar. Using artillery and air, the 2
nd
 Division was fully able to put the 
numerous Iraqi artillery pieces out of action even before the G-Day assault. This was of 
utmost importance because if they had remained undiscovered, these weapons could have 
caused the division heavy casualties as it went through the breach.
193
 
The positioning of the artillery units that were forward of the maneuver elements 
which they were about to support seemed to violate all doctrine with regard to the 
employment of the artillery at first glance. It however, made proper tactical sense. The 
intelligence had already reported that the Iraqi brigades to the division's flanks and front could 
reach the area of the breach with approximately five hundred guns. Many of these guns had 
out-ranged the 10
th
 Marines' M198 155mm howitzers since their range was a little over 30 
kilometers when using the Rocket-Assisted Projectiles (RAP). In order to ensure that the 
assault elements had accurate, timely and responsive fire support, it was worth taking the risk 
to move the artillery ahead of the maneuver units. A measure of security was provided to them 
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by the 23
rd
 Marines, the 3
rd
 Battalion, and 2
nd
 LAI Battalion, in the screening positions to the 
division's flanks.
194
 
By the end of G Day, the desert was filled with the sounds of combat. By 0430, the 
division's artillery preparation fires had already begun. There were flaming MLRS rockets as 
well as tracers of the Iraqi anti-aircraft fire. 1,430 rounds were fired against 40 targets in 
approximately 11 minutes. The targets were artillery positions which received heavy attention. 
In effect, the Iraqi battery positions were then fired on by a Marine battalion with dual-
purpose improved conventional munitions. The MLRS battery fired on four targets that were 
deep in the division's zone. Air strikes were also run against targets on Phase Line Red.
195
 
 At 0530, H-Hour, the lead elements of the 6
th
 Marine Regiment eventually crossed the 
line of departure and then followed the colored lanes that were assigned to its battalions. The 
6
th
 Marines had intensive training and preparation in the few months prior to their 
deployment. The regiment had the task of leading the assault through the Iraqi defensive lines 
as well as widening the gap on the other side of the second minefield in order to allow the rest 
of the division to be able to be pulled through. They had carefully rehearsed their role prior to 
the first day's battle. It had constructed a training range and also oriented on the azimuths 
which the assault battalions would follow in the weeks prior to the battle. Personnel were 
schooled in the use of the electronic navigation aids and a detailed fire support plan was 
prepared. The 6
th
 Marines closed on the first of the obstacle belts. At 0600, the 6
th
 Marines, 1
st
 
Battalion, reached the minefield. By 0615, both the 1
st
 Battalion, 8
th
 Marines and 2
nd
 
Battalion, 2
nd
 Marines, were reported to have arrived at the edge of the obstacle belt in lanes 
Green 5 and 6 and Blue 3 and 4. The work of the special engineer unit attached to the 6
th
 
Marines, Task Force Breach Alpha, began. The enemy's defensive belts consisted of wire 
obstacles and two minefields which were noted in the intelligence reports developed by the 
Marine recon units. The task force was well-equipped with sixteen M60A1 tanks with track-
width mine plow and 2 M60A1 dozer tanks, 4 armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLB), 39 
M58 line-charge trailers, 4 M60A1 tanks with mine rakes, 18 AAV's with M154 three-shot 
mine-clearing line charges, 15 M9 armored combat earthmovers, 22 AAVs for the engineer 
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squads, and 6 M1A1 tanks with mine plows in order to accomplish its task.
196
 
 In preparation for attack, the 6th Marines ran several air strikes on the "ICE-CUBE 
TRAY." This exposed a built-up area that contained a large concentration of dug-in Iraqi 
tanks and bunkers. Another regimental TOT was fired into the center of the "ICE-CUBE 
TRAY” by the 10th Marines to serve as an additional assurance against disruption from this 
area. A final issue that had to be resolved before the division moved off was the location of 
the eastern boundary of their AOR. The 2
nd
 Marine Division which was consolidated along 
Phase Line Red was some kilometers ahead of the 1
st
 Marine Division which had not yet 
captured the Al Jabir airfield. The previous boundary ran about one and a half kilometers west 
leading south from Kuwait City to Al Jaber placing the road within the 1
st
 Marine Division’s 
zone.
197
 
The I MEF staff was eager for 2
nd
 Marine Division to seize its objective at Al Jahrah as 
the 1
st
 Marine Division began its move. This was critical since the reports that came in the 
morning indicated that the Iraqi forces were withdrawing back to Iraq. The intelligence reports 
as well as Kuwaiti resistance said convoys were forming in Kuwait City and were moving 
through to the Mutlaa Ridge and Al Jahrah area.  
General Keys had convinced Lieutenant General Boomer, the commanding general of 
the I MEF, to order the 2
nd
 Marine Division so as to perform its separate breach of the Iraqi 
defensive lines. This separation of the II MARDIV’s had produced a considerable end result 
with only six killed in action, and 38 wounded Marines. The light casualties serve to enhance 
the value of the victory that was won by the division which includes: high training and morale 
of the Marines, soldiers and sailors as well as it being fought properly on all levels: tactical, 
strategic and operational. Sometimes, the real and effective lessons learned are those that 
reaffirm the principles by which wars have always been won. Thus the lesson to be garnered 
from the 2
nd
 Division is that the execution of campaign is a validation of the training and 
thought that was developed by the Marine Corps over the years and punctuated with the use of 
maneuver warfare tenets that were now installed as Marine Corps doctrine.
198
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 According to General Keys, maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in regards 
to everything in combat, the ultimate goal which is the actual destruction of the enemy. He 
perceived this as the province of the division and higher-level echelons. Maneuver warfare 
enables the commanders at all levels to fight smarter than their opponents. This contributed 
greatly to the division's accomplishments. The 2
nd
 Marine Division played a significant role 
with regard to accomplishment of the strategic mission which was freeing Kuwait from its 
occupation by the army of Iraq. The swift movement of the 2
nd
 Marine division alongside the 
1
st
 Marine Division through Kuwait led General Schwarzkopf to order the early advance of all 
other coalition forces.  
“..All those who served in the 2nd Marine Division during Operation Desert Storm are 
justly proud of their role, contributions and efforts to the final victory. It is an honor to serve 
though assisting in the liberation of a nation in this case Kuwait from tyranny is a privilege 
that is only accorded to few stated General Keys in his final assessment of this maneuver 
warfare victory for the U.S. Marine Corps..”199 
 
A post war assessment of the Marine Corps use of maneuver warfare was offered by a 
Maneuver Warfare plank holder, Lt. Col. G. I. Wilson when he states:  
“.. Gulf war’s operational art used tactical events (i.e. battles, engagements and the 
refusal to join battle) to strike directly at Iraq’s strategic center of gravity. The idea was to win 
strategically without resorting to a prolonged ground war….it was a matter of deciding where 
and when to fight and where and when not to fight….[Marine Corps] war winning operational 
art [maneuver warfare] centers on a decisive outcome quickly without  visiting the butcher 
shop of a nasty ground war. The application of the operational art and correct identification of 
Iraq’s strategic center of gravity proved central to the [Marine Corps] maneuver style success. 
The refusal to enter the ground war prematurely let the [Marine Corps] planners shape the 
operation and focus on winning the war at the highest possible level – the strategic 
level…..Baghdad was much more than a geographic location on a map. It was the nerve 
network and infrastructure of the Iraqi’s political military organization. By throwing strength 
against weakness, allied air against Iraq’s weak air and air defense, Iraq’s command, control 
and communications were effectively erased…..loss of the ability to communicate and 
exercise command and control at the highest levels prevented Iraq from coordinating the 
defense of the Saddam Line and counterattacking…….also this served well in shaping the 
ground war’s actions by [the Marine Corps]…..the quick in and out artillery raids by the 
Marines preempted Iraqi efforts…..the Iraqis were in severe trouble because the Marines were 
inside their (Iraqi) decision-making cycle [OODA Loop]….. it was also integrated  and 
sequenced to throw Marine strength Iraqi weakness in the ground campaign….the Iraqi static 
defensive position played into the double dilemma of either staying put [making them 
                                                          
199
 Keys, Telephonic interview with the author.  
 
82 
 
vulnerable targets from maneuver from the west, south and the sea]….if they abandoned the 
static defense they’re vulnerable to the devastating air and artillery attack..”200  
 
Lt. Col. G. I. Wilson was one of the original developers of General Gray’s “fighting 
smarter.” Maneuver warfare had now become the doctrine of “fighting smarter” and the 
battlefield tested doctrine of a Marine Corps Way of War.  
 While interviewing General James Mattis for this paper I asked him to share his 
personal thoughts about his actions during Desert Storm as it applied to the now 
institutionalized maneuver warfare utilized by the Marine Corps. Per General Mattis’ 
statement on this topic:  
 “.. Yes, no doubt about it ….. [And] as they put out the doctrine series it was just gobbled 
up.  They [Marine Corps] couldn’t print them fast enough from war fighting to strategy and 
campaigning to tactics to logistics and all were adding to the body of understanding of how it all 
came together.  You didn't just fight with the ground ... element of maneuver warfare, you fought 
it also with the air element, with the logistics fight, your command and control system was set up 
that way, like I said, for command and feedback.  So as we got further into it and the years went 
by, during the Gulf War it was clearly [employed]  I was in Mike Myatt's First Marine Division 
as a battalion commander, and one of his regimental commanders was a guy named Carl Colfert 
who had been with General Gray in General Gray's regiment and all at Lejeune, and so once 
again when I'm a battalion commander and I commanded one of the assault battalions to open the 
way into the obstacle belts into Kuwait, my regimental commander, my division commander 
were adherents to this [fighting smarter] This was the way we were going to fight.  So ... freedom 
was left to us, we were given mission type orders, we knew what we were going to do. We 
rehearsed the basic maneuvers to the point that I don't think over about three or four days of 
fighting I had to give more than a couple of tactical orders the whole time.  The battalion was so 
well trained and Colonel Colfert's regiment was so well trained ... that it was just a matter of 
maneuver and I / we had in those days ... batteries and I don't think I ever had fewer than sixteen 
artillery tubes firing for me as 3-11 maneuvered its artillery on its own.  Nobody was telling them 
what to do; the artillery units picked them up and moved them as was needed.  And yet I 
constantly have had -- I think it was fifty-five ... on the day we broke through to Kuwait City and 
the artillery guys were there lock, stock and barrel maneuvering ... artillery like it was self-
propelled and getting us through there.. “201  
 General Myatt in true maneuver warfare leadership found himself so advanced that he 
was surround by the Iraqi’s while in his command post. According to General Myatt the rounds 
were zipping through the Command Post. Captain Eddie S. Ray, Commanding Officer, 
Company B, 1
st
 Light Armored Infantry Battalion, Task Force Shepherd, realized that I 
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MarDiv commander needed help. Captain Ray’s actions during the early morning hours of 
G+1 of Operation Desert Storm earned him one of only two Navy Cross’s awarded during 
Gulf War I. The following is a brief account of Captain Ray’s action:  
 “..An Iraqi mechanized division counter attacked elements of the 1st Marine Division, 
in the vicinity west of the flame and smoke engulfed Burgan Oil Fields in Southeastern 
Kuwait. As dense black smoke shrouded the battlefield, an Iraqi mechanized brigade engaged 
the 1
st
 Marine Division Forward Command Post security forces. During the ensuing intense 
ten hour battle, Captain Ray repeatedly maneuvered his Light Armored Vehicle Company in 
harm's way, skillfully integrating his Light Armored Infantry weapons, reinforcing TOW's, 
and AH-1W Attack Helicopters to decisively defeat main the Iraqi counter-attacks. Leading 
from the front and constantly exposed to large volumes of enemy fire, Captain Ray led swift, 
violent attacks directly into the face of the vastly larger enemy force. These attacks shocked 
the enemy, destroyed 50 enemy Armored Personnel Carriers, and resulted in the capture of 
over 250 Iraqi soldiers. Operating perilously close to the attacking enemy, Captain Ray's 
courage, composure under fire, and aggressive war fighting spirit were instrumental in the 
defeat of a major enemy effort and the successful defense of the Division Forward Command 
Post.” (Captain Ray created his own mission orders knowing General Myatt’s intent and then 
proceeded to prosecute them in the form of maneuver warfare required to defeat this 
enemy.)..”202 
 The final assessment of the use of maneuver warfare application by the U. S. Marine 
Corps can be found in The Annual Report to the President and the Congress from the then 
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney in 1992 which also acknowledged this Marine Corps 
doctrinal change. Again as stated above, SECDEF Dick Cheney had conferred with Col. John 
Boyd concerning maneuver warfare on more than one occasion during both Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm operations.
203
 He states in the official report to Congress and President Bush:  
 “..The effectiveness of our Marine Corps forces was most dramatically demonstrated 
by the brilliant maneuver method of the I MEF through numerically superior defensive forces 
into Kuwait City – revalidating the maneuver warfare doctrine adopted by Corps. The threat 
of an amphibious assault during Operation Desert Storm was a masterfully successful 
deception. It probably saved countless American and Coalition lives by diverting and fixing 
six Iraqi divisions to aid the ground assault phase of operations. Having the amphibious group 
in the Persian Gulf provided the Commander in Chief, Central Command with a unique and 
flexible power projection and strategic reserve force..”204 
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In a recent “Boydian” seminar which took place February 15th 2014 San Diego, 
Colonel Mike Wyly aptly summed up Gulf War I’s adaptation of maneuver warfare as part of 
his telephonic lecture to the group:  
“..August 1990. The first Gulf War. Our ground troops are staged in Saudi Arabia, 
ready to attack the Iraqi Army in Kuwait, while the Air Force bombs and bombs and bombs 
for 180 days – 6 months! Joint Chiefs of Staff are reluctant to start the ground attack. Mass 
casualties are predicted crossing minefields, barbed wire, and trenches filled with burning oil. 
But finally, 24 February 1991, we here in the U.S. are told via television, “Its ‘G-Day’, the 
ground attack begins! What you don’t know when G-Day is announced 24 Feb. is that the 
ground attack already began 39 hours ago when Maneuver Warfare-imbued Major General 
Mike Myatt, commanding 1
st
 Marine Division infiltrated thousands of Marines through the 
gaps and weak spots – a classic maneuver warfare tactic – leaving the Iraqi front-line 
defenders, who had anticipated an old-fashioned Marine Corps frontal assault a la Tarawa and 
Iwo Jima, receiving now the shocking news: “The Marines are behind us!” “How many 
[Marines are there]?” They don’t know. One enemy soldier inside your lines gets counted 
multiple times. “Are the Marines going to attack us now in the rear? Or are they going straight 
to Baghdad? Marine casualties light, Iraqis, mass surrender. They don’t know how to handle 
it!..”205 
The I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces (I MEF and II MEF) had the strength of 
92,990 Marines, making Operation Desert Storm one of the largest United States Marine 
Corps operation in its entire history.
206
A total of 23 Marines were killed in action or later died 
of wounds, from the time the air war was launched on January 16 until the cease-fire took 
effect forty three days later. In the final tally of Killed In Action and Wounded In Action, only 
24 Marines would die, (14 were killed by friendly fire and 1 died in an accident leaving only 9 
KIA’s) while only 92 were wounded.207 These statistics would most certainly support and 
foster the development of maneuver warfare for the United States Marine Corps. Lastly the 
speed of bringing these actions to a successful close saved millions of dollars in daily war 
expenses as well. Lives and treasure saved plus success in the Kuwaiti battlespace earned 
maneuver warfare and fighting smarter its place in Marine Corps doctrine, strategy and tactics 
going forward. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Fighting Smarter, Marine Corps Support from the Top:  
Because of Desert Storm, the “fighting smart doctrine” of maneuver warfare was now 
entrenched within the fabric of the U.S. Marine Corps. To define this evolution at this point 
seems appropriate. Besides the obvious model presented by the “evolutionists” regarding the 
aspects utilized by the Germans in the early days of World War II, the following excepts from 
FMFM 1 gives us the tenor and complete definition of this Marine-centric warfighting 
doctrine’s philosophy:  
“..You will notice that this book [FMFM 1] does not contain specific techniques and 
procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. 
It requires judgment in application…The thoughts contained here represent not just guidance 
for actions in combat, but a way of thinking in general. This manual thus describes a 
philosophy for action in war and in peace……the object of war is to impose our will on our 
enemy. The means to that end is the organized application or threat of violence by military 
force….. [War] is the unique product of the dynamic interaction of myriad moral and physical 
forces. While founded on the laws of science, war demands, ultimately, the intuition and 
creativity of art. 
 
The warfighting doctrine which we derive from our theory is one based on maneuver. 
This represents a change since, with a few notable exceptions-Stonewall Jackson in the 
Valley, Patton in Europe, MacArthur at Inchon-the American way of war traditionally has   
been one of attrition. This style of warfare generally has worked for us because, with our 
allies, we have enjoyed vast numerical and technological superiority. But we can no longer 
presume such a luxury. In fact, an expeditionary force in particular must be prepared to win 
quickly, with minimal casualties and limited external support, against a physically superior 
foe. This requirement mandates a doctrine of maneuver warfare. 
 
By this time it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific 
methods used-we eschew formulas-but in the mind of the Marine……Maneuver warfare is a 
way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born 
of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on 
shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding 
his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in 
the way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the 
greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves – a philosophy 
of “fighting smarter..”208 
 
The main critic of the adoption of Marine Corps’ use of these warfighting tools to this 
day is Bill Lind; and possibly a very small number of the original proponents of this doctrine. 
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They contend that in the post-Gray commandancy years it was forgotten or ignored by the 
future commandants and the Marine Corps leadership cadre.  
This was clearly not the case and in point of fact maneuver warfare’s doctrinal usage 
has been evident during the interwar years as being utilized by U.S. Marines in both 
humanitarian and military environments. It also played a significant role on how the Marine 
Corps went about warfighting during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The role maneuver warfare plays can be 
recognized in the actions of the senior Marine Corps leadership in the development and 
implementation of a Marine Corps Way of War from maneuver warfare doctrine, 
campaigning, strategy and tactics by the follow-on actions of this leadership cadre.  
With the die having been cast by General Al Gray and aided by the initial proponents 
of maneuver warfare; there have been a number of efforts to further evolve this “smarter 
warfighting doctrine” into a Marine Corps Way of War. Again the “evolution” concept rather 
than “revolution” turnover is the key factor in this understanding. It is consistently referred to 
by the majority of Marines interviewed for this dissertation; and that were in this vanguard of 
“maneuverists” who fine-tuned the doctrine of Marine Corps maneuver warfare..209 
When General Carl Mundy assumed the commandancy of the Marine Corps as the 30
th
 
CMC he continued the developments begun by General Gray which can be seen in an article 
he wrote for National Security and Defense as it applied to sea basing in the littoral 
environment:  
“..Because of our ability to operate from the sea, from the amphibious and tactical 
aircraft platforms that are small moveable islands of our national resolve, unencumbered by 
basing requests or overflight problems, we can conduct subtle and controlled engagement 
across the broad spectrum of diplomatic and military interaction. Because of this, Marines can 
come ashore rapidly for humanitarian purposes, as we did in Bangladesh, Northern Iraq, and 
Somalia, and, when needed, we can move into rapidly planned and executed combat 
operations from low to medium-intensity conflict……Maneuver warfare is the heart of From 
the Sea. It is a warfighting style that emphasizes our strengths: the use of rapid maneuver, 
quick decision making, and the inherent flexibility of sea basing. The rapid seizure or securing 
of ports and airfields by forward operating Marines can enable the entry of Army and Air 
Force elements, as necessary.... the United States Marine Corps will continue to provide what 
some have termed, the most general purpose of the general purpose forces with strategic 
agility, on-scene presence, self-sustaining, and high flexibility, for a variety of crisis response 
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demands. Our ability to rapidly position two Marine Expeditionary Units off Somalia is 
illustrative of this point. We have got two powerful self-contained air-ground task forces 
sitting on the horizon there -- where they can be seen but not touched by clan violence. They 
have no logistic or political footprint ashore, but in minutes they can respond with an 
overwhelming combined arms team consisting of anything from attack helicopters to armored 
vehicles -- launched from the sea..”210  
 
It was General Mundy’s efforts to further USMC maneuver warfare in the joint Naval 
Publication NPD-1 1994 entitled Naval Warfighting which essentially was a derivative of 
FMFM-1 Warfighting stressing the principles of initiative, exploitation, combined arms, and 
independent action by commanding officers at all levels. It was also an attempt to bring 
maneuver warfare, the Defense Department and U. S. Army driven Netcentrics into 
alignment. MCWW saw if properly used, Netcentrics could enhance the speed of command 
issues in order to generate a higher tempo of action than that of the enemy. In an environment 
of where chaos is the rule, speed of command will aid the naval forces to adapt to rapidly 
changing situations and exploit fleeting situations at much higher speeds than the adversary. 
These words echo not only General Al Gray but also Col. John Boyd as they position the 
Marine Corps to go beyond attrition as a means of success in the Marine Corps battle spaces 
to come.
211
 
The 31
st
 Commandant, General Charles Krulak was instrumental in not only 
promulgating the FMFM-1 Warfighting publication, but also adding to the depth and main 
focus of effort of the original intent of Gray’s “fighting smarter” doctrine, strategy and tactics. 
General Krulak applied maneuver warfare doctrine during the second phase of operations of 
Desert Storm to the logistics support necessary to support the offensive actions of both the 1
st
 
MARDIV and the 2
nd
 MARDIV. General Boomer the overall commander of the USMC 
efforts during this time period had the highest regard and praise for General Krulak’s 
logistical support efforts:  
                                                          
210
 General Carl Mundy CMC, USMC, “The Role of the Marine Corps in the Post-Cold War Era,” 
National Defense Magazine, 1 November 1993,  http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/nonstaff/e/general-e--
mundy. (Accessed 17 May 2014). 
 
211
 Ibid. 
 
88 
 
“..I [Boomer] had commanders who were independent thinkers [a basic tenet of 
maneuver warfare] ….whenever they told me they could do something, I knew them well 
enough to know that they could do it even if it involved some risk..”212  
General Boomer had to place his logistical support way ahead of his combat forces so 
as to support the maneuver warfare’s fast tempo of the Marine Corps 1st MARDIV and 2nd 
MARDIV advances on the Iraqi army in Kuwait. Taking the initiative and commander’s intent 
Krulak without full combat support established the Al Khanjar support base 45 kilometers 
ahead of the advance. Not only was General Krulak a believer in fighting smarter he was also 
a successful practitioner of it as well. Because of his efforts the Marines were able to utilize 
the fast tempo and follow commander’s intent in driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait. This was 
accomplished much faster than had been planned for by General Schwarzkopf. The Marines in 
Desert Storm were an unstoppable force, and by utilizing the new doctrine of FMFM-1 they 
further added to the success’ realized by saving lives and treasure in this effort. Fighting 
smarter had its baptism under fire and proved that the impetus of maneuver warfare would 
become part of the ethos, spirit and practice of future Marine Corps actions.
213
 
During his commandancy General Krulak expanded FMFM-1 and it’s follow on 
FMFM1, 1-1, 1-2 and 1--3 with his publishing of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications 
(MCDP 1, Warfighting; MCDP 1-1, Strategy; MCDP 1-2, Campaigning; and MCDP 1-3 
Tactics) which were intended to amplify and enhance the original publications and intent of 
the Gray institutionalization of “fighting smarter.”214 In General Krulak’s forward to MCDP 1 
he acknowledged that the current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver from 
the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the philosophy of FMFM 1.  
In addition, he further stated that military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, 
especially a dynamic doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve within 
the Marine Corps based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the ever 
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changing face of war itself.
215
 His goals were to enhance the description of the nature of war, 
to clarify the descriptions of the styles of warfare, and to clarify and refine important 
maneuver warfare concepts such as commander’s intent, main focus of effort and critical 
vulnerability while retaining the spirit, style and essential message of FMFM 1. In the 
Preface, written by General Al Gray we find his hearty and glowing endorsement for General 
Krulak’s MCDP 1’s revisions. General Gray continues by stating that war is timeless and ever 
changing, while the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use [must] 
evolve continuously.
216
 Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve continuously. 
The Gray imprimatur and initial guidance of fighting smarter continues its evolution into the 
Marine Corps’ ethos, education and training. Commandant Krulak was so intent on the 
furtherance of FMFM 1, that he added two additional publications during his tenure as 
commandant; Warfighting Cliff Notes
217
 and Operational Maneuver from the Sea.
218
  
Before the completion of his term as commandant, General Krulak also provided two 
ideas that revolve around the Marine Corps new understanding of maneuver warfare. The 
coining of the terms: “The Strategic Corporal” and “The Three Block War” was an extension 
of the maneuver warfare tenets that were the core of the Gray efforts to keep the Marine Corps 
at the tip of the military spear. The Three Block War 
219
is a concept described to illustrate the 
complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by all Marines on the modern battlefield. In 
Krulak's timeless example, Marines may be required to conduct full scale military action, 
peace keeping operations and humanitarian assistance within the space of three contiguous 
city blocks, and all at the same time. The thrust of the concept is that modern militaries must 
be trained to operate in all three conditions simultaneously, and that to do so, leadership 
training at the lowest levels needs to be a high priority. The latter condition caused Krulak to 
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invoke what he then called out as the "Strategic Corporals."
220
 The Marines who are the low-
level unit leaders able to take independent action and make major decisions as the battles 
space and tempo reshaped itself during the chaos or fog of war being encountered. This is also 
a core function of commander’s intent, albeit in real time. Krulak was able to extend free 
thinking and fighting smarter in the utilization of a Marine Corps Way of War. 
The continuation of the institutionalization of maneuver warfare was carried to the 
next level by the succeeding commandant General James L. Jones with his timely publication 
of MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations in 2001.
221
 The progression is now directed towards 
the aspects of maneuver warfare in the combined arms section of the Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF). This MCDP describes the role of the Marine component in providing, 
sustaining and deploying of Marine Corps forces at the operational level of war. It also directs 
how the MAGTF conducts expeditionary operations at the operational and tactical levels. This 
document in essence is the continued evolution of a Marine Corps Way of War that is 
doctrinally based in maneuver warfare as it applies to expeditionary maneuver warfare and its 
supporting concept operational maneuver from the sea. 
As MCDP 1-0 states:  
“..Maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy and forms the basis 
for the concept of expeditionary maneuver warfare. During the late 1970s and the 1980s 
Marines embraced the theory of maneuver warfare and developed their own institutional 
approach to maneuver warfare. This process of debate, discussion, and experimentation 
culminated in the publication of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting. This seminal 
document subsequently provided the foundation for the training and education of Marine 
leaders who conducted maneuver warfare with great success in Operation Desert Storm. 
Warfighting was followed by a series of doctrinal publications [Krulak MCDP’s] that 
provided further guidance on the theory and nature of strategy, campaigning, and tactics in 
maneuver warfare. The continued development of new concepts and doctrine, along with the 
refining of accepted doctrine, will help ensure that the Marine Corps provide the Nation with a 
balanced force in readiness to conduct expeditionary operations in a dangerous and uncertain 
world..”222  
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Throughout this document the initial terms, concepts and tenets of FMFM1 can again 
be evidenced. All aspects of this new guidance are the central points of General Gray’s initial 
“commander’s intentions” as they relate to fighting smarter.  
The other major development to enhance the basis of maneuver warfare under the 
Jones’ commandancy was the incorporation of the V-22 Osprey a hybrid airframe used for the 
combined arms air component. The Osprey enables and enhances the concept of MAGTF to 
be extended well beyond the 200 mile mark for Marine Corps insertion of troops. The use of 
the V-22 enhances maneuver warfare because it can deliver Marines at speeds equivalent to 
traditional airframes instead of the slower helicopters. This adds to the rapid tempo of attacks, 
shaping the battle space, and expands maneuver itself into new possibilities. This has 
increased the vertical as well as horizontal application of envelopment and rapid tempo and it 
has become the compliment to a fighting smarter MCWW. 
The Commandant to follow General Jim Jones was General Michael Hagee; a 
“wartime commandant.” Based upon interviews with Generals Conway, Mattis and Kelly the 
practice of Marine Corps maneuver warfare tenets were applied in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
under the Hagee commandancy.
223
 As for the furtherance of the institutionalization of fighting 
smarter General Hagee revamped the Commandants Required Reading List. According to 
Commandant Michael W. Hagee,  
“..Warfighting excellence demands that our Marines not only maintain physical 
endurance and technical proficiency, but, just as importantly, they also continue to develop 
intellectual adaptability along with effective problem solving skills..”224 
All-Marine Message 007/05 announced an updated Marine Corps professional reading 
program. It was a first step in reinvigorating a key element of Marine Professional Military 
Education (MPME) according to General Hagee. The revised program maintains an emphasis 
on warfighting and is designed to instill wisdom and judgment needed in a MCWW.  
In November 2006, a panel of retired and active duty military personnel met to update 
the professional reading program, formally known as the Commandant’s Reading List. “There 
were one hundred and twelve separate books on its required reading list: forty five books for 
the enlisted reading list and eighty three books for the officer reading list. According to 
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Colonel Jeffery Bearor, Training and Education Command’s Chief of Staff, there are sixteen 
books shared between the enlisted and officer lists.
225
 The panel concluded that revisions were 
necessary to reinvigorate the program. They noted that the strategic environment is ever-
changing and will become progressively more complex and challenging.
226
 
General Hagee approved the revised program, seeing it as a clear continuation of 
Gray’s reading program designed to promote lifelong learning. He recognized that full 
implementation of this goal, however, would require a new sense of ownership and creative 
inspiration. General Hagee went on and wrote:  
“.. All Marines must develop a disciplined approach to studying, thinking, and 
discussing our profession, fully fostering a higher level of shared competency within our 
Corps. In addition, we will not achieve continuous improvement in warfighting proficiency 
without guided professional growth and a sense of comradeship that only leaders at all levels 
can instill. The revised reading list has a number of books assigned to multiple ranks and 
provides a starting point for these goals. The selected books will facilitate a common 
understanding, stimulate intellectual curiosity, and enhance unit cohesion. But a reading list is 
not enough. The readings become more meaningful when discussed with others..”227 
Further, General Donald Gardner, USMC (Ret.), president of the Marine Corps 
University, points out:  
“..While the individual books give Marines historically-based information that 
emphasizes warfighting, the discussion of the readings among Marines that follows, properly 
contextualizes the works and place them in the proper perspective. The group discussions 
serve to encourage critical thinking skills, create an environment where ideas are introduced 
and debated, promote higher levels of professional understanding, and raise the intellectual 
bar of the individual Marine. Those who lack sufficient understanding of the lessons learned 
in the various works would gain greater comprehension by listening to their peers discuss the 
material in a manner that they can easily grasp. This approach fosters both unit cohesion and 
intellectual development, whereas the prior programs only seemed to increase an individual 
Marine’s knowledge of a particular topic. One of the key components in emphasizing a 
discussion-focused program is selecting appropriate works that are both timeless and relevant 
to today’s geostrategic environment. In addition to classical works, the program now contains 
contemporary works that emphasize terrorism and the Middle East, such as The Arab Mind, 
From Beirut to Jerusalem, and Terrorism Today. Both sets of books encompass broad topics 
and are timeless in application. Furthermore, works such as The Face of Battle, This Kind of 
War, Rifleman Dodd, and others are found on both enlisted and officer lists because these 
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books apply across the board and demonstrate sound lessons on basic leadership for all 
Marines. It is important to note that the works in the program are not set in stone. While all of 
the selections are essentially timeless and formative in relation to their academic standing, the 
program will not remain stagnant in terms of its composition. Marine Corps University now 
manages the Professional Reading Program and will establish a Board to make 
recommendations concerning what material will best meet the program’s enduring objectives 
in the future.  
The senior leadership chose to attack the stagnation of the reading program at a crucial 
time in our Corps’ history. By placing this program at the forefront of his agenda, General 
Hagee insisted upon high intellectual standards during a time that requires mental agility and 
analytical versatility. Dialogue and discussion groups can facilitate the critical-thinking skills 
that are necessary for the professional growth and creativity of Marines, regardless of rank or 
background. Today’s warfare continually demands flexibility and split-second decision 
making skills from Marines at all levels. Thus, the Professional Reading Program serves as a 
mechanism to develop the individual Marine’s intellectual framework and tactical 
calculations. The future of our Corps continues to depend on strong leadership and a 
prodigious pursuit of lifelong learning. This program seeks to encourage all Marines to 
become creative thinkers in an age where the individual Marine is faced with constant 
battlefield dilemmas..”228  
The Commandant's Reading List: 
In an Unclassified message ALMAR 007-05 dated 8 Feb 2005, from the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps describes the current makeup of the Marine Corps Professional Reading 
Program. As the 33
rd
 Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael W. Hagee, 
published his list of professional readings, stating that:  
"..In order to increase the depth of our professional education, we will reinvigorate the 
Professional Reading Program.."  
The purpose of this ALMAR is to initiate actions that will accomplish that goal, to 
contribute to the growth of aggressive and informed leaders, and above all ensure that their 
main effort as serious practitioners of the profession of arms remains excellence in 
Warfighting. This is the continuation of the maneuver warfare thread that has characterized 
the making of modern Marines.
229
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Gen Hagee’s objective in continuing the Professional Reading List echoes the reason 
29th Commandant of the Marines Corps, Gen A.M. Gray originally published the list in 1989. 
General Gray identified in his initiating documents, six objectives for the Professional 
Reading Program in order to provide a continuum of study for all Marine leaders. These 
objectives remain unchanged and are reiterated as follows: 
A. To impart a sense of Marine values and traits. 
B. To increase knowledge of our profession. 
C. To improve analytical and reasoning skills. 
D. To increase capacity of using printed media as a means of learning and 
communication. 
E. To increase knowledge of our Nation’s institutions and the principles upon which our 
country and way of life were founded. 
F. To increase knowledge of the world’s governments, culture, and geography.230 
The background of the Marines Professional Reading Program is that Professional 
Military Education (PME) serves as a bridge between an understanding of the strategic 
landscape and the unique decision-making requirements for each combat situation. Today’s 
strategic environment, characterized by uncertainty and lethality, requires leaders at all levels 
that are mentally as well as physically agile and capable of making difficult, timely decisions 
in the midst of complex and stressful situations. Repetitive and varying decision-making 
opportunities create competent judgment, flexibility, and adaptability. Field training and 
exercises are just one means to improve the thought processes. However, these opportunities 
will always be limited. The tremendous experiences that men and women have gained over 
the ages concerning the nature and conduct of war can, if properly studied and understood, 
serve as an important force multiplier providing myriad opportunities to “experience” decision 
making in war.
231
 
Discussions with leaders during our recent operations in the Global War on Terrorism 
confirm this assertion. As General Gray stated: 
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“..Success in battle depends on many things, some of which we will not fully control. 
However, the state of preparedness of our Marines (Physical, Intellectual, Psychological, 
Operational) IS in our hands. The study of our profession through selected readings will assist 
each Marine’s efforts to achieve operational competence and to better understand the nature of 
our ‘calling’ as Leaders of Marines.."232 
“..A perfect list is always subject to debate and discussions; but that spirit of discussion is 
what is required to achieve a shared increase in “our” Professional competency and foster 
increased cohesion of effort. The revised Professional Reading List meets the enduring 
objectives stated above and will greatly assist in achieving my guidance goal of excellence in 
Warfighting through competence and comradeship. It was developed based on the following 
guidance: 
A. The list does not incorporate fleeting trends. 
B. It emphasizes Warfighting. 
C. It is historically based. 
D. It uses serious literature that has an established permanence. 
E. It encompasses a broad context. 
F. And, it is achievable by all Marines..”233 
The Reading List: 
The Professional Reading list is a component of the Professional Reading Program that 
is, in turn, an element of our Professional Education Program. It serves as a standardized 
guide that provides a common understanding throughout the Marine Corps and stimulates 
intellectual curiosity. A number of books are on the reading list of multiple ranks (e.g. 
Privates /Private First Class /Lance Corporals and 2nd and 1st Lieutenants) for the benefit of 
all in each audience. The following is the reading list that supports the program and is 
formatted by Title and Author only:
234
 
Privates /Private First Class /Lance Corporals:  
A Message to Garcia, Hubbard, Blackhawk Down, Bowden, Rifleman Dodd, Forester, The 
Defense of Duffer’s Drift, Swinton, The Killer Angels, Shaara, The Soldier's Load, Marshall, 
United States Constitution. 
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Corporals / Sergeants: 
Battle Leadership, Von Schell, Fields of Fire, Webb, Flags of Our Fathers, Bradley, Gates of 
Fire, Pressfield, The Bridge at Dong Ha, Miller, The Last Full Measure, Shaara, The Red 
Badge of Courage, Crane, The United States Marines: A History, Simmons, Tip of the Spear, 
Michaels, With The Old Breed at Pelelieu and Okinawa, Sledge. 
Staff Sergeants:  
Attacks!, Rommel, Pegasus Bridge, Ambrose, Phase Line Green: The Battle for Hue 1968, 
War, The Arab Mind, Patai, The Art of War, Sun Tzu (Griffin), The Forgotten Soldier, Sajer, 
The Village, West, This Kind of War, Fehrenbach, We Were Soldiers Once, Moore and 
Galloway. 
Gunnery Sergeants: 
Breakout, Russ, Citizen Soldiers, Ambrose, Command in War, Van Creveld, My American 
Journey, Powell, Navajo Weapon, McClain, Savage Wars of Peace, Boot, Semper Fidelis: 
The History of the U.S. Marine Corps, Millet, Unaccustomed To Fear, Willcock. 
Master Sergeants / 1st Sergeants:  
Band of Brothers, Ambrose, Bayonet Forward!, Chamberlain, Defeat into Victory, Slim, 
Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence, Strong Men Armed, Leckie, The Face of Battle, Keegan, 
The Mask of Command, Keegan, War in the Shadows, Asprey 
Master Gunnery Sergeants / Sergeant Majors:  
First to Fight, Krulak, Fortune Favors the Brave, Myers, No Bended Knee, Twining, 
Reminiscences of a Marine, Lejeune. 
Warrant Officer - 1:  
Leading Marines: MCWP 6-11 Small Wars Manual, The Armed Forces Officer, Marshall, The 
Quiet American, Greene, Victory at High Tide, Heinl. 
Midshipmen and Officer Candidates:  
A Message to Garcia, Hubbard, Beat to Quarters, Forester, Chesty, Hoffman, The United 
States Marines: A History, Simmons, Warfighting MCDP 1. 
2nd Lieutenants:  
Cleared Hot, Stoffey, Chancellorsville, Sears, Fields of Fire, Webb, On Infantry, English and 
Gudmundsson, Rifleman Dodd, Forester, The Arab Mind, Patai, The Easter Offensive, Turley, 
The Face of Battle, Keegan, This Kind of War, Fehrenbach. 
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1st L Lieutenants / Chief Warrant Officer -2:  
A People Numerous and Armed, Shy, All For The Union, Rhodes, Attacks!, Rommel, 
Company Commander, Macdonald, Once an Eagle, Myrer, Reminiscences of A Marine, 
Lejeune, The Forgotten Soldier, Sajer, The Storm of Steel, Junger, The Ugly American, 
Lederer and Burdick, Utmost Savagery, Alexander. 
Captains / Chief Warrant Officer -3:  
Command In War, Van Creveld, Eagle Against The Sun, Specter, Field Artillery and 
Firepower, Bailey, Fields of Battle, Keegan, From Beirut to Jerusalem, Friedman, Goodbye 
Darkness, Manchester, Infantry in Battle, Marshall, Savage Wars of Peace, Boot, Stonewall in 
the Valley, Tanner, Terrorism Today, Harmon, The Art of War, Sun Tzu (Griffith), 
Unaccustomed To Fear, Willcock 
Majors / Chief Warrant Officer -4:  
A Bright Shining Lie, Sheehan, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, McPherson, 
Crucible of War, Anderson, European Armies, Strachan, For The Common Defense, Millet 
and Maslowski, Grant Takes Command, Catton, On War, Von Clausewitz (Howard and Paret), 
Strategy, Hart, The General, Forester, The Glorious Cause, Middlekauff, The Guns of August, 
Tuchman, The History of The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (Landmark Version by 
Strasser), The Mask of Command, Keegan. 
Lieutenant Colonels/ Chief Warrant Officer -5:  
A Revolutionary People at War, Royster, Defeat into Victory, Slim, Frontiersmen in Blue, 
Utley, Masters of War, Handel, One Hundred Days, Woodward, Patton: A Genius for War, 
d'Este, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence, The Army in Viet Nam, Krepinevich, The Lexus 
and the Olive Tree, Friedman, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Corum, Supplying War, van Creveld. 
Colonels through Generals:  
Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution, McPherson, All Quiet on the Western 
Front, Remarque, Carnage and Culture, Hanson, Crusade In Europe, Eisenhower, 
Dereliction of Duty, McMaster, Diplomacy, Kissinger, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, Weigley, 
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Hughes, Feeding Mars, Lynn, Generalship; Its Diseases 
and Their Cures, Fuller, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command, Sumida, Memoirs 
of General W. T. Sherman, Edited By McFeely, Military Innovation In The Interwar Period, 
Murray and Millet, Supreme Command, Cohen, The Campaigns of Napoleon, Chandler, The 
Conduct of War, Fuller, The Rape of Nanking, Chang, War and Peace, Tolstoy. 
The Commandant outlined several actions that would take place to implement the 
professional Reading Program. However, he orders that all Marines are to actively read and 
discuss books from the reading list. There are intentional cross linkages of books among ranks 
98 
 
to help achieve this goal, as discussion and dialog are the best means to increase means to 
increase common understanding. 
Closing comments from the Commandant [CMC Hagee]: 
The emphasis of this program is on Warfighting. It is a dynamic program and 
recommendations and contributions that meet our objectives and my guidance are highly 
encouraged. I expect all Marines to continue their personal development through reading. I 
challenge each Marine to actively spend time preparing for the next battle. Prepare yourself in 
body, mind, and spirit. Share what you learn by discussing your reading with fellow Marines. 
By reading and discussing, you participate meaningfully in our Warfighting culture.  
Keep attacking, 
M.W. Hagee  
General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps 
235
 
CMC Generals Hagee and Conway supported this educational warfighting philosophy 
and the current CMC General Amos has issued ALMAR 001/ 13 revamping the reading 
program also in the spirit of furthering the intellectual developments of all Marines. It must be 
noted though that the commandant’s intent is guided by the original principles that General 
Gray instituted in the original Commandants reading list. The original reading list was created 
by Colonel Paddy Collins and then major John Kelly in 1990 – ‘91.  
General Kelly details this development during my interview with him:  
“ .. So I [Gen. Kelly] get promoted.  I go to TBS [The Basic School].  Lucky enough to 
get assigned to TBS [when] Gray becomes the commandant and he then goes to TBS at Quantico 
and says to the CO at Quantico Paddy Collins, a fascinating Marine of old, colonel, and he was 
one of the henchmen that -- and I say that in a positive sense -- he was one of the henchmen that 
Gray hired, General Gray hired, to make these changes and to make them in a draconian way:  
We're going to make this happen in the Marine Corps. So Paddy comes down to TBS.  He has a 
TBS CO and a bunch of us.  I was a major at the time, a brand new major.  And he starts in.  This 
was about '90, '91…. I guess.  This is what the commandant wants and you guys are going to do 
it and its maneuver warfare and so on and you're going to write it.  And oh, by the way, he wants 
a book list.  He wants a reading list…… a reading program.  And so he leaves and a good friend 
that was a CO at The Basic School, Terry Ebert at the time said:  "Does anyone know what the 
hell he was talking about?  What is this maneuver warfare thing?  What is this?"  And I said, "I 
do."  And so I became the front guy at The Basic School and when Paddy left, he said, "And by 
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the way, he wants the reading list this week -- or [Gray] wants the reading program this week." 
So I went home and literally wrote down every book on my shelf which were several hundred on 
3 x 5 cards and then came in and met with Paddy Collins at Headquarters Marine Corps and I 
said, "Okay, this is what I think the program should be and the reason I did 3 x 5 cards was 
because I thought that we could arrange the books in like what should a private through lance 
corporal [should] read.  That would be a different reading than what the corporal and sergeant 
should read.  Corporal, sergeant, staff sergeant, and oh, by the way, those lieutenants should read 
those books too.  And the gunnery sergeant, the senior enlisted.  That's where the captains, the 
majors and all of that.  And it went from soup to nuts.  The Marine by Drew Davis, books about 
Chesty Puller are on the list.  Everyone ought to read that one, their PFC's.  Easy read book and 
it's about one of our great heroes, all the way to Dowdy's book on futuristic warfare and all of this 
and everything in between.  And so we presented that to the TBS CO. I arranged the cards and 
commandant looked at it and said, "Publish it."  General Van Riper was a one star at the time at 
Quantico and he looked at the number.  He couldn't add a book to the list so that became the 
reading list and the reading program the next day essentially.  They published it -- they went to 
work on it a couple of weeks later.  It came out in a letter and said okay, this is it.  And we should 
be reading constantly, all the time.  And that's where the reading program came from..”236 
 In the almost twenty five years since this development, the Marine Corps has fostered a 
reading program for its warriors focusing on the profession of arms that has set apart these 
warfighters; and further enhanced maneuver warfare or “fighting smarter” by these educated 
warriors. Without these educated warriors the Marine Corps Way of War would not exist. 
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Chapter 5 Education and Training: 
  “..I also wanted a program created that would go through all the necessary “wickets” 
and give our people (Marines and civilians working directly for the Marine Corps) Master’s 
Degrees when they graduated out from our school and that type of thing..” 
  General Alfred M. Gray, 29
th
 Commandant United States Marine Corps.
237
 
 The purpose of Marine Corps training and education organizations is to establish 
a highly specialized military force educational system for use throughout the Marine Corps. 
This applies to all education and training conducted by all Fleet Marine Force units. In order 
to gain essential competency, Marines require a full spectrum of learning opportunities. The 
basic foundation for the skills that are required in the Marine Corps consists of education and 
training at the tactical-through operational level. This education and training is a shared 
responsibility that is distributed among the schools and also the units in the Fleet, and the 
branches of Education and Training Command to include the Marine Corps University.
238
  
The challenge for Marine Corps teaching and learning establishments is providing the 
kind of dynamic education and training to officers and enlisted leaders at all the levels which 
prepare them to demonstrate new skills in rapidly and ever-diversifying operational 
environments. It ensures that they retain traditional Marine Corps capabilities, doctrine and 
ethos. The doctrine, in this case is maneuver warfare as adopted and adapted by the Marine 
Corps in the 1980’s, and enhanced through to today.  
Education incorporated with training is an extremely important part of all the Marine 
Corps syllabi. However, different tools are to be used in order to develop an effective Marine 
Corps fighting force. Education and training complements each other since they are tightly 
interwoven at each and every level of professional development.
239
 Early stages of a Marine’s 
career are often weighted more heavily toward training and; education dominates the later 
stages of a Marine’s career.240 The exception is the Commandant’s reading program. Training 
is, and has been defined as the conduct of discipline, instruction and, the building in of 
                                                          
237
 Gray, In person interview with the author. 
 
238
 For a general frame of reference of educational possibilities, the Marine Corps University site can be 
accessed at www.mcu.usmc.mil/SitePages/Home.aspx.  
 
239, Gilbert Ariely, “Operational Knowledge Management in the Military,” in Encyclopedia of 
Knowledge Management, D.G. Schwartz, Editor. (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Inc., 2006), 281-288. 
 
 
240
 Ibid.281-288. 
 
101 
 
information as well as various procedures incorporated into the progressive repetition of tasks. 
The product of training is aimed at tactical skill development and proficiency.  
General Gray further elucidated this aspect with the following clarification and 
guidance when he stated in our interview: 
“.. I think that the training was a very important part, almost separate bullets, was 
training and education but they are two different things so the idea of going back to the basics 
you had to understand what we meant by basics it was a pretty large thing and not just basic 
training and things like that. So when we said back to the basics we meant in many ways back 
to the principles of what got us there every year and back to the things that are tried and true 
and sort of like what I have said many times “if you want a new idea, read an old book” and 
so going back to that, making sure that everybody was an infantryman, making sure that 
everybody understood that the country and indeed the world thinks that they are commandos 
so why not be commandos? That’s what it’s all about, be what you’re supposed to be and so 
going back to that was a major structural step to going forward. Going back and creating a 
school of infantry, creating the institutionalizing squad leader school and all of that type of 
activity coupled with the effort to create an professional military education program that 
allowed for continuing education forever because if you don’t continue to study you get 
behind in any profession and its deadly if you get behind in the profession of arms. What the 
other thing about the education was that it embraced all, not just Officers, but staff, 
commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers, in the Marines.  It embraced the NCO 
schools and modified that, it embraced the Staff NCO academies and the like; it embraced all 
professional schooling whether it was done by the Marine Corps all under the umbrella of the 
newly formed Marine Corps University..”241 
Today for Marines, education is the process of mental as well as moral development. It 
has also been defined as the drawing out of students in order to initiate the learning process 
and to bring their own energies, and interpretations so as to bear the product of education 
which is a creative and receptive mind.
242
 Education also provides a framework under which 
civilian and military leaders gain a profound understanding of operations and strategy, as well 
as to develop critical thinking skills that are required for dealing with surprise and uncertain 
factors, to be fully proficient in joint matters, and also to be able to comprehend the warrior 
environment.
243
 This has been an ongoing process since the Gray commandancy and the 
establishment of the Marine Corps University in 1990. 
Here in lies the foundations of maneuver warfare or fighting smarter that were the end 
results of the evolution incorporated into the institutionalization of Gray’s ideas. Colonel Mike 
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Wyly was at the core beginning of these modern educational developments concerning 
maneuver warfare and Marine Corps education and follow on training procedures.  
Wyly stated the following in this evolutionary process for the Marine Corps:  
“.. You have to “be there” [lead from the front] to make effective change. It cannot be 
done by remote control or from far away. Contact with the people who do the work of the 
organization must be continuous. Making change in an organization is not something you get 
to do subtly or by halves. My connection with John Boyd, the OODA Loop, and “Patterns of 
Conflict” began in 1979 when I was just being promoted from major to lieutenant colonel and 
a 2-star general was looking for someone to take over teaching tactics to Marine captains in 
the Marine Corps “schools” at Quantico.  
The general wanted to liven up the tactics course, make it relevant to modern war, and 
raise the intellectual level of the schools. He chose me to be Head of Tactics Instruction for 
the 9-month September to June course conducted annually for about a hundred and twenty 
captains each year. I had done what I could to keep my pledge to make change[Chip 
Pilkington Obligation] but the breadth and width of the area I could influence had been 
relatively small – until the general gave me my mission in 1979. The General was Bernard 
Trainor, then a 2-star and Director, Marine Corps Education Center. The typical scenario was 
that a new lieutenant colonel would report to the general’s Education Center and then be 
handed down to one of the schools. The schools were directed by colonels. So had my case 
been typical, it would have been, “Colonel, here’s Lieutenant Colonel Wyly, put him to work 
where you see fit.” But in my case the general already knew me and, instead, told the colonel, 
“Here’s Lieutenant Colonel Wyly, your new Head of Tactics Instruction.” This approach of 
arriving “force-fed” caused me to come with a bit of a cloud over my head and is one of the 
reasons that the Colonel told me that, while I would be in the position where the general 
wanted me, I would not be assigned as leader of one of the ten conference groups, each 
consisting of twelve captains (students of the school) apiece into which the 120 captain-
students were organized. The stated reason was that I was unmarried and the school liked to 
include officers’ wives in as many after-hours activities as possible.  
The social life and family life of officers arriving as students were important. I was 
disappointed because, having been a student of the Amphibious Warfare School, myself, 
previously, I well knew that it was within the small conference groups that serious thinking 
happened and minds were molded. But most of all, it was the “feedback” that I was going to 
get from the 12 captains in that small Conference Group. And their wives! How am I doing, 
captain? Are you inspired? Is this making sense? How do we make it Marine Corps-wide? 
And - yes – a captain’s wife - does he come home and talk about it – excited? Talking about 
battle…maybe even about what Napoleon traditionally had cooked up for him for supper on 
the eves of his great victories. It was three days before Labor Day Weekend and the school 
would be in session the day after Labor Day. So, getting myself a Conference Group became 
my first conscious application of Colonel Boyd’s OODA Loop as a means of bringing about a 
desired end – this even though my first meeting with John Boyd lay a month in the future.  
I’d been dating a young home economics teacher – dating, not living with (I am an 
old-fashioned sort of guy) – and we seemed to be getting along; that is Observation and 
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Orientation had already happened between us. So I telephoned her, proposed, and explained 
we had to Decide and Act right away in order to get with the mission at the outset of school. 
She gave me a “Yes” and we went to the county Justice of the Peace the next morning. At 
0800 on the next working day I was in the Colonel’s office with a notarized [marriage] 
certificate. The Colonel’s sense of honor prevailed and I was a full-fledged member of the 
faculty, leader of a conference group as well, who would imbue our captains with our high 
tempo way of war. I owed and still owe a tremendous debt of loyalty to General Trainor for 
the opportunity he gave me.  
I went right to work, first, doing everything I could to “liven up the course”. I had 
already discovered military history as the vehicle for teaching about real battle both from the 
lessons it taught and the interest it stimulated. I scrapped old lesson plans that had been 
followed by the school’s faculty for years. I substituted combat history. Together with General 
Trainor, I created a list of books we would require the students to read. I changed exercises in 
planning to exercises in executing tactics – making decisions instead of producing long 
written orders. And I met Colonel Boyd! All this would lead to an opportunity  to spread the 
word Marine Corps-wide instead of unit by unit, job by job, as I had tried to do up until now. 
The Amphibious Warfare School drew captains of every military specialty Corps-wide, 
educated them, and sent them back to duty throughout the Corps, both Coasts of the United 
States, the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Mediterranean – everywhere.  
General Trainor would soon receive his third star and a new two-star would replace 
him. But I was already “in the saddle” for a three-year tour of duty, fall of 1979 until the 
spring of 1982. I also set to work to use the three years that lay ahead, conceptualizing 
“modern tactics.” It was a 3-year task in itself. I published articles in our Corps-wide 
professional magazine The Marine Corps Gazette. Marines wrote responses in the Letters to 
the Editor column. We responded to the responses.  
Often I found myself saying “I still don’t know where I am going but I know what I 
want to leave behind. I wanted tactics relevant to the fast-moving battles of today, large and 
small. I wanted to leave behind the set-piece, methodical warfare, some of it still carryover 
from the days of trench warfare. Colonel Boyd was a breath of fresh air. An entrée into the 
answer to “Where am I going” and more importantly; where “We, our Corps, are going.” John 
Boyd and I became fast friends. He visited our school on my invitation, often, lectured, 
walked around and met young captains during exercises.  
General Trainor gave me his strong support at every turn. Privately – often in late 
night phone calls at home, he [Boyd] would relate his discoveries about air to air combat. I 
would say, “The same is true on the ground!” and we would share the same concept in a 
ground context – or the other way around as I described fire fights I’d been in in Vietnam. 
Each year a crop of captains would graduate. With them they carried the message of what they 
had learned from our study of history, our exercises preparing for decision-making in battle, 
and what they had learned from Colonel Boyd.  
Just as General Trainor was being promoted and transferred, I learned that a change of 
command was taking place in the 2
nd
 Marine Division down at Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina. The new commander was Major General Al Gray. I had never met him. But I knew 
him by reputation. He was bright, extra-energetic, held by some to be a maverick – and – he 
had heard out John Boyd’s four-hour presentation and liked it!  It was the spring of my 
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second year teaching at the Amphibious Warfare School. I found out who was going down to 
join General Gray’s 2nd Marine Division. We made plans. “Get to General Gray – tell him 
what’s happening!” They did. The chemistry was perfect. General Gray needed no help from 
me. His goals for our Corps were the same as mine.  The General needed no help form me but 
I needed help from him! It was time to break apart the notion that learning Boyd’s ideas, or 
studying modern tactics under me, was something that happened at Quantico but would be left 
behind when our captain-students joined combat units in the fleet! My captain –students 
needed to know that and hear it. This was important. Here at Quantico they were preparing for 
what they would find happening in combat units – in General Gray’s 2ndMarine Division!  I 
invited General Gray to come up to Quantico and lecture to our captain-students. He did it. He 
motivated and inspired them. Down at Camp Lejeune General Gray was experimenting with 
new ideas – some of his own – some of the ideas brought from Quantico from our 
Amphibious Warfare School graduates. It was happening now – change being made Marine 
Corps-wide. The movement only expanded. It never shrunk back.. “244 
In discussing this major development for the Marine Corps with General Trainor I had 
asked him why he chose Colonel Mike Wyly. His response simply put: “..Wyly uses the 
Socratic method of pedagogy!..”245 
Educating leaders is critically important for the continued and efficient advancement 
of professional military excellence, in order to meet this challenge; it has become a Marine 
Corps priority. In the ever changing and rapidly developing combat environment that affects 
Marine Corps leadership, the process of refining and evaluating the educational experience is 
a continuous effort.
246
 Improving the Marine Corps officers Professional Military Education 
(PME) is vitally important to ensure the continued excellence of this officer cadre. The 
common challenge for the Marine Corps is finding the correct balance that will exist between 
providing an applicable education for the current as well as for future leaders while they are 
meeting the operational requirements in any wartime or peacetime environment. 
In order to fully understand the education program at the Marine Corps University, it is 
important to understand the educational foundation as well as the founders of the education 
and training system at this university. Marine Corps University was founded in August 1989. 
It was founded by order of Commandant Alfred M. Gray. It must be acknowledged that the 
Marine Corps University schools have a much longer history that began in 1891. Today’s 
Marine Corps University is the initial legacy of Generals Breckinridge, Butler, Lejeune and 
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Gray. Even before the formal institutionalization of Marine Education, General Gray began 
the process of bring education into the scheduling of Marines daily time expenditures:  
“..At Cadina the Air Force base I found twenty six Air Force officer wives that had 
Master’s Degrees and educational experience and they came up with the teachers and we paid 
them and all that and I had this program, you went to school, period and I put it right on the 
training schedule and we got it down within a couple of months if you were a Marine or sailor 
no matter where you came from you need to check into Camp Hanson the first thing you did 
was show your education credentials and tear-away forms, [and you] would go back to school 
or schools where this kid [Marine] had been and get their transcripts and we had an open 
learning center kind of a concept where we would then test these people.  We had batteries of 
tests from math and science and English and all that and so we tried to stay away from a kid 
having to study something he already knew, or something he already had credit for so we 
place him where he should be and that kind of thing.  You know all my experience with 
education in Marine Corps all through years you know it was all for the non-warriors, if you 
will, it was all for the supply people, the logistic people you couldn’t go to school if you were 
in infantry or artillery or something like that there was no time, you were training and out in 
the field and all that. So I put it right on the training schedule with infantry.  Well you know 
they were, you know, fit to be tied first the pilot unit was the 2
nd
 battalion 4 Marines under 
Colonel Slade, who was one of my boys who had worked with me before and a really, really, 
really good man and he was all for it.  Anyway we put it right on the training schedule and all 
these Company Commanders were griping and grousing because they don’t have enough time 
to train and all that kind of thing.  So I’d meet with all the Officers once a week up at the club 
they had so many different units there and grousing about it so I said “you know I am not 
going to tolerate this anymore and unless you prove to me that while you’re waiting for the 
trucks to take you to central training you are doing gun drill, motor drill or something like 
that, machine gun drill you have nothing to complain about there is plenty time.  Effective 
immediately, you are now members of the PTA, the Parent Teachers Association, I want you 
to go down there once a week and see how your sons are doing at school (we didn’t have any 
woman Marines in Okinawa) and you take those teachers out to lunch and thank them for 
what they are trying to do.”  They grumbled but they did it.  And to make a long story short 
we had a graduation; full up kind of graduation sponsored by the Division, the Division Band 
was there, we had caps we had everything and all that kind of thing and speakers.  Of course 
we had integrated this with Kawasaki High School which was the DOD school in Okinawa 
and so [it was] all accredited and all done the right way..”247 
 
Further support for Marine Corps educational development can also be attributed to a 
post-Vietnam issue as stated by General Gray as follows from our interview:  
 
“..There was one other aspect, and I will get back to particularly in Vietnam, we 
commissioned many of our Staff NCOs and what was left was pretty good but not as good as 
it could be. We moved up a whole bunch of young people and we never, in my judgment, 
never adequately prepared them to be Staff NCOs, we didn’t send them for school training or 
anything like that.  The Officer Corps generals was pretty down on the Staff NCOs, 
                                                          
247
 Gray, In person interview with the author. 
106 
 
particularly the people who were not out in the field who were not living through the “mud 
times” as I call them.  So, they were very critical and in the mid-70s they had some big 
conferences about that topic and the like and I took exception to many of the people who were 
commenting.  I said “You got it all wrong, we commissioned our best people.  We put out a 
whole bunch of new people in.  We didn’t do anything to teach them or educate them on what 
they had to do.  So it is our fault”.  The officer corps fault of course some of enlightened 
Generals like General Wilson and General Bauer they agreed completely.  So we started the 
Staff NCO academy and got back to doing what we ought to do but that was how that all went 
down. The lesson there is leadership at the grass roots level and taking care of people is really 
what it is all about.  You know you never forget that kind of thing and if you ever do, you 
ought to be kicked in the rear end..”248 
The efforts of the Marine Corps so as to give its personnel formal military schooling 
started in 1891. This was when the School of Application was established and it was the first 
resident school for all future Marine officers. The School of Application became the Officers 
Training School in 1909. It eventually relocated to the Marine Corps base at Quantico, 
Virginia following America’s entry into World War I. It then became the nucleus of Marine 
officer instruction. Throughout World War I, many experienced veterans who were returning 
from France were employed in order to train those who were preparing to deploy in the war 
effort. World War I demonstrated to Major General Lejeune the need for the education of 
Marines of all ranks. General Lejeune later insisted for adequate time to be allotted for the 
study of various weapons and also for their proper tactical employment. As a consequence, the 
Marine Corps Officers Training School was opened in the fall of 1919, also at Quantico, 
Virginia.
249
 Brigadier General Butler also realized the importance of military education for the 
professional officers. He continued General Lejeune’s concepts by developing plans for two 
more courses of instruction. The first course was the Field Officers Course. The second course 
was the Company Grade Officers Course. The basic Marine Corps Officer Training School 
together with additional courses formed the foundation that was termed as “Marine Corps 
Schools’’ by General Lejeune. This laid the ground work of the Marine Corps University that 
exists today.
250
 
During the interwar years, some key visionaries such as Major Earl Hancock (”Pete”) 
Ellis foresaw the need for other studies in amphibious warfare. As a result, comprehensive 
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instruction in amphibious operations increased dramatically in the late 1920s, as the Marine 
Corps foresaw the need to train its officers in this anticipated mission.
251
  
In order to expand the Marine Corps Schools, correspondence courses were eventually 
established to parallel the already established resident courses. In 1930, special groups were 
then formed from selected Field Officers School students and graduates to work on 
amphibious landing requirements and doctrine. Brigadier General Breckinridge rewrote the 
entire curriculum into a Marine Corps orientation that consequently championed the “new 
science” of amphibious and close air support warfare. Breckinridge therefore required his 
officers to become skilled instructors and specialists in this new Marine Corps “science.” 
This amphibious landing from the sea concept became so significant that the Field 
Officers School was temporarily discontinued. This was done to allow the students and the 
staff to devote their full time in order to develop the needed doctrine. Two schools were later 
re-designated Junior Courses for Field Grade and Amphibious Warfare Senior Officer and 
Company Grade Officer. This reflected the importance of the Marine Corps’ new mission. In 
1943, an operationally oriented Command and Staff Course was opened at Quantico, Virginia. 
This course was based on the need for school-trained field grade officers who had acquired 
commensurate skills to serve in the Pacific Theater during World War II.
252
  
In 1946, the Marine Corps eventually reestablished a three-tiered professional military 
education system.
253
 The lessons that were learned from World War II as well as various new 
concepts that were based on atomic warfare theory were incorporated into the curricula of the 
Junior Courses as well as the Amphibious Warfare Senior School.
254
 In the 1950s, the Marine 
Corps’ curriculum was modified again, and it must be stressed that it incorporated the use of 
helicopters with amphibious warfare. In 1964, the Junior Course, the Staff College and the 
Senior Course were re-designated into the new Amphibious Warfare School. The AWS 
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combined sea/air emphasis remained the theme in the courses throughout the 1970s. In 1971, 
the course for the Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academy convened at Quantico, Virginia, 
and in 1981, the Noncommissioned Officer Basic Course was then established at 18 different 
sites. The Senior Course for the Staff Sergeants was also implemented at Quantico, Virginia. 
In 1982, Master Sergeants as well as the Advanced Course for First Sergeants were effectively 
implemented at the same institution at Quantico, Virginia. Thereafter, a dynamic and effective 
refinement of the Marine Corps’ professional military education system under went significant 
curriculum changes. The late 1970’s into the early 1980’s saw maneuver warfare theory being 
introduced which eventually focused on Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations 
which were then implemented.
255
 
  In 1989, under the influence of General Alfred M. Gray, the five independent Marine 
Corps schools were organized and joined into the Marine Corps University.
256
 In 1990, the Art 
of War Studies program was formed and it eventually matured to be fully incorporated into 
the Marine Corps War College, a senior-level officer professional military education school.  
In 1990, the Advanced Course became a course for the Gunnery Sergeants. MCU 
adjusted itself throughout the 1990s to fit the needs of the Marine Corps. Thereafter in 1993 
the Commanders’ Program was fully established for all Lieutenant Colonels. E-9 Symposiums 
and annual E-8 Seminars were established. In 1995, the Logistics Instruction Branch was 
developed to teach all ranks the art of logistics.
257
 In 1996, the First Sergeants course was 
established, and in 1997 the College of Continuing Education was formed to integrate all 
officers in long distance education programs within a single college. These events demonstrate 
how Marine Corps University institutionalized fighting smarter and maneuver warfare for its 
future.
258
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In 1999, Marine Corps University was eventually accredited by the Commission on 
Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. MCU was accredited to award 
a Master’s of Military Science degree for the Command and Staff College. Thereafter in 2001, 
MCU was accredited to award a Masters of Strategic Studies to the graduating students who 
were at the Marine Corps War College. In 2003, MCU was accredited so as to award a 
Masters of Operational Studies to the graduates of the School of Advanced War fighting. 
Later on in 2002, the Command and Control Systems Course and the Amphibious Warfare 
School successfully merged to finally become the Expeditionary Warfare School. Also in 
2003, the Logistics Instruction Branch was then renamed the School of MAGTF Logistics 
(SOML). The Senior Leader Development Program (SDLP) was thereafter established in 
order to manage the General Officer education program. This program has since grown into 
the Lejeune Leadership Institute which is now responsible for the development of all 
leadership programs throughout the Marine Corps.
259
 
The Marine Corps War College has been employing a very active teaching 
methodology that provides professional educational experience where students should be, and 
are also accountable to their peers as well as the faculty and for their own professional and 
academic contribution. Instructional techniques and methods also include extensive seminars, 
case studies, reading, war games, presentations, tutorials, decision exercises, research, writing 
and examinations, and contribution to actual field exercises. The College also acknowledges 
that civilian leaders and senior military should complement the competence in Marine Corps 
national defense matters with an effective understanding of informational, economic, political, 
and social environments which influence the basic formulation and foundation of the 
countries’ over all national strategy.260  
Marine Corps University Colleges and Schools 
Enlisted Professional Military Education (EPME) 
School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) 
Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) 
Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) 
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College of Distance Education and Training (CDET) 
 
School of Advanced Warfighting 
The mission of the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) is to provide a graduate-
level professional military education for all the selected field grade officers who have already 
completed the Marine Corps Command and the Staff College; the sister services Intermediate 
Level School (ILS) programs, or the non-resident ILS programs. Building upon the experience 
of SAW, ILS broadens and eventually deepens the education of the selected officers in regard 
to the preparation for high impact MEF / Corps level or the higher planning billets at the 
service and the joint level through rigorous development of problem solving skills and also 
decision-making at the strategic and operational theater level of war.
261
  
The Educational Philosophy of School of Advanced Warfighting 
The School of Advanced War Fighting (SAW) is a decision-making and problem-
solving course rather than a “planning” course. However, planning is also widely used as a 
vehicle for study and preparation of the course.
262
 The majority of the learning exercises 
included in the School of Advanced War fighting can be described as: A Marine is often 
presented with a mass of different and vast types of information and also given some problems 
to solve. The problem may also be used to devise a campaign plan, to make decisions in a war 
game, conduct a staff study, answer a discussion question, craft a brief or point paper, or to 
even carry out additional research for an essay that has been assigned on a specific topic. The 
process becomes iterative by breaking the problem into its various elements, to solve these 
elements, relate them to partial solutions to the greater problem, and also to identify the 
question on which the whole problem turns and to finally, resolve that question or problem. 
Implied is the potential for an inherently greater experience and tempo in recognizing as well 
as discarding distracting non-critical information.
263
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This study of military history helps the learners to enhance the understanding of 
military issues, to develop the analytic mind of the officer and also facilitates the officer’s 
future decision-making efforts when they have eventually graduated. The historical studies are 
not often used didactically but rather, they are usually approached without bias so that all the 
conclusions that result through the analysis of established facts can also be later on evaluated 
without any prejudice. The learner will be unable to anticipate the problems that they might 
face after graduation and in their further military service. The School of Advanced 
Warfighting seeks to equip the graduates to solve any kind of problem that might arise later on 
in the course of their service to the nation.
264
  
Foundations of the Operational Art 
The Foundations of the Operational Art course examines the science and the art of war 
at the operational level. This course sets and achieves many intermediate goals that are meant 
to lead to the attainment of a campaign goal. The core campaign goal is what is to be achieved 
and the operational art is the how it is achieved. Furthermore, the campaign goal is often set 
by strategy. The operational art focuses on the arrangement, employment as well as the 
synchronization of joint forces in terms of space, time and purpose. The Foundations of the 
Operational Art course, explores the principal issues that surround decision-making and 
informed thinking as they contribute to achieving the campaign goals in support of central 
strategic objectives. The basic emphasis and foundation of this course is on the integration of 
evidence, theory and the development of critical analytical skills. The learning methodology is 
employed in case-study manner that is informed by doctrine and theory.
265
  
Operational Planning 
The Operational Planning Course consists of a series of planning various problems 
during which the learners are expected to execute various selected steps of the staff planning 
process. The emphasis is mainly placed on the mission course and analysis of action 
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development which are further refined into functional and sound concept of operations. The 
Marine Corps Planning Process is usually presented by members of MAGTF Staff Training 
Program. This provides the framework for fundamental planning development in every 
exercise. Additionally, learning is reinforced through the requirement to teach, the SAW 
students often act as the Operational Planning Team as well as the facilitators in teaching of 
the Marine Corps Planning Process that is directed to the Command and Staff College 
students. 
266
 
The Learning Objects/Outcomes of Operational Planning: 
1. To evaluate the impact of the local conditions and the actual terrain on the conduct of the 
military campaigns and operations.  
2. To assess the effectiveness of the various historical and conceptual methodologies for the 
campaign design and also for operational-level decision-making.  
3. To develop the operational level mission concepts of operations, analyses and also MEF 
level operations orders.  
4. To synthesize the processes, inputs as well as the outputs of the Marine Corps Planning 
Process and also other planning or design methods in developing the operational orders.
267
  
Future War Fighting: 
Future War Fighting deals with the central importance of recognizing the eventuality 
of the existing paradigms that lose their relevance under the culminating pressure of ever 
changing conditions (Fog of War - Schwerpunkt). Several lessons that are offered under 
Operational Art use an illustrative evidence of future war, past history and how change had 
been confronted.
268
 The Future War Fighting course also provides the learners a platform with 
readings on and exposure to the existing agencies, institutions and also their efforts to 
anticipate and further prepare for the future. In addition to these sub courses, each learner is 
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required to develop a formal paper that deals with the consequences of the significant change 
negating the underlying assumptions that concern the operational practice, equipment, 
organization or doctrine.  
The Learning Objectives/Outcomes of Future Warfighting:  
1. To enable the learners to effectively evaluate how the military organizations adapt, 
innovate, and change.  
2. To assess the likely impacts for a military organization when the basic tenets of that 
organization change. 
3. To enable the learners to evaluate the nature of innovation and also the changing 
character of war. 
4. To analyze the impact of the regional, political and cultural elements on the 
employment of future military forces. 
269
 
 The College of Distance Education and Training (CDET) became an issue for General 
Gray. As a former in-listed, General Gray by his very nature of looking out for all Marines felt 
this area of Marine Corps education was just as important as the rest of the Marine Corps 
University.  
He stated in our interview that:  
 “..one of the things that really bothered me was that only 25% of the officers would get 
to go to residence school and the other 75% were left out in the cold or would have to take it 
by correspondence or extension and so one of the chief parts of the professional military 
education program I directed, amongst other things, that I wanted the non-residence school 
effort to be as good or better than residence school effort..”270  
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS:  
These are formal schools that are specifically meant to accommodate the requirements 
of professional military education programs that are set for the noncommissioned officers 
(NCO’s), the Staff NCO’s and other officers. Currently, these schools include NCO schools, 
the Amphibious Warfare School, the Staff NCO Academies, the Command and Staff College, 
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The Basic School, Communication Officers School, all of which comprise the Marine Corps 
University. Included within the course offerings at the Command and Staff College are the 
new top level Art of War Studies Program and the new postgraduate School of Advanced 
Warfighting.
271
 
 
Officer Candidate Schools: 
This is the entry-level training for Marine officers that is equivalent to recruiting and 
training (Boot Camp) for the enlisted Marines. The majority of the Marine Corps officers 
often complete OCS in order to earn a commission. The officer candidates go through a 10-
week, or two 6-week courses that are spread over separate summers, and are designed 
primarily to screen, as well as evaluate the candidates' fitness to lead Marines by placing them 
in various leadership positions in a stressful environment. The students are evaluated during 2-
3 day garrison command billets at the squad and fire-team level tactical billets, platoon and 
company level, during field exercises. 
The Officer Education System Objectives and Goals: 
The main goal of OCS is to produce a cadre of broadly based officer leaders who: 
1.   Demonstrate critical judgment, integrity, confidence, and responsibility; 
2.   Are knowledgeable of "how the Marine Corps runs;" 
3.   Can adapt and solve problems creatively; 
4.   Can operate in an environment of ambiguity, complexity, and rapid change; 
5.   Are fully competent in tactical leadership and technical leadership;  
6. Can build effective teams amid continuous technological and organizational 
change.
272
 
 
At this juncture there seems to be a divergence of thought within the Marine Corps and 
occasionally from the outside by the lone critic (Mr. Bill Lind) as to the efficacy of teaching 
the doctrinal changes that comprise maneuver warfare’s “fighting smarter”. There also seems 
to be a small but growing group of Marine officers that feel that they are far from the mark in 
their professional development regarding maneuver warfare methodology as outlined by the 
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three commandants cited above; Gray, Krulak and Jones. These small groups, who are seeking 
more in depth maneuver warfare education, have gravitated to Bill Lind. The Lind objections, 
as well as the some of the current staff tasked with the furtherance of “fighting smarter” seem 
to be the basis for these young officers position.
273
  
What seemingly appears on the surface as an abandonment of the initial efforts to 
inculcate the doctrine of maneuver warfare into the ethos of the Marine Corps in reality is the 
conundrum that was offered by Col. John Boyd and reinforced by Col. Mike Wyly that once 
you are exposed to maneuver warfare it is not the end all and be all; but the starting point of a 
continual and ever changing military environment based on political, economic, social and 
militaristic aspect that make up of the Clausewitz’s Fog of War and Friction of War.274  
In addition, Marine Corps battlefield(s) Commanders who have utilized the concepts and 
motivation that are inculcated with “fighting smarter” were responsible for the success’ in Iraq 
(OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF) and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
275
  
Colonel Mike Wyly captured the essence of this in his description of the 1
st
 Marine 
Division in Iraq in 2003:  
“.. Fast forward to 2003: 1st Marine Division… again this time under the command of 
past-master maneuverist Major General Jim Mattis. The order of the day is “Move! Fast! Go 
where the enemy is not. There is security in speed! Keep the enemy off balance. Subordinates 
don’t wait for orders. Use high initiative! Find the weak spots and go! Twenty days after the 
forward thrust begins the Marines have covered four hundred miles and made it to Baghdad. 
Not even the vaunted World War II German Blitzkrieg across France moved that fast! …. 
Now – what about the small unit actions that ensued after the march up? Young lieutenants 
and captains can relate to you, fire fight after fire fight where it was their initiative, speed, 
flexibility, and license to make decisions on their own that saved American lives and threw 
the enemy off balance. They will tell you about “the other side of the coin”, too. Frustrated 
young captains can relate when “rules of engagement” and “bureaucracy” – the nemesis of 
maneuver warfare – held them back, stifled initiative. Many of those captains are back in 
Quantico now. I am in touch with them now. They are committed to ensuring that the Marine 
practice of maneuver lives and grows – along with the heavy influence of John Boyd and his 
OODA Loop..”276 
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It is evident that these up and coming officers, some of their current instructors and Bill 
Lind as well, need to reassess their respective positions as what fighting smarter actually 
means as it is applied by the Marine Corps. Lind, in his fashion, appears not to be flexible. 
Any deviance from strict adherence to the German model with its attending German 
vocabulary and the required “six book Lind Canon” is not acceptable!277 Couple this with the 
fact that Boydian maneuver warfare development needs to be dynamic and fluid; as dynamic 
and fluid as the changing complexion of each military engagement. Each militaristic event 
effects, and is effected by the operational art of warfare as it unfolds before the “Strategic 
Marine Corporal” and up through to the commanding Marine general officer. Of 
consequence, the Lind pontifications are unfounded and illogical in light Col. John Boyd’s 
guidance that this is just the starting point of his military philosophy.
278
 
Maneuver warfare as proffered by Generals Gray, Krulak and Jones is a part of the 
educational systems found at the Marine Corps University, OCS and The Basic School.  
A retired “maneuverist” Marine and prolific author on the subject of maneuver warfare 
who is currently under contract with MCU states that these topics of maneuver warfare are to 
be found within the syllabi of School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), Marine Corps War 
College (MCWAR), Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), The Future War curriculum, OCS 
and The Basic School curriculum in some form or other.  
As stated by Bruce Gudmundsson: 
“.. I think that having watched this for about thirty years popping in and out at various 
points, I first joined the Marine Corps Reserve in 1977 and have since then spent three different 
active duty tours and actually two tours after that.  First tour was boot camp and such.  And then 
having worked with the Marine Corps on and off since then mostly at Quantico, you see things 
ebb and flow.  It's very much like the tides if you'll forgive a maritime analogy.   
And the maneuver warfare thread is always there but it's got competitors.  Not so much in 
schools of thought sometimes but also in schools of non-thought.  That's to say the competing 
schools of thought are -- first of all, the Air Force dogma which keeps getting renamed every 
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decade or so but remains basically the idea that if you pick the right targets and service them, 
you're problem is solved.  So that effects base warfare, what have you … And that's been going 
on since the 1930's and goes all the way back to Giulio Douhet and 1918, 1919 or so.  So that 
idea is there. And that, of course, is probably the least powerful idea in the Marine Corps but it's 
got a lot of contractor money behind it and if you find yourself in the defense procurement world 
or certain circles, the Pentagon, that's an idea.  The Navy has bought into it too. The Navy and the 
Air Force have made peace with each other and with this air-sea battle document and the Navy 
has basically said we're also in the target servicing business.  So that's one competitor.  
The second competitor is what I'll call the Army way which is this idea that there is an ideal 
type of operation we want to conduct.  We work it out in detail.  We design our forces for it.  And 
anything that deviates from that is an interruption in our real job.  It's something we don't want to 
do.  I've called it neo-classism (sic). It's conventional warfare and it's based on the idea that you 
work things out in doctrine.  Some clever person writes a script.  You learn your lines and you do 
it.  A friend of mine, Bill Lind, who'd played a big role in the maneuver warfare movement, 
compares it to an opera company that only does Aida.  They do a great job of Aida.  Their paper 
Mache pyramids and elephants and the whole shebang but that's all they do.  The trouble is when 
you're called upon to do everything at the Improv which is what most operations are like.  So 
that's a second school of thought.   
And the schools of non-thought are the idea that we'll just sort of muddle through, the idea 
that the there is some grand wisdom somewhere in the institution and we'll be taught what we 
need to know before we need to know it. So these schools of thought have been competing for a 
long time and at any given time one predominates, one over the other.   
So at certain schools, The Basic School traditionally, the Expeditionary Warfare School, 
The School for Captains, for the O3's, because O3's are ranked on an MOS, are very much 
influenced by the Army way, that opera company doing Aida model.  And in fact they use the 
word "doctrine" improperly.  By improperly I mean that officially the Marine Corps doctrines is 
only little white books, there's only war fighting and its companions.  Everything else is just 
technique.  But they tend to use the word "doctrine" in the same way as the Army does which is 
to say these scripts for various types of operations. 
 The Air Force idea gets pretty powerful once you get to the staff colleges, and part of that 
is because all the service staff colleges tend to borrow material and personnel from each other.  
When you have political sciences, the easiest sort of military technique or military approach to 
adopt is, again, that Air Force approach, where it's very simple …  It's simple and it's predictable 
in its outcome, at least that's the theory. So you have all these intellectual threads going, and 
maneuver warfare is one of them. It's [maneuver warfare] been enshrined in war fighting but 
there are a lot of people who don't read it or who've read it and not embraced it.  I'd probably 
include the current commandant in that, General Amos.   
And the Marine Corps like the Coast Guard is a monarchy.  The other services are 
oligarchies where you have a lot of four star barons and there's a counsel of barons and the chief 
of staff or chief of naval operations is merely the most senior of them.  The Marine Corps and the 
Coast Guard actually have a commandant and commandants have a lot of influence, both 
ceremonial and practical.  And a lot of people, of course, will take their cues from the 
commandant.  
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So what's the state of maneuver warfare?  It doesn't have the energy it had during the Al 
Gray days but it has influenced the culture.  For example, I'll use the anecdote 1984, maybe '85, I 
was a young officer serving in Okinawa, and I was discussing military history at dinnertime and 
colonel comes up to me and chews me out.  He says why can't you talk about something normal 
like sports?  Now fast forward to the Gray years.  It's now 1990.  He's been assigned as an 
instructor at The Staff College and he is ostentatiously reading the same book, one book, but he 
makes sure that every time he reads it his door is open and that people can see him doing his 
professional reading. So twenty, thirty years ago if you were seriously into your profession, you 
were seen as an odd duck and in some cases actively -- persecuted is much too strong a word but 
it was not the type of thing that made you one of the group. Nowadays those who don't do it 
apologize for it.  I think a lot more people are doing it..”279  
In responding to the following question that it's a maneuver warfare evolution and  that the 
Marine Corps in one way, shape or form throughout its history and into its DNA, if you will, has 
used maneuver warfare whether it's been institutionalized by General Gray or it came 
serendipitously through schwerpunkt in battle. Gundmunsson stated:  
“..I think that's fair.  I think that there are underlying -- I'll use the analogy of a river and 
that the water is always coming in, it's always going out, and it comes from various places but 
there is a mainstream.  And there is, I think, a mainstream in the Marine Corps culture, the DNA 
to use your term that might be called maneuver warfare “lite”.  So for example, you have two 
officers both of whom are partaking of the Aida view  They're people who when it comes to 
putting together a course or describing what the Marine Corps does have taken a small "d" 
doctrinaire approach.  They want to have the scripts.  But when push comes to shove and you tell 
the Marine to do something different, he'll do it.  You give him a different mission, he'll do it; 
whereas the Army guy will go off and say "no thank you” if he can.  And if he can't say "no 
thank you" he'll stamp his feet and grouse about how this is not real soldiering.  So I'm not saying 
all Army guys are like that.  I'm just saying that's sort of the mainstream view that comes out.  
So there is an ad hocery about the Marine Corps which comes from self-perception, it 
comes from history, it comes from pride in being different, adaptive, having a tradition that's not 
based on any particular mode, any particular technique.  So if you look at the way Marines 
celebrate their own history -- and Marines are very much aware of their history in a way that 
members of other services aren't.  There is a celebration of doing lots of different things.  So that 
creates an inherent flexibility and there is a celebration of the innovator which has a particularly 
interesting effect during the Krulak years.  And I think the reason that the maneuver warfare 
movement took hold in the Marine Corps and persists, I'm not saying its dominant, but it 
certainly captured the debate in the Marine Corps.  Now, the difficulty, of course, is that there are 
a lot of people who just don't care about debate, but for the Marine Corps, for Marine Corps 
ideology it is enshrined in Warfighting and the other documents.  So it's official.  
Anyway, what I'm trying to say is that there's a natural affinity, that there are two 
phenomena here.  There is the maneuver warfare movement per se and there's a broader culture 
and the broader culture in the Marine Corps again, to use your term, the DNA, is more conducive 
to the maneuver warfare mindset than the DNA in other services .. “ 
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 Further discussion with Gundmunsson provided the de facto realities in regard to 
maneuver warfare and the current posture of the Marine Corps:   
 “.. I'm not looking for 100% maneuver warfare purity.  I'm happy with the 80 percent 
solution.  My central point is that the maneuver warfare movement even though it often had that 
Teutonic flavor to it because of Bill Lind and because of the accessibility of literature and what 
was available at the time, is in keeping with a current within Marine Corps history, a broader 
current within Marine Corps history; and, whether it's a dominant current or not; it it’s certainly a 
major current today.   
 So that's going on. The other thing that's going on is that now that maneuver warfare is 
official, now that MCDP1 has been enshrined, there's a tendency to use the vocabulary of 
maneuver warfare whether or not you're drinking from that particular well.  This was certainly 
the case, I think, with General Krulak.   
 So no commandant is going to argue against maneuver warfare but you get a lot of what I 
call superficial understanding and not just among commandants, among a lot of Marines in 
general.  
 Our mission is to promote the use of the case method within the Marine Corps.  And we 
actually work for a private foundation.  We don't work for the Marine Corps.  We work for The 
Marine Corps University Foundation.  What happened was that there was a gentleman who had 
served in the Marine Corps in the late '70's, then gone to Harvard Business School and then went 
to make a whole lot of money as a venture capitalist.  And he wanted it to be said that the secret 
to his success was a combination of the Marine Corps and the Harvard case method.  And so he 
gave a bunch of money to do that, to promote the use of the case method within the Marine 
Corps. Quite independently of that, years ago I came to the conclusion that the “lost wax” of 
maneuver warfare in the German tradition and the thing that we were missing in our maneuver 
warfare movement was the use of problems, simulations, games.   
 And a big part of the German system was the combination of these tactical decision 
games, these map problems, staff rides, things like that.  And by staff ride I don't mean a history 
lesson on the ground as the Army calls the staff ride, but actually going out to a place where you 
expect a battle to take place, an operation to take place, and working through theoretical 
situations, fictional situations.   
 That, plus the attention to the military history I think was at the heart of the German 
tradition and that was largely -- not entirely -- missing from what we were doing and that it was a 
practice rather than a theory. So we tended to over-emphasize reading.  By "we," we in the 
maneuver movement because that's how we learned rather than emphasizing these exercise, these 
games.  And the games constantly saying here's the situation, what do you do, what are your 
orders?  And asking people for their decisions rather than some pat answer, some recited -- we're 
not looking for recitation.  We're not testing knowledge, we're asking for a decision.  That belief 
has very much colored what we do.  So I am taking this project to use the Harvard case method 
which is similar in many respects.  And I borrow the prestige of Harvard and the fact that once 
they hit middle age, most military officers’ start fantasizing about being businessmen; this adds 
that missing element in our own maneuver warfare movement.   
 We are developing these cases and teaching the instructors how to teach these cases.  And 
these are situations that are drawn from history, and drawing them from history is the key, 
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because I think the critical mistake the Germans made was that the majority of their problems 
were fictional.  Let’s just say they take real terrain but invent the situations.  And that gave them 
a bias towards tactics as opposed to the higher arts of war.  They tend to neglect logistics, neglect 
grand strategy, and neglect just anything that wasn't tactics, so they ended up with these tactical 
geniuses but strategic nincompoops. What we're doing is we're promoting maneuver warfare by 
promoting the case method.  These problems that are open-ended problems that require custom-
tailored solutions and we're constantly saying "what's your plan, sir, what do you do" have a big 
element of role play, work hard to make sure that we draw from a wide selection of historical 
periods so we're often playing different people from different perspectives.  We don't just play 
Americans.  We don't just play Marines.  We play all sorts of people.  We'll often say okay, we've 
done it from this point of view, now let's do it from the other point of view.  So we have Red 
Teams who are doing red teams.  That's what we do. So our official job is both the case method, 
our unofficial drive is to promote maneuver warfare through the case method and we're both 
learning from the Germans but also learning from the Germans' mistakes.. “280 
  
My next question probed the idea that maneuver warfare was embedded in the entire course 
materials offered at these schools. Gudmundsson replied:  
 “..  What happened during the Gray years is the maneuver warfare movement captured 
the vocabulary, and that was certainly a victory and there's a lot of legitimacy in that.  Whether 
that translates into actual belief or action is a different story.  But, there certainly has been the 
triumph for maneuver warfare vocabulary…..  I think it was a partial success but the other 
currents are still there.  And what's the dominant current?  I think it really depends on what 
people you're talking to. Our strategy is to start from the bottom and work up.  That's a function 
of who are the most receptive.  The people who are the most receptive to this are NCO's.  The 
second group is junior officers and so on and so forth and moving up.  The approach is very non-
theoretical; it may even be anti-theoretical.  But we don't go in there with theory.  We just go in 
there with "here's the situation, here's your role."  We start addressing the student in that role so it 
definitely becomes a game and there is the sense that this is something a little bit different, this is 
something fun.  And then we say "what do you do?"  And if somebody throws out maneuver 
warfare jargon, we say "well, what do you mean by that answer?"  The point here is not to get 
people to recite the decree.  The point is to say, "Okay, here's the situation.  What do you do?"  
And if somebody says, "I'm going to get inside their Oodaloop," I say what do you mean by 
that?”  How do you plan to do that?  How do you communicate that?  What are your orders?" It's 
very deliberately Socratic and not the dogmatic Socrates of Plato but the open-ended Socrates of 
the Discourse. A good way to get at our approach is by looking at Mortimer Adler, stuff he was 
writing in the '40's and '50's; actually he was writing through the '80's.  You have to be very 
Socratic if not dogmatic so that the question is / are we teaching maneuver warfare?  I would say 
we're teaching pre-maneuver warfare.  This is the empirical action-oriented approach, open-
architecture approach of which maneuver warfare is a part.  I think the mistake we mad -- I won't 
say "mistake" -- this may have been unavoidable given what we had, the resources we had but 
the imperfection of what we did in the '80's and early '90's, by laying out a dogma and the 
attempting to lay out a theory and that is something that few people are able to learn from and 
that is not appealing to a lot of people.  So I think what we're doing I think will draw in more 
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people and give people a deeper understanding and better yet set them on a path of self-
education. Kind of like General Mattis [who has a] thirst for reading military history. But, the 
difference is that it's not just a matter of reading.  If we tell people just to read -- first of all a lot 
of people don't read.  We're in a post-literate age.  It's a Golden Age for people who do read but 
it's never been easier to find books but competitors for books are legion as well.  But even among 
those who do read, do people know how to read?  And the trick to knowing how to read is to go 
into the book with lots of questions.  So a lot of what we do is we get people thinking.  We give 
them lots of questions.  We leave them with questions because our job as instructors is to ask 
questions not to provide answers..”281 
 I then posed to Gudmundsson the following thought; I think the Marine Corps as it 
approaches maneuver warfare, puts a Marine imprimatur on it, a customized version if you will 
of MCWW maneuver warfare.  
He replied:  
 “..This is something that the Marine Corps culture, the way of doing business that will 
always evolve. And, again, the point of the maneuver warfare movement was not to create a pure 
ideal and then judge the Marine Corps against it.  The point, I think, was to take a tradition and 
build upon it.  There was a pre-existing inclination and that maneuver warfare pushed the Marine 
Corps further in that direction. I think that essentially all the military sciences are based on 
history.  That's how you get at them unless you're dealing with something that's purely physical 
like ballistics.  Your way to understand things is history.  Our official motto is that there is no 
goddess by Clio and Michael Howard is her prophet. That's another big part of what we're doing.  
We're trying to plug Marines into that treasure trove of history, make it relative to them, and 
make it accessible to them.  Fundamentally this is about education because we don't know what 
they're going to be called upon to do tomorrow, let alone ten years from now.  There's a great 
deal of uncertainty out there, and that uncertainty is inherent for the warrior.  So we don't want to 
give them a blueprint that they're going to have to dismiss anyway.  We want to give them the 
ability to sketch their own blueprints the ability to think openly..”282 
 In concurrence with what has been offered by certain faculty of the MCU, the 
following has been offered by a future Marine officer as he completes the required curriculum 
of The Basic School:  
Question 1: To what extent is the tenets of FMFM-1 (CMC Gray) and the follow on 
MCDP 1 (CMC Krulak) taught at The Basic School today? 
“..MCDP1 is the back bone of The Basic School Curriculum in my opinion. Initially, 
we are told to read the doctrine at least once. After this point, we have a number of discussion 
groups regarding the doctrine. Most of these groups were roughly within two weeks upon the 
read completion date of the book. Following these discussion groups, the elements of Friction, 
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Uncertainty, Fluidity, Disorder, Complexity, Human Factors, Violence and Danger, and 
Physical moral and Mental Forces are witnessed every day.  There has yet to be a day to date 
that we have not been exposed to some kind of element of war listed above.  This includes the 
weekdays when we are in garrison (uncertainty of the schedule, complexity of the classwork, 
and physical moral and mental forces from PT, class work, and time management).  The 
weekends are not much better, as every weekend is a time to prepare as much as possible to 
limit your uncertainty for the next week and limit the disorder of gear prep, study time on the 
weekdays. Finally the field, this is where every aspect of warfighting is implemented. 
Whether it be an instructor dropping artillery sim [ulation device] next to your patrol, causing 
you to make a decision on a next course of action as quickly as possible.  These situations 
bring problems because of the disorder. They essentially are testing the fluidity of your order, 
how can you adapt to a terrible situation, how long does it take you to react, how tactical is 
your solution, how to you adapt to your plan b going to hell, etc. Other situations could be 
lack of Intel when going on an attack. A 6 digit grid point is only as accurate up to 100 meters. 
So when you’re only given Intel from higher on an enemy location in the vicinity of a 6 digit 
point, the uncertainty is always high. In addition to this, the visibility in the tree line only 
reaches up to 200 meters. Forcing you to develop a plan encompassing any kind of contact 
you may encounter, because as we all know, you will not be attacked when you are ready, it is 
when you are most exposed, and in the worst possible position to form any solid counter 
attack, will you be attacked. These situations force the leader to make an aggressive decision 
and maneuver on the enemy, reinforcing the violence of action and thought process of 
bringing the fight to the enemy with a tempo that YOU control, not the enemy.. “283 
 
Question 2: How are the principles of OODA Loop and Patterns of Conflict by Col. 
John Boyd presented to these future officers of the Marine Corps?  
“..The OODA Loop is a continuous cycle presented to Junior Officers and is preached 
in hope that we will understand what Col Boyd was trying to say. Essentially, the leader who 
can process information and data faster will make a decision faster. This rapid information 
processing starts with knowledge. I was told by one of the staff officers here at TBS that "The 
Marine Officers best weapon is his mind." We fine tune that weapon by constantly reading 
and engaging the weapon.  Everything we are taught is meant to be interpreted differently, 
because there should never be one solution or answer to anything. The knowledge gained off 
of reading is then discussed in groups, and geared toward how we can implement these 
readings. The idea of "getting in the enemy's OODA" is something that we must always be 
attempting to accomplish. It is never good enough, to just say what the enemy is doing, but 
what he is thinking, and what he will think/do upon contact, or maneuver, or any other 
variable thrown in to combat.  This is developed in our Period of Instruction and described as 
the Enemy's most Likely Course of Action. This is where we make assumptions based on Intel 
and previous enemy actions on the current enemy situation.  This is to include his MG 
orientation, fields of fire, defensive positions, etc. After that, we establish conditions which 
will force the enemy to conduct some type of movement (Defend heavily, reinforce from 
others, attack, withdraw, or delay our advance). Essentially the purpose in this is to get inside 
the enemy's OODA. What he will be doing before we get there, what will he do when we get 
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there, and then what will he do when we impose our will on him. This is called "red celling" 
the enemy, because as we all know, nobody stands still like crazy Ivan on the range, the 
enemy is moving and as we adapt to his movements he adapts to ours. Thus the constant 
struggle of getting inside the enemy's OODA ties directly to warfighting's fluidity. The faster 
our Tempo and more friction forced on our enemy, the less likely he is to cycle his 
OODA..”284 
 
Question 3 How is this doctrine of USMC maneuver warfare presented to these future 
officers getting ready to lead Marines on an off the battlefield? 
“.. Maneuver warfare is presented to the young Lts. of the Marine Corps as theory, to 
which we apply it in our own means. Much like MCDP 1, MCDP 1-3, and all other Marine 
Corps doctrine, Marine Officers are expected to grasp concepts and theories, and run wild 
with them.  This is the beauty of small unit leadership. Maneuver warfare is presented to us as 
fluidity and tempo on the battlefield. The instructors are always pushing and probing, 
especially in the field, to force the unit leaders to make clear and concise decisions faster and 
faster. Every moment spent "thinking" of what to do next is another moment spent in a kill 
zone, and that is the mindset pushed on us. In Garrison, the tempo at which we keep activities 
and keeps Marines engaged helps keep them in tactical mindsets. We may have a tactical 
discussion group where we are a squad leader on a patrol and we are faced with a combined 
arms dilemma, or on a squad attack and in route to the objective you take fire and have the 
ability to destroy an enemy platoon, but it is not near your objective. It is in these discussion 
groups where the mind is sharpened after the tactics are taught. These groups are where 
maneuver theories are applied in possible real life theories in garrison..”285 
  
The question has been posed concerning a Marine officer’s current education based 
upon the Cox interview:  
Do I [the author] think this interview’s responses are shared widely at The Basic 
School? And additionally how could I prove it. In response I offer the following thoughts: 
1. All the maneuver warfare doctrine has been defined and incorporated in the 
educational and training processes. 
2. Every commandant from General Gray to today has in their own way, signed off on 
and expanded Gray’s “intent” in FMFM-1 Warfighting; so de jure, the die is cast until this 
doctrine changes by some future commandant’s direction. 
3. De facto, the responses to my questions are in the traditions and exposure to the 
original intent of Colonels Wyly and Boyd and General Gray before and during his 
commandancy. 
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4. It seems per Bruce Gudmundsson it is taken seriously by the NCO and the younger 
junior officer cadres within the Marine Corps. 
5. Albeit small in number Marine Corps generals such has Mattis, Conway, Kelly 
questioned have attested to the success won because of Marine Corps battlefield applications 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This also implies that there are a large number of Majors through 
Colonels and Brigadiers of Marines serving under them and utilizing the maneuver warfare 
doctrine; as their predecessors did in Grenada and Gulf War I, Somalia and other “Small War” 
applications.  
For those who have been the torchbearers, evolutionists; and past, current or future 
practitioners for this doctrine it must be noted that there is nothing more important than this 
idea of fighting smarter for the Marine Corps by using the doctrine of maneuver warfare. And, 
any abrogation of this exposure for Marines’ military education would not be acceptable 
especially in the current 4
th
 and 5
th
 Generation Warfare environments. Lastly it may be added 
that this error of omission would be a throwback to the days of the attritionist ways of 
American warfare.
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Chapter 6: 1991 to 2001 Small Wars to Big Wars 
This chapter will discuss the use of maneuver warfare by the Marine Corps. The 
chapter’s main focus will be on strategy and tactics used by the Marine Corps and its use of 
maneuver warfare principles in small actions. It will span the military actions and 
humanitarian assistance in the post Desert Storm period through to the start of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in 2001. To recap the concepts of warfare in general, there are three 
accepted warfare theories today:  
1. Attritional warfare,  
2. Revolutionary or Irregular warfare,  
3. Maneuver Warfare.  
This time period exemplifies what has been acknowledged as “Small Wars.” It is a 
projection of force employed by the United States Marine Corps for what could be considered 
an emergency use of military assets to either join in combat or carry out life sustaining 
operations in times of natural or man-made disaster.  
The term is defined in the 1940 Marine Corps publication Small Wars Manual, 
FMFRP 12-15 as follows:  
“.. Small wars defined……The term "Small War" is often a vague name for any one of 
a great variety of military operations. As applied to the United States, small wars are 
operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with 
diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is 
unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are 
determined by the foreign policy of our Nation..” 287 
 
It must also be noted that this publication was written in the post “Banana Wars” era. 
The kinetic memory of these Marine deployments, are still fresh in the DNA of Marine Corps’ 
“Small Wars” history. It defined the doctrine, tactics, campaigning and strategy that 
eventually was incorporated into the Maneuver Warfare Doctrine that was refined and 
enhanced by Gen. Al Gray and his cadre of evolutionists. It was during the Gray 
Commandancy that the Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15 went into a reprint and 
redistribution to all Marines.
288
  The Small War Manual finds its way into the current military 
environments of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. A redefined 
                                                          
287
 Small Wars Manual, 1-1, 1. 
 
288
 Formally available as NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual, originally printed in 1940. This was 
reprinted at the direction of Gen. Gray CMC, Marine Corps Combat Development Group, (Quantico VA: 1990). 
 
126 
 
joint Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. Army No. 3-24 / U. S. 
Marine Corps MCWP No. 3-33.5) was published in 2007 and co-authored by General David 
Petraeus (US Army) and Lt. General James Amos (U.S. Marine Corps / Asst. Commandant). 
Of importance here is the fact that close to ninety percent of this publication comes from the 
original Marine Corps 1940 Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15. 
289
 
The United States Marine Corps had over its long and successful history integrated 
maneuver warfare doctrine, strategy and tactics into its combat and humanitarian approaches. 
The concept of maneuver warfare, for the layman, is nothing more than a “clever” plan, action 
or movement to gain the upper hand in an “adversarial” event. An adversary may mean the 
enemy and or the elements that are the cause(s) of natural and man-made disasters. This 
therefore would mean that maneuver warfare can be expressed not only through military 
actions but also through non-military actions such as humanitarian assistance.  
As stated in the previous parts of this dissertation, the success of maneuver warfare 
depends on the use of these following principles: 
1. The military force that applies this form of warfare has to be decentralized.
290
  
2. If an action has to be communicated to the highest rank, then the decision 
transmitted all the way back through the process will prove time consuming and ineffective.  
3. Time is a major aspect of every military operation; maneuver is about gaining a time 
advantage over the opposing military or a non-military event.  
4. Decisions have to be made as per the situation,
291
 and then communicated later to 
the chain of command; this done in order to give the headquarters a gist of the military’s 
performance so that it can carry out its oversight role effectively.  
5. Maneuver warfare is characterized by a disorganized approach to combat, the 
military has to be ready to adopt and work with the disorder and chaos.
292
  
6. Communication through the entire rank is at times decentralized since it is hard to 
tell what path the action is taking from the components of higher ranks.  
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7. Spreading confusion or chaos to the enemy gives the attacking military an 
advantage over the opposing military.
293
  
8. Operating under such chaotic conditions can take its toll on the attacking military as 
well.  
9. There should never be a set battle space formula, there are no guidelines as the 
military’s actions are to remain unpredictable to the opposition. 
10. It is very important to remain as subtle as possible and keep the opponent 
guessing.
294
 
11. In humanitarian assistance actions, speed not deception is the desired outcome. 
The United States Marine Corps has used this approach in most of its operations to an 
extent that it is actually the main focus of effort for these operations. This chapter will focus 
on its strategies and tactics in selected operations while giving special attention to the 
application of maneuver warfare. The core areas of operations addressed in this section 
include: Operation Provide Comfort; Operation Fiery Vigil; the Los Angeles Riots; Somalia 
Operation Restore Hope; Balkans Operation Deny Flight; Operation Distant Runner; Haiti 
Operation Uphold Democracy; Liberia; Central African Republic; Bosnia / Kosovo; Albania; 
Sierra Leone; Eritrea; Operation Desert Fox; Balkans Operation Allied Force; East Timor.  
 Marine Corps General John Kelly (CO, U.S. Southern Command) reflects on “Small 
Wars” and the importance of them to the Marine Corps:  
 “..I think the Marine Corps was actually very, very maneuverish prior to World War II, 
and a lot of that just had to do with the nature of warfare in the Caribbean and the fact that we 
didn't have -- this is, I think, important -- we didn't have any written doctrine.   
 The Marine Corps really didn't have truly written [code or doctrine] we had a Small Wars 
Manual. Small Wars Manual is mostly a discussion about warfare but there's no "how to" in the 
suggestions about it.  But there's no "how to" if you will.  
 Even if you go back to World War I, as we prepared to go overseas, we essentially were 
taught methodical warfare by the attritionists in it and that is the French.  And so from that we 
fell in on the French style of warfare in World War I.  But then when we came out of that, totally 
methodical -- the firepower intensive and all that  
 -- and then when we came out of that and operated in the Caribbean, we just had a bunch 
of NCO's and young officers who were doing warfare and thinking through the challenges they 
had with no written doctrine. Small Wars Manual gets written, which didn't then pertain to World 
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War II really.  But you had a bunch of guys, NCO's and young officers, who had been in the 
Caribbean fighting and thinking and adjusting and they were very intellectually agile guys.   
 So we took that jungle war experience to the first battle, Guadalcanal, and we were very 
good at it.  We were very, very, very good.  The Japanese were supposed to be the best jungle 
fighters in the world and the first time they met Americans on a battlefield they met their match 
in the U.S. Marines because of the experiences coming out of the '20's and '30's from Haiti and 
Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, all that..”295  
 The lessons learned from small wars and humanitarian assistance throughout the 
twentieth century became a continuing thread in the evolution of the Marine Corps and its 
institutionalizing maneuver warfare into a MCWW.  
Operation Provide Comfort 
The 1980’s to 1990’s witnessed the cruel reign of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. During his 
dictatorship, he caused immense suffering and inflicted numerous atrocities on the citizens of 
Iraq. One ethnic group that bore the greatest of Saddam’s horrors was the Kurdish minority in 
northeast Iraq. The Kurds were a segregated people whose lives revolved around Kurdish 
tribal loyalties. To this end, their undying loyalty to their tribal heritage earned them the 
enmity and animosity from other Iraqi tribal and political groups, as well as the Ba’athist 
regime in particular. Saddam Hussein unleashed a deathly campaign of ethnic cleansing 
against the Kurds. His tool of inflicting this ethnic cleansing was the Iraqi military and the 
ultimate use of chemical warfare. He escalated the brutality when the Kurds openly revolted 
against his Ba’athist regime. The reports estimate that over five thousand Kurds perished in 
this 1988 chemical warfare attack.
296
 As the suffering escalated, the Kurds fled Iraq for 
neighboring countries. They lived in refugee camps in the rugged mountainous regions of 
Turkey. The temperatures there were extreme and harsh, usually below the freezing point. The 
sanitation was poor and this was worsened by disease and famine. Conditions in these camps 
made it difficult for the refugees to be thankful to the Turkish government. Turkey had 
naturally been reluctant about the influx of Kurdish refugees but obliged after international 
pressure made them yield. As their relationship with the Turkish government became more 
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strained, the Kurds’ plight caught global attention and the focus of the United Nations.297 
President Bush (41) ordered the formation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) whose mission was to 
protect the Iraqi Kurds. This military response action was Operation Provide Comfort. The 
principal objectives of the operation as stated by President Bush were to enable the Iraqi 
Kurds to return home and to live in peace, free from oppression, free to lead their own 
lives.
298
This military operations revolved around delivery of humanitarian aid in the 
demilitarized zone as JTF fighter planes patrolled the skies above Iraq’s 36th parallel.  
The 24
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and a battalion of the Army’s 325th 
Airborne Infantry was taken to Zakhu, Iraq. It was named JTF Bravo. They were to oversee 
the return of the Kurds to their homes. Moreover, they were charged with the duty of building 
resettlement camps where the Kurds would have access to food, water, sanitation and security.  
They were also charged with handling unexploded ordnance within the camp and creating 
avoidance awareness of these explosives. They effectively carried out their tasks as assigned. 
It was quite difficult to promote peace while at the same time warding off the Iraqi Army 
which posed possible assaults at every opportunity. The policy applied by the Marine Corps 
was called “aggressive restraint.” This involved not condoning any Iraqi attacks, but at the 
same time it was supposed to allow the Iraqi military to withdraw peacefully from the 
Kurdistan region in this post-Gulf War I environment. This became essential because the 
Marines were in this operation at a numerical disadvantage.
299
 Instead of engaging with 
military force they resorted to peaceful but aggressive means of approaching the conflict. This 
is a tenet of maneuver warfare’s refusing to give battle unless it was to the benefit of the 
aggressor, in this case, the Marine Corps. This caused general confusion within the Iraqi 
Army, but saw the success of this operation in the long term.  
The Marines also involved the Kurds in the decision making process and the Kurdish 
resettlement plan. In addition, the Marines let the Kurds take part in the construction of the 
settlements. This brought Kurdish loyalty, giving the Marines an advantage over the Iraqi 
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Army by winning support of the population. It was a very subtle way of bringing maneuver 
warfare to humanitarian assistance. This was a page taken from Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 
12-45 and the DNA of the Marine Corps.
300
 Operation Provide Comfort integrated a sub-
operation which was named “Encourage Hope”. It was mainly concerned with the 
psychological aid given to the refugees. The integration of this operation has made Operation 
Provide Comfort one of the most successful operations in the history of humanitarian 
assistance as provided by the Marine Corps to date. 
OPERATION FIERY VIGIL-PHILLIPINES 
Mount Pinatubo, a volcano that had been dormant for 600 years, suddenly erupted in 
Philippines. The volcano sent ash and smoke 40,000 feet into the air, plunging the Philippine 
island of Luzon into darkness. For the next two days lava flowed out of the mountain 
completely covering the landscape. In addition, a typhoon hit the Philippines coastal area at 
the same time. The rain water mixed with the ash that was suspended in the air and gave the 
appearance that it was raining mud. The weight of this mixture made roofs collapse. The ash 
that had settled around the mountain also mixed with the water and flowed down the Pinatubo 
River. In response to this growing humanitarian crisis, a United States Marine Corps military 
contingent was deployed. It was made up of 6,000 Marines and sailors from III MEF and 
Marine Barracks at Subic Bay Naval Base. Their mission was to help the 50,000 U.S 
servicemen, and dependents as well as thousands of Philippinos who had been displaced by 
the onset of the volcanic eruptions and the typhoon.
301
  
The operation was named Fiery Vigil. It was led by MAGTF 4-90, in which Col. 
Marshall B. Darling was in command. MAGTF 4-90 was later joined by the 15
th
 MEU (SOC) 
and MAGTF 2-91 which were led by Col. Terrence P. Murray and Lt. Col. Larry E. Johnson 
respectively. Despite their recent departure from the Gulf War, the III MEF was to aid in the 
relief effort by delivering the required supplies for the Marines in the Philippines.
302
 The 
Marines had several missions during the operation which entailed assisting the topographical 
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experts in studying the volcanic activity, conducting surveys to determine where mudflows 
were likely to develop, deploying security detachments, constructing potable water units, 
distributing food, evacuation, repair of power sources and conducting cleanup operations. 
Marine Corps helicopters that were involved in the evacuation included HMH-772, based with 
MAG-36 on Okinawa, backed by HMM-163 from the 15
th
 MEU (SOC) and Helicopter 
Squadron 12 from the USS Midway (CV 41). By 28
th
 July, the entire evacuation exercise was 
completed. The speed and agility evident during the operation was a vital insight into 
maneuver warfare as it was applied to humanitarian assistance. In this case, a high rate of 
tempo coupled with a main focus of effort paid off for the Marine Corps. An estimated 20,000 
people were evacuated from the Philippine island of Luzon. The greatest percentages of these 
evacuees were sent to displacement centers on Cebu, aboard Seventh Fleet ships that were 
also dispatched. Other evacuees boarded aircraft to continental United States, after a short 
stopover at Guam for processing. The naval base at Subic Bay was in operation during the 
entire relief operation even though it was damaged. The employment of the MAGTF 4-90 and 
MAGTF 2-91 shows the relevance of maneuver warfare in this entire combined air, land and 
sea operation.
303
 The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is an asset of the Maritime 
Prepositioning Force (MPF) program whose main characteristic is its ability to respond 
quickly to all incidents ranging from humanitarian operations to main theater war efforts.  
LOS ANGELES RIOTS 
On March 3
rd
 1991, Los Angeles Police Department officers brutally beat Rodney 
King, an African American. The beating was preceded by an intense car chase across LA 
County between the victim, and LA Police Department. A resident video recorded the beating 
incident from his balcony, then later made it available it to the local television station, KTLA. 
The video only showed Rodney King being struck by the police batons over 50 times. More 
than twenty officers were present at the scene. King sustained serious injuries including 
twelve fractures. King was released without any charges being pressed against him while the 
arresting officers were charged by an LA grand jury in connection with the incident. The 
judge in the case declined to press charges against the seventeen officers who watched the 
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incident including the four officers who had administered the beating. In a change of venue 
the four officers who had beat King were also later acquitted.  
Because of the legal rulings, a county-wide riot took place in Los Angeles County. It 
was instigated by its minority population of African Americans. The tipping point of the riots 
was reached when a white truck driver was pulled out of his truck and beaten almost to death 
by the now out of control rioters. Governor Pete Wilson declared a state of emergency and 
National Guard troops were called upon to contain the situation. Heavy patrols were 
authorized on the streets by the California National Guards (CANG) and a Marine Corps 
Reserve component. The Marines which were engaged did not escalate their actions in force 
projection levels. However, the Marine Corps mere presence on streets provided enough 
incentive at keeping the rioters at bay and prevented further looting and destruction of public 
and private property. With strategic locations and active patrols the Los Angeles streets 
became pacified.
304
  
A key tenant in maneuver warfare is shaping the AOR and then deciding when to offer 
force projection to an adversary. The Marine Corps Reserve component’s posture acted as an 
intimidation measure for the rioters. In this regard, the riots came to a sudden end as law and 
order was restored. A major part of Warfighting is imbued with not only Boyd’s OODA Loop, 
but also the Asian military philosophy of Sun Tzu which offers the guidance required to 
understand one’s adversary before thoughtful force projection is applied. In this case the 
Marine Corps had the situation well in hand by not delivering force projection.
305
  
BALKANS OPERATION DENY FLIGHT, BOSNIA/ KOSOVO/ ALBANIA, OPERATION 
ALLIED FORCE 
 I have taken the liberty of combining three different yet independent Marine Corps 
actions as they played out in the dissolution of the nation state of Yugoslavia into its original 
ethnic entities’ boundary lines. The first was Operation Deny Flight. Its importance for 
maneuver warfare applications is minimal, yet when coupled with the other operations in 
Bosnia it helps shape this future battlefield as well as disrupt the actions and developments of 
the Bosnian Croats and Serbs war plans and strategy. The second and third operation; Bosnia, 
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Kosovo and Albania along with Operation Allied Force are excellent examples of employing  
maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps in the area of combined arms as well as employing 
other maneuver warfare strategy and tactics.
306
 
 Bosnia lies in the middle of the former Yugoslavia. It is made up of three major socio-
ethnic groups. These are the Muslims who make up about forty four percent of the population, 
the Christian Serbs who are thirty one percent and the Croats who are seventeen percent. In 
total the population constitutes 4.6 million people. In 1992 a referendum that sought Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s independence from Yugoslavia was approved which caused fighting to break 
out. In a bid to expand the boundaries of their territories and to link them, the Serbs embarked 
on a military campaign. The campaign was also aimed at cleansing the Muslim ethnic tribes 
that were not of Serb origins. This entailed the extensive use of murder, rape and forced 
relocation as a way of forcing the Muslims and Croats out of the territory that the Christian 
Serbs believed was theirs. The Bosnian Croats employed the same methods in the regions they 
sought to capture. Bosnia-Herzegovina was therefore thrown into a series of socio-ethnic 
cleansing campaigns that led to enormous bloodshed.
307
  
The United Nations employed their UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in an attempt 
to bring the sectarian fighting to an end and restore peace. This became a non-starter because 
there was insufficient political support from the key countries in the European Union. It was 
perceived that the strength of the Bosnian Serb position was too formidable to risk UN action. 
The United States also refused to engage in this conflict. Eventually the Clinton 
Administration agreed to work alongside the French and the British in resolving the conflict. 
The Bosnian Serbs were viewed as the initiators of the conflict, but using extreme force 
against them was not condoned by the world court of public opinion; including a reconstituted 
post-Cold War Russia. Russia which had maintained close ties with the Serbs would never 
tolerate use of such force against the Serbs. Acting within the limits of United Nations 
mandate and resolutions remained the only U.N. option to retain its position of neutrality and 
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still be able to effectively employ its combined military power. These provisions led NATO to 
offer their air assets to UNPROFOR in October 1992.
308
  
The mission of Operation Deny Flight revolved around three objectives. Foremost, 
was to carry out aerial monitoring and ensure adherence to the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 816, which enforced a ban on all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the 
airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also known as the “No-Fly Zone” (NFZ). Second, it was to 
provide protective air cover, Close Air Support to U.N. forces on the ground upon request and 
under the jurisdiction of the U.N. peace keeping forces as per the U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 836, 958 and 981.Third, it was to carry out airstrikes, with U.N. approval, against 
designated targets that put at risk the security of the U.N. safe areas which included Bihac, 
Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebenica, Tuzla and Zepa.
309
 
The Marine Corps’ Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMFA (AW)-533) 
commenced on their bombing missions. These attacks were aimed at preventing Serbian 
planes from assaulting the Bosnians. The Ubdina airfield was struck. This airfield was used by 
the Bosnian Serbs in their operations. The airstrikes came as a result of Bosnian Serbs’ 
violation of the U.N. no-fly zone. This led to the closure of the airport when it was rendered 
ineffective by the MAWAS bombing sorties. When the Bosnian troops shelled the U.N. safe 
areas, the military response was to conduct airstrikes on the Pale ammunition storage bunkers. 
This too, was given as a primary mission to the MAWAS.
310
 
In addition, the 26
th
 MEU was involved in active combat with the insurgents within 
two weeks as the Marines prepared to utilize an amphibious landing from the USS Kearsarge 
Amphibious Ready Group anchored in the Adriatic Sea. It is at this time that they gave 
credence to the Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine that ensures training of Marine units 
as special operations capable in multiple missions. Marines must be ready for rapid 
deployment from the sea by immediate embarkation for land operations. This doctrine is 
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especially important in a world where crises have a tendency of quickly getting out of hand. 
The MEU is a small unit, made up of 2,000 Marines and sailors, and it is self-sustainable. In 
the face of combat, the MEU is capable of projecting force to the limits of America’s military 
arsenal in order to achieve their specific missions.
311
  
On June 8
th
 the 26
th
 MEU prepared to take off from the amphibious landing helicopter 
ship USS Kearsarge (LHD3), landing platform dock (LPD-15) and the landing ship dock USS 
Gunston Hall (LSD-44). They were to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s multinational 
peacekeeping force, assuming the role of an enabling force for power projection as needed. 
The Marines became the first American troops involved in the Kosovo region combat 
operations. They landed at Greece’s Litohoro Beach. The orders they had received were to 
proceed into Macedonia and merge with the British, Italian and French troops that had already 
arrived in Skopje.
312
 
The Marines approached Skopje by 12
th
 June where they put up a forward support base 
as they provided security alongside troops from the other NATO nations. The forward 
operating base was then advanced to the southwest of Kosovo, at Gnjilane. Meanwhile, the 
Marines who remained in Skopje ensured that the supplies to Gnjilane never ceased. The air 
wing of the Marines busied itself with the construction of an airfield which was named Camp 
Able Sentry. It is from here Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 was able to take off and 
land in the course of the operations. The Marine Battalion Landing Team was engaged in 
patrolling the neighboring villages and towns trying to keep the peace in their part of the 
AOR.
313
  
They captured over a hundred weapons, grenades and munitions which had formed the 
arsenal of the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as the Serbian Army’s arsenal. The 23rd of 
June came with its share of problems for the Marines as the temperatures dropped to the fifties 
coupled with a harsh, cold wind that did not improve the operational conditions in the field. 
Furthermore, there were thunderstorms whose end result was muddy terrain conditions; which 
also posed major problems for the Marines. In spite of this, the Marines held their positions 
and provided the returning refugees with needed security. That same evening the Marines 
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were involved in an assault with some insurgents to the south of Gnjilane. Another such 
assault occurred on the 25
th
 of June, which left one of the gunmen dead. Within two weeks the 
26
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit had moved far beyond the coast of the Balkans, and restored 
peace and order per its mission orders.
314
 
The main objective of Operation Allied Force was to destroy the military and security 
structure that Yugoslav President Milosevic had employed in the vast depopulation and 
extermination of the Muslim Albanian majority in Kosovo. Toward this end, the goals of 
NATO required that the airstrikes would be continued until the Yugoslavian president 
satisfied five conditions. Foremost, he was required to ensure a credible end to all the military 
actions and put an immediate stop to all the violence and repression. Second, it was pertinent 
that he ensured that the military, police and paramilitary troops withdraw from Kosovo. Third, 
it was paramount to provide approval for an international military presence within Kosovo. 
Fourth, Milosevic was required to agree to the non-negotiable return of the refugees and 
displaced persons and uninterrupted access to them by the humanitarian aid organizations. 
Finally, he was required to give credible assurance of his readiness to cooperate on the basis 
of the Rambouillet Accords in putting in place a political framework for Kosovo in 
compliance with international law and the charter of the United Nations.
315
  
The enemy forces were composed of ground troops, anti-aircraft troops, air force, and 
mechanized troops. In this regard, the composition total of the enemy forces were as follows; 
the ground troops were composed of 114,000 active duty soldiers and 1,400 artillery 
specialists. The anti-aircraft troops were in possession of 100 surface-to-air missiles. These 
missiles posed a considerable threat to NATO airpower. The Yugoslavia forces were also in 
possession of 1,850 air defense artillery pieces. Much as these were not as sophisticated as the 
STA missiles, yet they were still a threat to NATO aircraft. Their air force was made up of 
240 war planes which consisted of MiG-21s and MiG-29s, 48 attack helicopters. The 
mechanized troops had: 1,270 tanks which consisted of T-72s, T-74s, T-55s and M-84s.They 
also had 825 armored fighting vehicles. Moreover, there were about 40,000 Serb forces within 
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and outside Kosovo. These forces were equipped with tanks and APCs. The Serbian forces 
patrolling the Kosovo border had formed various units of reserve forces, deployed forces and 
garrison forces. The deployed forces were in possession of 96 tanks while the garrison forces 
were equipped with 30 of these tanks. There was a particular concentration of Serb troops in 
the region around the border Kosovo shared with Macedonia. These forces increased in 
number as the weeks passed by.
316
 
On the 20
th
 of May, the Marine All Weather Fighter Squadrons (VMFA (AWs) 332 
and 533 commenced their flights from Hungary in order to stand by as the military operations 
began. The decision was made not to integrate ground forces in combat at this point. This was 
aimed at keeping the NATO troops casualties as low as possible. Much as this made the 
Serbian fighters take advantage of the unopposed battle space; but this also exposed them to 
the airstrikes that were to be conducted. Here the tenet of maneuver warfare as to “when and 
how to give battle” was again employed. It is important to note that, the air defense of the 
Serbians was rendered ineffective. They could barely stand up to NATO’s air attacks. Serbian 
attacks were met with more air strikes that eventually annihilated their air defense system, 
further shaping the battle field for Marine maneuver. In total, 70 of the Serbian aircraft were 
destroyed in this operation. Five of these were destroyed during an air-to-air assault. Also, oil 
refineries were destroyed. This was done in a move to hinder the Serbian operations by cutting 
off their fuel supply. True to this strategy, the Serbian operations were halted on three 
occasions due to the lack of fuel. This was a manipulation of the Serbians’ center of gravity by 
disrupting their already overburdened OODA Loop. Communication systems that were 
charged with the command and control of the Serbian troops were equally disrupted on a large 
scale. Marine Corps forces did their best in isolating Yugoslav troops in Kosovo. This was 
accomplished by controlling the roads and rail links, and further by disrupting field command 
posts. By April 22, in spite of some adverse weather conditions present in Kosovo, NATO 
struck an artillery battery, six tanks, 23 vehicles, a column of troops and a field command 
post. The Serbians finally withdrew, having incurred huge losses in terms of artillery and 
warfighters. Most of their munitions had been destroyed in the attack and not much of their 
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ground forces had been left to continue fighting. Their infrastructure had also been largely 
destroyed in this military campaign. They eventually withdrew from Kosovo.
317
  
OPERATION DISTANCE RUNNER –RWANDA AND BURUNDI 
In 1994, Rwanda’s population was close to seven million people. Its population 
consisted of three ethnic tribes: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa. The Tutsi were fourteen 
percent of this population, the Hutu were eighty five percent and the Twa were one percent. A 
group of Hutu extremists accused the Tutsi elite of being responsible for the social, economic 
and political upheavals in Rwanda; and also complained about the Tutsi’s involvement with 
the rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front. The rebel group was made up of a large Tutsi 
population. The Rwandan president, Habrayimana, added to these issues. He and his team 
incited the Tutsi community against the Hutu, which resulted in forming a wide rift between 
the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Hutu lived in fear of the minority, based on their oppressive rule 
and government support. On April 6
th
 1994, a plane with President Habrayimana aboard was 
shot down. This sparked immediate violence in the country. The Hutu formulated plans that 
would wipe out all of the Tutsi. Any of the existing political leaders who may have averted it 
were immediately assassinated. The same was done to anyone who had in the past shown a 
particular dislike or disregard of the Hutu extremists’ activities. Once sure that nobody would 
contain them, the Hutu embarked on a war of genocide. They killed anybody who they 
thought to be a Tutsi or had any affiliations with this minority tribe. Whole families were 
wiped out, women and children were raped and murdered. An estimated 200,000 people were 
eliminated in this tribal genocide. The following weeks saw the killing of 800,000 Tutsi men, 
women and children. This number was more than half of the Tutsis’ total population. 
Thousands of Hutu were also killed alongside the Tutsi when they voiced their opposition to 
this genocide. There were some Americans and other expatriates who had been caught up in 
the genocide. They sought to be evacuated from Rwanda.
318
  
The 11
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit was ordered to carrying out the evacuation of 
these U.S. nationals. The 11
th
 MEU was in Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital. On April 7th and 8th, 
the 11
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit evacuated the U.S. nationals who had been caught up in 
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the neighboring Bujumbura clashes. The Marines were a force of 330. The Marines flew six 
hundred and fifty miles after taking off from the helicopter assault vessel USS Peleliu to 
Bujumbura. On the April 12
th
, they also crossed the Burundi border into Rwanda where they 
rescued foreign citizens and U.S. nationals. In less than twenty four hours the 11
th
 MEU had 
accomplished its mission by expediting their actions in a rapid tempo.
319
 There were no 
military actions needed or taken by the U. S. Marine Corps. 
HAITI OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 
In the December 1990 Haitian elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former priest 
garnered the majority of the Haitian votes to become Haiti’s president. However, his power 
was usurped through a military coup d’état and Joseph Nerette was put in office as Haiti’s 
next president. This led to the political destabilization of the country and eventual intersession 
by the United Nations. In June 1993, the United Nations voted a ban on the import of oil and 
arms into Haiti to force a return to the legitimate government. Since the military ousted 
President Aristide, the Haitian people had suffered greatly at the hands of the Nerette military 
junta.  
The disenfranchised Haitians risked their lives on a daily basis, trying to cross the sea 
to the United States, all in an attempt to flee the terror that reigned in their country. The 
Haitian refugees numbered close to twenty one thousand daily. The Haitian economy went 
into a steady decline that saw inflation rise up to an estimated forty percent. This came as a 
result of the oil and arms embargo that the United Nations had placed on Haiti, in accordance 
with its Resolution 917.
320
 The UN efforts bore fruit when the survival of the military was 
threatened by impending attacks by United States forces as well as other United Nations 
troops. Once the United Nations delegation had approved of military intervention the Haitian 
government acquiesced. The military invasion was replaced by a humanitarian assistance 
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operation lead by the United States. It was aimed at helping the Haitian people who were in 
dire need of food and medical relief.  
The U.S. Marine Forces Caribbean, based at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was deployed to 
this region, and conducted an amphibious entry from the sea into Haiti. The amphibious 
landing was made at the Cap Haitien from the American warship USS Wasp.
321
 Once within 
the country, the U.S. Marines provided needed security as well as humanitarian aid. The 
Marine patrols within the island were enforced and the military junta toppled. The PSYOPs 
were conducted and proved effective in informing the Haitian people on the importance of a 
good government and the need for shunning future rebel activities. Operation Uphold 
Democracy brought the Marine Corps back to Haiti using those tenets of irregular warfare and 
maneuver from its Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-45 as now indorsed by the Marine Corps’ 
new maneuver warfare doctrine. This was a further evolution of the principles originally 
learned and used by the Marine Corps in the beginnings of the 20
th
 century in Haiti. Marine 
Corps history was repeating itself both by having the Marine Corps return; and by prosecuting 
this mission true to its previous and now current maneuver warfare DNA.
322
 
OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE- LIBERIA and OPERATION QUICK RESPONSE-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
In 1996, civil war broke out in the Republic of Liberia. This small scale conflict 
quickly escalated to massive violence within the country. Within the first week of the 
hostilities, owing to the violent street fighting five hundred people went to the American 
Embassy grounds seeking refuge. Another twenty thousand were huddled in the nearby 
American Embassy housing compound. In April 2006, the President of Liberia petitioned the 
United States Ambassador in a request for security aid, resupply; and evacuation of all foreign 
nationals in harm’s way.323 
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Although the factors involved in the evacuation of Liberia were urgent, it was an 
overall small operation. With Marine Corps units from the USS Guam’s (LPH 5) amphibious 
ready group and the 22
nd
 Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC) which were ordered to Monrovia 
to conduct this mission, the Marine Corps began this operation. On arrival, the 22
nd
 MEU 
(SOC) commanding officer took over the command of Joint Task Force- Assured Response 
(JTF-AR). The Joint Task Force Assured Response comprised of Air Force, Navy and Marine 
Corps troops. With more support from the HC-4 MC-53 helicopter detachment and a number 
of both Navy and Marine aircrafts, security at the embassy was enhanced and transportation 
began to normalize. This resulted in the evacuation of three hundred and nine noncombatants, 
forty nine of whom were from the United States.  Meanwhile, the USS Portland had dropped 
anchor some distance of the coast of West Africa. It had come to provide additional support 
for the operation. This combined arms application under Marine Corps guidance furthered the 
Marine Corps utilization of maneuver and fighting smarter doctrine.
324
 Again as in Rwanda 
and Burundi, these two operations became nonmilitary actions. The quick response of the 
Marine Corps eliminated the need of force projection. 
In February 1996, the Central Africa Republic was in a state of financial crisis in 
which payments to civil servants had been delayed for several months. A state of unrest 
ensued in which a number of soldiers rebelled against the government. This mutiny was joined 
by other civil servant and it soon turned into a myriad of protests and riots. The government in 
turn employed brutal measures to quell the surge of riots in Bangui the capital.
325
 This 
compelled the U.S ambassador to ask for assistance from the U.S. government. The assistance 
came in form of the 22
nd
 Marines Expeditionary Unit, which was at the time involved in 
Operation Assured Hope in neighboring Liberia.  
The MEU immediately began its execution of these evacuation orders. The thirty five 
man Marine Corps force was to carry out the mission; the majority of this force consisted of 
riflemen from the Marines’ ground combat unit, the 2nd Battalion of 2nd Marines (2/2). The 2/2 
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boarded helicopters provided by the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162, their 
destination being the airport of Freetown, Sierra Leone. On arrival, Marine KC-130R flew the 
detachment into the Central African Republic where U.S. State Department officials were 
waiting with the evacuees. The quick offloading of the aircraft was immediately followed by 
setting aboard the American citizens and other foreign expatriates. They were flown to 
Yaoundé in Cameroon. Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy was secured in Bangui and the Marines 
focused themselves with subsequent evacuations. The Marines remained unshaken in the 
midst of the clashes between factions in the streets around them. Later, a second rifle platoon 
was flown in to reinforce a security unit already in place. Their positions were often hit by 
stray rounds but the Marines and civilians who sought refuge from them were never faced 
with serious security threats. Ultimately, the Central African Republic’s Presidential Guard in 
alliance with French paratroopers managed to restore order within the city. The last of the 
U.S. Marines left Bangui on the 22
nd
 of July, having evacuated four hundred and forty eight 
people from the Central African Republic aboard the Marine Corps and Air Force C 130’s.326 
OPERATION NOBLE OBELISK-SIERRA LEONE 
In 1997, Sierra Leone experienced another coup d’état. It was staged by their army’s 
junior officer cadre. They were led by the thirty three year old Major Johnny Paul Koroma. 
The coup d’état had left one hundred people dead and the city of Freetown at the mercy of  
this rogue military junta, common looters and street gangs.  
The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Task Force from Camp Lejeune can quickly establish 
its presence in a region of conflict without necessarily obtaining the permission or support of 
the host nation for over flight rights. The U.S. Marine Corps’ Amphibious Task Force made a 
landing in Freetown in spite of a flight ban by the junior army officers who had removed 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah forcefully from power. The coup had plunged the country 
into political and social upheavals that raised the concern of the American government about 
the safety of its citizens in Sierra Leone. A pre-dawn Marine Corps rescue operation began 
after the release of helicopters from the USS Kearsarge, a warship that had anchored about 
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twelve miles offshore. Nine hundred people were evacuated from the country, of which three 
hundred were Americans. They would then be taken to Conakry, Guinea.
327
 
 
OPERATION SAFE DEPARTURE- ERITREA 
In 1998, Eritrea was caught up in the middle of a border dispute with Ethiopia. 
American citizens and other foreign nationals’ safety were at great risk. The American 
government moved to evacuate its nationals alongside citizens from other countries. The 
noncombatant operation was named Operation Safe Departure, which took place in the 
Eritrean capital, Asmara. By the end of the operation, a total of one hundred and sixty seven 
people had been safely evacuated. These evacuees included one hundred and seven American 
nationals.
328
 
The 11
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was deployed from 
there base in Camp Pendleton to carry out the rescue operations. The 11
th
 MEU (SOC) was at 
this time on a six-month long deployment. They had been aboard the USS Tarawa 
Amphibious Ready Group whose ships are usually home ported in San Diego. The 
Amphibious Ready Group Consisted of USS Tarawa, USS Mount Vernon and USS Denver. 
The contingent was made up of a Forward Command Element which basically comprised of a 
support team and a liaison team. The evacuees were flown to Amman, Jordan by the Marines’ 
KC-130 Hercules aircraft. The team consisted of 30 Marines and sailors plus a small security 
element that was draw form the unit’s infantry section.329 
OPERATION DESERT FOX 
A special UN commission had been set up to look into allegations that Iraq was 
manufacturing chemical and biological weapons. This commission was headed by Richard 
Butler, the Australian ambassador to the United Nations. In 1998, Butler publicly asserted that 
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he had been unable to carry out his investigations to a satisfactory completion. However, he 
maintained that Iraq was concealing most of its illegally produced chemical and biological 
weapons, despite not having concrete evidence in support of his claims. The turning point to 
this operation came when on October 31
st
; Saddam Hussein announced that the inspections 
would no longer be welcome in Iraq. In response to Saddam’s declaration, President Clinton 
promised that the inspections would go on even if it meant resorting to the use of force.
330
  
This operation, named Desert Fox was to be a Marine Corps Air application in 
conjunction with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. Operation Desert Fox was designed 
to weaken Saddam Hussein's power base, believed to be his Republican Guards and his cache 
of weapons of mass destruction. One hundred targets were assigned to tactical aviation 
(TacAir); the majority of the assigned targets were large buildings such as Republican Guard 
barracks, headquarters, and command-and-control sites consisting of radio relay towers and 
bunkers. The campaign was planned for a concurrent naval TacAir/Tomahawk Land-Attack 
Missile (TLAM) strikes on the first night, followed up by combined TacAir (U.S. / British) 
TLAM and Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) strikes the following three 
nights. Tomahawk and cruise missile strikes were planned against targets that were heavily 
protected by Iraqi air defenses, in and around Baghdad.
331
  
The following account of the Marine Corps’ mission is offered by Major Ross Roberts, 
a Marine aviator and the operations officer for VMFA-312, a Marine F/A-18C squadron 
attached to CVW-3, which was deployed on board the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) during 
Operation Desert Fox: 
 
Special Note: I have used the [brackets in Italics] to incorporate and highlight maneuver 
warfare tenets in use by the Marines in the VMFA-312 unit during Operation Desert Fox. 
 
                                                          
330
 Steven Lee Myers and Barbara Crossette, “Iraq Accused of Arms Violations That Could Result in 
Air Strikes,” New York Times, December 16, 1998, 
http://events.nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/iraq/981216iraq.html. (Accessed May 21, 2014). 
 
331
 Major Robert Ross, USMC, “Desert Fox the Third Night,” Proceedings Magazine,” April 1999, 
Vol., 125/4/1 154. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999-04. (Accessed  May 21, 2014). Major 
Roberts, a naval aviator and former artillery officer, was the operations officer for VMFA-312, a Marine F/A-
18C squadron attached to CVW-3, deployed on board the USS Enterprise (CVN-65).  
 
 
145 
 
“..General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander-in-Chief, Central 
Command, visited us on 10 December and gave us the news. He said the window of 
opportunity was here, and that "All of the slack has been removed from the trigger." Once 
again we were on the uphill climb of the emotional roller coaster that always accompanies 
preparations for combat. The decision to implement Desert Fox depended on Richard Butler's 
report to the United Nations scheduled for release on 15 December. On 14 December, we got 
the 72-hour warning order and broke out the target folders and strike plans we had been fine-
tuning. 
As I walked to my Hornet late on the evening of 16 December, I saw the glow of 
Tomahawk launches from the surface ships to the south. It was 2306. Our first scheduled 
launch time was 2345, and I thought that we would go. Thirty-three combat-loaded aircraft 
and bomb carts were crowding the deck. I knew that we had passed the last hurdle in the 
execution timeline—and we went. 
By night three, I was on my third mission, but this one was different: I was leading it. 
The target was in south central Iraq. It was also the longest range of all the strikes during the 
operation, 420 nautical miles one way, and required aerial refueling. Most of the strike leads 
had flown in their assigned target vicinity during Operation Southern Watch and were familiar 
with the target area, inertial navigation system update points, targets, and key terrain features.  
The day prior to execution (day two of Desert Fox) I gave my final concept of 
operations brief to the battle group and air wing commanders. With the plan approved, I set to 
work on finishing the details with my strike team. A month earlier, we had planned a westerly 
attack heading because the prevailing winds were light at altitude. The latest forecast winds at 
our altitude averaged 80-120 knots from the west. This changed our plan and reduced the fuel 
margin, but it was still manageable. The success of the aerial refueling plan was critical to 
mission success and it concerned me. [Main Focus of Effort vs. Fog of War] 
Most of the missions into southern Iraq during Southern Watch were single cycle, 
autonomous day strikes that did not require aerial refueling; missions that required tanker 
support were in the daytime. Desert Fox, on the other hand, was conducted at night. 
The first Desert Fox night strikes were all single cycle, designed that way to keep the 
element of surprise on our side [a prime aspect of maneuver warfare]. We hoped that by not 
alerting host bases of land-based tankers and combat search-and-rescue we could [maintain 
the element of surprise.] We took every precaution to maintain secrecy. For this reason, the 
first night of the campaign was to be a naval show, demonstrating one of the greatest 
capabilities of sea-based air power coupled with the [element of surprise]. [Combined Arms 
Application] 
Without the assistance of Air Force tankers, we were limited to targets in southeastern 
Iraq. Organic aerial refueling was available to assist the recovery of aircraft low on fuel only. 
Beginning with night two, we had several long-range strikes planned, all of which required 
extensive tanking. U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force aircraft were involved now, making the 
campaign a coalition effort. We refueled from Air Force KC-10s. 
My strike brief was uneventful. I spent extra time explaining the tanker plan, and 
"what if'’s" [Fog of War] the alternate plans thoroughly in the event a tanker did not show. 
This paid off, as we discovered on the premission tanker rendezvous. The tankers were not in 
the briefed formation, nor did they have the briefed fuel off-load, because they were doing 
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their best to cover all of our strikes with a limited number of aircraft. [The fog of war and the 
unexpected in the battle space] 
The tankers were not in visual formation, and they were using separate frequencies. I 
locked my radar on to what I perceived was my tanker, but, as I lined up on the drogue, 
something obviously was wrong. This tanker had a center-line drogue, while my assigned 
tanker—the one I was talking to on the radio—was supposed to have wing-mounted drogues. 
It turned out that I had the right radio frequency but the wrong tanker; mine was twenty 
nautical miles away on the opposite end of the tanker track. To make matter worse, my tanker 
had only enough gas to give each receiver 2,500 pounds of fuel—instead of the 4,000 pounds 
we had planned on. 
As luck would have it, 8 of the 14 aircraft made the same mistake I did. At this point, I 
was pretty busy trying to figure out who was on what tanker on what frequency. I could 
already see the "Rolex" coming [a term used to cover the unexpected and delay the time on 
target in increments, allowing for unforeseen circumstances]. After much consternation over 
the radio, I finally reassigned aircraft to the planned tankers, but this lengthened the time I had 
allotted for refueling. I used our two S-3 Vikings (sea-control aircraft, with a secondary 
mission of aerial refueling), which I had planned to use as hose multipliers, to top off my 
wingman and me (who had been short-changed on the initial off-load in an effort to get all the 
aircraft refueled more quickly). 
I completed the aerial refueling five minutes prior to the push time. I looked at the 
mass of circling aircraft through my night vision goggles thinking, "How the hell am I going 
to get this mess joined and pushed on time?" It was time for the Rolex word, and I broadcast 
"Rolex five" on the strike common frequency; all acknowledged. Three minutes into the 
Rolex, we were still not joined. I finally had the strike package roll out on the ingress heading. 
I thought it would be easier to sort the formation out if we were straight and level heading in 
the same direction. 
I had planned the ingress route to avoid probable Iraqi antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) [when to offer battle]. The strong head winds complicated the 
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) package (one EA-6B and two FA-18s carrying two 
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs). I pushed the SEAD package three minutes 
ahead, planning to catch up with them as we turned the corner from west to east in the final 
attack from the initial point. 
I had not updated my inertial navigation system (INS) at Fahlaka Island (off the coast 
of Kuwait) as planned because of the mess at the push/rendezvous point. We usually planned 
at least two and sometimes three update points along the route to correct for the inaccurate 
ship's inertial navigation system. We found this step was the most critical in successful target 
location. I hoped my INS would be accurate enough to at least find my second update point (a 
road intersection) with the FLIR. It took some searching, but I found it and was able to tighten 
up my INS. This was fortunate because my system was three-quarters of a mile off and would 
have made target location very difficult if not impossible. At the initial point all of the strikers 
checked their lasers and FLIRs and I was surprised to hear everyone check in with operational 
systems. We always planned and briefed detailed back-up buddy-laser plans to enable a 
wingman to guide the bombs of an aircraft with a malfunctioning laser or FLIR. [Insure that 
rapid tempo was not slowed at the point of attacks if malfunctions occurred] 
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The strike package was composed of four strike F/A-18s, each loaded with two GBU-
16s (1,000-pound laser guided bombs); two F-14s, each with two GBU-10s (2,000-pound 
laser guided bombs); two F-14s as fighter escorts; two F/A-18s doubling as HARM shooters 
and escorts for the EA-6B. 
The target was a Republican Guard base. [Disrupt the ability to command for the 
enemy; therefore shaping the battle space] The aim-points were a headquarters building and 
three barracks. One of the barracks was long, similar in design to those on U.S. bases. All of 
the buildings were concrete two-story structures. The three small buildings were assigned one 
F/A-18 per building with the remaining Hornet and two F-14s on the long (about 100 meters) 
barracks. 
With all of our inertial systems updated, I had confidence we would be able to find the 
target(s). At the initial point, we turned right 120 degrees to place the target on the nose. As 
we began our turn my wingman called over the strike common frequency: "SAM launch nine 
o'clock!" I immediately responded, "Those are the HARMs!" They were on the way to their 
target just as planned, searching for the SA-2 and SA-6 postulated to be in the target area. It 
felt good to see them arc over us and into the target area looking for Iraqi surface-to-air radar 
emissions to guide on, giving us a short window of protection. [Protecting the ability to put 
strength against weakness] 
The base was a small complex in a large expanse of desert. We were hoping the roads 
on the base would still be hot enough to provide a thermal contrast, which could be 
transformed by the FLIR into a green-and-white television picture in the cockpit. As we came 
in nose on to the target, the road complex that I had burned into my memory over the last 
couple of days was visible on my cockpit display. I picked the road where I had predicted my 
aim point would be and waited for the FLIR picture to build (as the range to target decreases, 
the FLIR picture gets better). I positively identified my target, the headquarters building just 
to the east side of a road intersection.[ We always tried to limit collateral damage and this 
target was isolated, which lessened my concerns.] 
I made one last check of my weapon systems as my wingman found his aim-point. I 
talked myself through my air-to-ground checklist, "Air-to-ground master mode, GBU-16 
selected, quantity two, fuse delay one, laser armed, master arm on, tapes on (if it’s not on tape 
it didn’t happen), sweeten the laser aim-point, finger on the pickle, everything is looking 
good." Precisely at the planned distance from the target, the aircraft rocked as the 1,000-pound 
bombs were ejected from the bomb racks two-thirds of a second apart. 
The next 30 seconds is always the longest. As the bombs fall ballistically toward the 
target, all you can do is continue to refine the FLIR aim-point to ensure the laser will fire 
precisely where desired; things are intense in the cockpit. Looking outside just shows you 
what is being sent back at you. Ten seconds to go, all right! The laser starts its automatic 
firing sequence. The laser-guided bombs (LGBs) fall ballistically until the last ten seconds and 
then guide on the reflected laser energy to the target. Five seconds . . . three . . . I could see the 
bombs fly to the target on the FLIR . . . one second . . . Direct hit. "Shack,” I shouted over the 
radio. (That's one term we picked up from our Air Force friends.) My wingman achieved the 
same results. 
As I pulled off target and looked over my shoulder, I saw the AAA I was oblivious to 
during my delivery while I was concentrating on my FLIR display. It was all bursting below 
our altitude just as on the previous two nights. Two more impacts, both Shacks. 
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The third section (two F-14s) approached the target area last, searching for their aim 
points. All of the targets were smoking holes only half of the long barracks was still standing. 
Some quick work by the Tomcat crews flattened it. So far, everyone had hit and destroyed his 
assigned aim point; for the sixth and final bomber, there was nothing left but the alternate 
target, similar in size to the headquarters building I had just pulverized. He expertly guided the 
two GBU-10s into the building and completely removed it from the desert floor. We always 
briefed an alternate target to limit collateral damage if the primary targets already were 
destroyed.[Collateral Damage Deficits see Small Wars Manual]  
Quick fuel checks off target confirmed that the detailed fuel planning had worked out 
so far. As planned, we climbed to altitude to maximize fuel efficiency (120 knots of wind at 
our back) and to avoid being targeted by the dreaded, unallocated SA-6. Some members of the 
flight had 800 pounds less fuel than planned, but this was manageable as long as the tankers 
arrived on schedule. Ten minutes away from tanker rendezvous I called the tankers to let them 
know we were inbound. The strike package cycled through the single KC-10 (two-hose) 
tanker remaining without incident. Two S-3s provide the much-needed post mission fuel as 
briefed. Everyone took only what he needed and pressed home for the ship. The landing was 
dark and scary as usual, but uneventful. After the debrief we went to the various ready rooms 
to review the FLIR videos. It was amazing to see the amount of destruction we caused that 
night. Morale was high. Electro-optical imagery taken the following day confirmed the 
destruction we witnessed on our FLIRs. Five aim points destroyed, one heavily damaged and 
unusable—and all this with just six bombers. 
The four-day campaign resulted in an unprecedented number of assigned targets either 
damaged or destroyed. Navy TacAir alone chalked up 72% of assigned targets damaged or 
destroyed. This can be attributed to an environment extremely conducive to the use of FLIRs 
and LGBs and air crew familiarity of the target areas and terrain [prior Intel shapes the battle 
field]. The Tomahawks damaged or destroyed a very high percentage of their assigned targets. 
Most of their targets were deep within Iraq and heavily protected by SAMs and AAA. The 
Tomahawks appeared to be more effective and efficient at bombing large fixed targets than 
TacAir. Manned aviation was extremely effective at destroying hardened bunkers. 
If naval aviation is going to capitalize on the success of Desert Fox, future 
[employment of strike aircraft should focus on missions requiring surprise and flexibility. 
Manned aircraft are optimized for rapidly changing scenarios and proper planning enables 
them to change their missions once airborne.] As described, however, our strikes required 
detailed planning well in advance of execution. There was little flexibility because target 
assignments and times-on-target (TOT) were controlled centrally. During Desert Fox, 
Tomahawk planners worked in the space next to our strike planners, yet we were not able to 
integrate them into our plans, even though the majority of targets assigned to aircraft were 
perfect Tomahawk targets. We were simply handed a target folder with a desired probability 
of destruction, a TOT, and the rest of the plan was up to us [Mission orders].  
Fixed targets are vulnerable to Tomahawk and Conventional Air-Launched Cruise 
Missile attacks, and potential foes may counter our strength here with mobility. Shifting 
TacAir to mobile targets should counter this gambit. Tomahawks and TacAir are 
complementary; defending against both is a true dilemma..”332 
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OPERATION RESTORE HOPE- SOMALIA 
After the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991, civil war broke out in Somalia between 
supporters of General Mohamed Farah Aidid and supporters of President Ali Mahdi 
Mohamed. The United Nations sought to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Somalia through United Nations Operation in Somalia 1 (UNOSOM 1). Its objective was to 
provide a safe environment that would enhance delivery of humanitarian assistance and help 
rebuild the social, political and economic life of the Somalis. Local warlords fuelled the 
internal war to the point that UNOSOM could not reach its goals. UNOSOM’s efforts to 
provide a relief supply was a total failure, as aircrafts carrying the supplies were looted as 
soon as they made their landings. Troops sent into Somalia were shot at, aircraft carrying aid 
were shot down and ships were attacked in Somali waters and were prevented from docking. 
Meanwhile, the Somalis’ plight escalated with an estimated fifty thousand being killed, with 
three hundred thousand plus dying of starvation and an estimated two million rendered 
homeless.
333
 
President George H. W. Bush (41) proposed that U.S. troops be sent into Somali. In 
December 1992 twenty five thousand U.S. troops and ten thousand troops from other allied 
states were deployed to Somalia. This coalition’s agenda was to make the trade routes to 
Somalia secure so as to enable the safe delivery of relief supplies to the Somali’ people.  
The U.S. Marine Corps came ashore in Somalia on 9
th
 December 1992. The invasion 
had not been communicated to the relevant Somali state authorities. The entry was considered 
forced. Forcible entry from the sea enables the Marines to exploit the gaps in the enemy’s 
defenses by involving naval and joint capabilities, surprise, projecting sustainable power into 
an AO and keeping the entry safe for follow-on forces.
334
 The Marines then proceeded to 
secure the Mogadishu International Airport and the American Embassy. Once the Airport was 
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secure, bringing in the relief supplies would go on as planned. The I MEU provided security 
for the convoys that transported the relief supplies. Maneuver warfare requires evaluation of 
both the enemy and attacking their military’s weakness with your own strength. By securing 
the airport and ports, one of the hindrances to transport of the supplies was remedied. This 
added to the threat for Somali fighters as the U.S. troops would increase thereby protecting 
logistic replenishment. The Somali fighters also had to withdraw from Mogadishu which was 
the focal point of their operations. Once ashore, the I MEF maintained its presence there for 
some time. This was done to sustain the Joint Task Force as well as the U.S. Army until the 
arrangement for theater support was complete.  
Here in Somalia both Marine Corps FMFM- 1 Warfighting doctrine and Small War 
Manual FMFRP 12-15 were the standards set for the United States Marine Corps deployment. 
The lead Marine was Brig. General Anthony C. “Tony” Zinni who had vast experience 
(Operation Provide Comfort, Iraq) within this area of expertise. Zinni was also a student of 
Gen. Gray but was not considered an “evolutionist” plank owner per se. The following 
exemplifies the Zinni infusion of Marine Corps DNA and the then current doctrine of 
maneuver warfare during the Somali deployment for the Marine Corps:  
Small Wars Principles: The numerous planning considerations outlined in the SWM still apply 
to today’s complex operating environment.  The SWM outlines the requirement as follows:  
1. Unity of Effort: The SWM describes unity of effort by stating that the actions of Marines 
need to coincide with the actions of State Department officials, non-government aid agencies, 
the local supported government, and the community in general. The SWM stresses the need 
for a singular commander with designated authority to avoid both contradictory actions among 
organizations and the transmission of conflicting messages to the local populace. The manual 
also indicates that unity with the State Department is crucial to maintaining the political 
objective [von Clausewitz, On War].
335
 In addition, the manual explains that the best way to 
remain united with the local government and populace is by developing and supporting a 
constabulary. Cooperating with the local government, army, or constabulary keeps U.S. forces 
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in accordance with the intricacies of the resident culture(s), which greatly helps to foster local 
support. 
336
 
2. Security: The SWM stresses that Marines should plan for their own security (force 
protection) and for the security of the local populace (force projection). The manual describes 
the need for a balance in security. Marines need to protect their operating bases, but not to 
such an extent that they isolate themselves from the locals. The SWM indicates that Marines 
need to interact with the locals and become familiar with their culture and social system. By 
doing this, Marines will gain the locals’ trust and valuable intelligence which will further 
support security.
337
 
3. Restraint: The SWM indicates that minimal destruction and loss of life is necessary to be 
able to achieve a lasting peace. The Manual states,  
“..Caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power 
with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and 
consequent minimum loss of life..”  
 
The use of restraint will be perceived as a sign of mutual respect and cooperation.  The 
SWM also indicates that educating Marines will result in restraint.      
4. Perseverance: The campaign examples used in the SWM indicate that the Marine Corps 
should not plan small wars as small tactical operations.  Major Allen Ford, USMC, in his 
thesis “The Small Wars Manual and the Marine Corps Military Operations Other Than 
War,”338 identifies five phases within the SWM that a small wars campaign may follow: 
Phase 1: Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard. 
Phase 2: The arrival of reinforcements and general military operations in the field. 
Phase 3.Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the 
legislative and judicial agencies. 
Phase 4: Routine police functions and elections.  
Phase 5: Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations. 
                                                          
 
336
 FMFRP 12-15, SWM, 12-5, 5. 
 
337
 Ibid., 6-67/68, 39-40. 
 
338
 Major Allen Ford, USMC, Master’s Thesis “The Small Wars Manual and the Marine Corps Military 
Operations Other Than War,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003, 59-64. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ford.pdf. (Accessed 22 May 2014). 
152 
 
The SWM phases above are still applicable to today’s operating environment, and they 
indicate the need to consider a larger campaign mentality during planning.
339
 
5. Legitimacy: The SWM’s reference to legitimacy is related to the political objective of the 
operation. The manual emphasizes the importance for the actions of Marines to portray an 
image of legality, morality, and righteousness. If Marines abuse their authority or break local 
laws, they should receive adjudication quickly and appropriately. The actions of all 
organizations within in an area of operation should not give the perception of favoritism or 
alienate a certain group. Most importantly, the military actions taken should resolve the 
problem at hand. The above SWM planning considerations provide a model for planning 
contemporary expeditionary operations. The SWM’s content is still relevant to today’s 
operating environment and should be used in current planning. 
The following from General Tony Zinni set the tone for this operation as well as the 
implantation of Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine: 
“..General Zinni’s Twenty Lessons Learned from Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) 
(See below the intended effects of Marine Corps FMFM- 1 Warfighting doctrine) 
 1. The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.  
2. Start planning as early as possible, and include everyone in the planning process.  
3. If possible, make a thorough assessment before deployment.  
4. In the planning, do a thorough mission analysis. Determine the center of gravity, 
end state, commander’s intent, and measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, cost-capturing 
procedures, and estimated duration.  
5. Stay focused on the mission and; keep the mission focused. Line up military tasks 
with political objectives. Avoid mission creep; allow for mission shift.  
6. Centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation.  
7. Coordinate everything with everybody. Set up the coordination mechanisms.  
8. Know the culture and the issues.  
9. Start of restarting the key institutions early.  
10. Don’t lose the initiative/momentum.  
11. Don’t make enemies. If you do, don’t treat them gently. Avoid mind-sets.  
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12. Seek unity of effort/command. Create the fewest possible seams.  
13. Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each individual/group 
involved.  
14. Encourage innovation and nontraditional approaches.  
15. Personalities are often more important that processes.  
16. Be careful whom you empower.  
17. Decide on the image you want to portray, and stay focused on it.  
18. Centralize information management.  
19. Seek compatibility in all coalition operations: political compatibility, cultural 
compatibility, and military interoperability are crucial to success.   
20. Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training for 
nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness training and understanding.”340  
OPERATION STABILIZE- EAST TIMOR341 
Since the late 1800 the island of Timor has had conflicting political goals that in the 
late 20
th
 century required military intervention. There were three political parties vying for the 
leadership of the country. These three parties held very different views concerning the 
attainment of independence and, what would be the post-independence posture of the country. 
By 1999, tens of thousands of East Timorese had either been killed or their whereabouts were 
unknown because of the political conflicts. It is at this time that the Indonesian president B. J. 
Habibe gave in to international pressure. He presented the East Timorese citizens with two 
choices; to attain complete independence from Indonesia or seek political autonomy. Seventy 
eight percent of the East Timorese voted in favor of complete independence in spite of 
intimidation by the Indonesian pro-annexation militia gangs. The violence that erupted after 
the elections was extreme. The government of Indonesia did not attempt to quell it. This 
resulted in two hundred and fifty thousand plus refugees fleeing to West Timor. 
Australia was approached with the request take the leading role of a multi-national 
force that would deal with the crisis. Three U.N workers had lost their lives at the hands of 
these insurgents in West Timor while two of them had also been killed in East Timor. This 
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force came to be known as International Forces East Timor (INTERFET). The objectives of 
INTERFET were: To establish peace and security in East Timor, to protect and render support 
for the UNAMET which had already arrived in East Timor, and lastly to try its best to carry 
out humanitarian operations.
342
  
The U.S. Marines moved into the country, their mission was to provide humanitarian 
aid; while at the same time warding off the threat of the gangs. They were augmented by four 
U.S. Navy ships, which included the guided missile carrier USS Bunker Hill. The Marines 
began by transporting the relief supplies to the inhabitants of the island, in order to avoid any 
more killings of UN aid workers. The 13
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit was dispatched to 
provide them with security as they went about their duties. The Marines acted as a good role 
model for ensuring doctrinal and organizational flexibility into the regular workings of the 
Timor military troops. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) played a major role in 
the operation. The MAGTF, as stated above, is a task organized combined arms team that has 
been cultured to fit into every mission.
343
  
Such success in task organization that is displayed by the Marine Corps accrues from 
enhancing of habitual relationships that foster maneuver warfare applications. Unit cohesion is 
a key element in this symbiotic relationship. This apparent relationship led to familiarity and 
in-depth understanding of each aspect of the mission. This would also lead to more effective 
support at the Joint Task Force level. According to the American and Australian commanders, 
the turning point of the operation came with the arrival of the Marine Expeditionary Unit and 
Naval Amphibious Ready Groups (MEU/ARG) off the coast of Dili. This occurred on 
October 5
th
 1999. Their presence led to the daily improvement of conditions in East Timor as 
they worked in alliance with the INTERFET troops.
344
  
Major General Cosgrove, Australian Defense Forces, had been adamant about 
deploying his forces to East-West Timor border where the pro-Indonesian militia gangs 
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launched sporadic attacks. The arrival of this MEU/ARG not only increased the mission 
capability, but also fostered the securing of the border quickly, just by its imposing presence. 
This MEU/ARG had in their possession more firepower than the militia gangs in total arms. 
Success was followed by success as the 31
st
 Marine Expeditionary Unit left the island and in 
its place came the 11
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit Amphibious Ready Group on 26
th
 October. 
Arriving also was the Marines Special Purpose MAGFT (SPMMAGFT) which embarked 
from the USS Juneau (LPD 10) in 2000. The flexibility with which the MEUs conducted 
themselves allowed them to participate in many missions both humanitarian and military in 
nature. By recycling MEU troops on a daily basis, the USFORINTERFET never went beyond 
its force limit requirements. Apart from that, each of the MEUs provided USFORINTERFET 
with more functional area skills.
345
 
General Tony Zinni, USMC set the tone for this operation based upon his long history 
of successful humanitarian and expeditionary warfare actions garnered in his forty year career 
as a Marine. His “Twenty Lessons Learned” (See above from Somalia Operation Restore 
Hope) also was the template for East Timor. It set the tone for this operation as well as the 
implementation of Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine in general.
346
  
 In summary of this chapter, Small Wars to Big Wars, the use of a Marine Corps 
Way of War for the period of the 1990’s to 2001, to include Bosnia, Somalia and other Marine 
Corps actions or interventions, it must be noted that maneuver warfare applications were in 
evidence both on the battle field as well as in the village square. Of further importance is the 
concept that the Marine Corps was using its “Small Wars” DNA within the context of 
maneuver warfare doctrine. The evolutionary character of the Gray Commandancy was now 
melding the “lessons learned” with the proposition that “free thinking” and Boydian “outside 
the box” ideas were compatible in the classroom as well as on the training fields of the Marine 
Corps. Add in the work of Gen. Krulak’s “Three Block War” and his “Strategic Corporal” 
concepts that in effect further validate a unique U.S. Marine Corps Way of War. 
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Chapter 7 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM- AFGHANISTAN 
In the post 9-11 aftermath, the United States wanted to bring an end to the ongoing 
practices of terrorist-type, irregular or guerilla warfare which it had faced since the late 
1970’s. The 9-11 attacks on New York, and Washington DC were the final straw; and now 
formal military actions were commenced with Congressional approvals in place. Western 
civilization’s warfare and its prosecution, as the western world had experienced for the last 
five thousand years were to be the calculus to solve this problem of both attritional and 
irregular warfare.  
To a very large extent the enemy was an amorphous, transnational, non-state 
belligerent now based in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They were under the 
leadership of al Qaeda’s Osama Bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Bin Laden was a 
veteran of the Mujahedeen Jihad which had sought to expel the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. He had previously based his operations in Sudan. However, al Qaeda had to 
relocate to Afghanistan when the United States applied heavy diplomatic pressure on Sudan to 
end the support and fostering of al Qaeda’s exporting of terrorism. Al Qaeda is a group of 
Islamist extremists made up of various nationalities. With these battle hardened mujahedeen, 
al Qaeda unleashed an international low technology form of terrorism or irregular warfare on 
the western world in general, and on the United States in particular. 
Al-Qaeda is a radical transnational Islamist terrorist group that was the creation of 
Osama Bin Laden. He formed it in the late 1980s. To this end, he set aside three hundred 
million dollars ($300,000,000.00 USD), all his personal wealth, and aimed at wiping out the 
Western presence in the Islamic world, while at the same time waging acts of terrorism or 
irregular warfare based against the United States. Bin Laden started in 1993, when a group of 
jihadists unsuccessfully tried to blow up New York’s World Trade Center. President Clinton 
dismissed the act as a civil crime, not as a terrorist act, or even the possible act of war which it 
was. On 11 September 2001, the terrorists carried out a successful attack on United States 
territory. This attack has since been dubbed “9/11,” two Boeing 767 airplanes crashed into the 
World Trade Center, leading to the eventual collapse of the business complex. In addition to 
this, over one hundred lives were lost in a simultaneous attack at the Pentagon. And yet still, 
another terrorist controlled plane crash landed in Pennsylvania. The plane was supposed to 
have been flown into the White House. Not less than three thousand civilians and some 
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military lost their lives in this so called act of war attributable to an al Qaeda fatwah against 
the United States  
As the reality of this jihadist attack filtered through national and international 
parameters, President George W. Bush (43) called for a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 
This came on 12
th
 of September, just a day after the attack. He was later to learn that the 
attack had been orchestrated by al Qaeda’s Osama Bin Laden who was now currently based in 
Afghanistan. The attack was of course carried out by the al-Qaeda jihadist militia. Apart from 
the 9/11 attacks, the United States reportedly had other economic interests in southwest Asia. 
The emphasis here is on the region’s rich oil deposits. Apart from that, by successfully 
initiating a terror attack on America’s home soil, doubts were cast pertaining to America’s 
superpower status. There was a need in these downward political spirals to restore the 
country’s image as the reigning superpower. This further fuelled the need for American forces 
to be deployed to Afghanistan and destroy the jihadists of the al Qaeda and their protector, the 
Taliban. 
In the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom, there were three major issues. 
These issues were: First, the message that the assault would relay to other nations that had 
such terrorists’ ambitions, Second the message that would be relayed to other Muslim nations 
in Southwest Asia and the Middle East as a whole and third, the message that would be 
relayed to the Afghanistan civilians after the destruction of the Taliban.
347
  
This operation was very delicate considering all the risks that were involved. The first 
point of action taken by the United States was to order the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to 
hand over Osama Bin Laden. As expected, the Taliban regime was unwilling to comply with 
the order. Consequently, President Bush declared the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan. The operation was to officially start on the 7
th
 of October, 2001. Some days 
before this, Special Forces operatives were deployed in Pakistan and Uzbekistan. This was 
done following the counsel of the then commander of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, 
General Tommy Franks. Black Hawks made their entrance into the Afghan skies undetected. 
What followed was the placement of recce units that were charged with gathering information 
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and guiding the air raids to key terrorist targets. Ready to step off were 15
th
 MEU (SOC) and 
the 26
th
 MEU (SOC) which were prepositioned in the Arabian Sea on the USS Peleliu (LHA-
5). They were later reinforced by the 13
th
 MEU (SOC) from the USS Bonhomme Richard for 
the anticipated assignment against the Taliban fighters.
348
 The initial combat depended solely 
upon U.S. air power. This was a strategy employed to achieve two main effects. Foremost, it 
was designed to keep al- Qaeda and Taliban forces in, or to have them retreat into caves or 
other observed shelters. Second, it was to wipe out most, if not all, of the Taliban forces 
before the military carried out joint ground operations. On the 7
th
 of October, the F/A-18 
Hornets escorted bombers from the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps This pre-
structuring of the battlefield signaled the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.
349
 
It had been ascertained that the Taliban were not only a problem to the United States 
but were also a problem for the traditional tribes of Afghanistan. There already existed an 
anti-Taliban organization, the Northern Alliance, whose sole purpose was to do away with the 
Taliban. The Marine Corps Special Operations units partnered with the Northern Alliance in a 
bid to exterminate their common adversary. The strategy for this operation was to develop 
liaisons with such anti-Taliban factions who would on their behalf fight the Taliban and cause 
their downfall. The Marines achieved a rapport with the most powerful of the Northern 
Alliance leaders. This can be likened to the Civil Action Patrols devised to fight the 
communist based warriors from North Vietnam. The Marine Corps CAP units trained and 
supported the South Vietnam villagers, while also helping in protecting these villages almost 
fifty years prior. The DNA of the Marine Corps had evidenced itself again.
350
 
They were provided with air support to help them extend this semi home grown force 
projection over Northern Afghanistan. In effect the Marines created a force multiplier as both 
entities opposed the Taliban. This was to be accomplished before the Afghan winter season. 
Winter in Afghanistan meant serious difficulty in movement. The employment of surrogate 
                                                          
 
348
 “Operation Enduring Freedom Update,” Marine Corps Gazette, 2002, Vol. 86, 2. https://www.mca-
marines.org/gazette/2002/02/operation-enduring-freedom-update. (Accessed 23 May 2014). 
 
349
 Ibid. 
 
350
 West, “The Village,” ix-xvii. 
  
159 
 
forces that were more familiar with the country’s terrain was in itself a major blow to the 
Taliban. Having to contain the Northern Alliance and at the same time worry about the 
looming Marine Corps maneuver warfare efforts in the Afghan skies posed both a military and 
political dilemma for the Taliban.
351
The Northern Alliance accepted the Marine’s invitation. 
This was done because the Taliban had one of their military leaders, Ahmed Shah Masoud, 
killed. This created bitter feelings towards the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. 
 An initial glimpse into the Marine Corps practice of doctrinal maneuver warfare was 
offered by General Mattis when he stated: 
“..The Marines first went in to Helmand [province]….. I don't recall us ever being in 
traditional warfare…..  The Marines were brought in by a heliborne assault ….. Instead of 
attacking from the outside of Sangin in through the irrigated area of the river valley, they landed 
in the middle of town and worked outward which completely screwed up the enemy….. The 
Marines brought in 850 men in the first two hours of the assault.  They completely cornered the 
Taliban / al Qaeda forces…. It was maneuver warfare.  The enemy knew we were coming.  
They'd seen the Marines forming south of Sangin an area named by Alexander the Great…..The 
squads [of Marines] manned and moving from inside Sangin had worked outwards forcing the 
enemy into their own IEDs as they retreated.  The enemy never recovered from that fundamental 
tactical mistake. The military leadership of the enemy left much to be desired in handling this 
unexpected attack route of the Marine’s … Now, the Taliban were good at one thing, dying..”352 
The Marines first priorities was to destroy the terrorist training camps in and around 
Afghanistan, and at the same time provide humanitarian assistance to the civilians while 
protecting critical infrastructure. Maneuver warfare presented itself in two ways: initiating 
surprise and creating confusion. The Taliban had underestimated the technology the Marines 
brought to the fight. The Taliban’s realization that they did not have near equal technology 
compared to that of the Marines was enough to throw them into a panic. Panic more often than 
not ultimately stirs confusion and disorder among enemy combatants, making them easier to 
subdue.
353
 
Another maneuver strategy the Marines Corps utilized was to annihilate the heads of 
Taliban / al-Qaeda terrorist organizations. This Taliban / al-Qaeda partnership was by then 
under the Taliban reign. The Marines therefore developed a major interest in the countries 
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leaders. The Taliban had publicly offered their support for al-Qaeda. The Taliban gave Osama 
bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network security and Osama bin Laden offered them financial 
support in return. There was a very thin line that separated the al-Qaeda organization and the 
Taliban forces. In some instances there was no separation line. By capturing the key 
leadership cadre of either or both organizations, its operations would be interfered with or 
disrupted to the point of stagnation.
354
 This would bring the Marines’ desired effect of 
winning at the least possible costs in lives and treasure. Boydian philosophy of faster OODA 
cycling by the Marine Corps enhanced their maneuver prospects.
355
 
In the next two weeks, the Marines made a clean job of the Taliban’s air defenses. The 
Northern Alliance helped in orchestrating the air strikes. Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
(JDAM’s) were employed in bringing down the Taliban air defenses. These munitions were 
GPS-guided. This alone was enough to cripple the entire opposition and it would be expected 
that the attacking military would withdraw after such an assault. However, the aim of 
maneuver warfare is not just to destroy the enemy on the battle field. It is equally aimed at 
breaking the enemy’s will as well.356 This meant that the Marines did not want to give the al-
Qaeda a chance to rise again. Therefore, initiation of ground warfare was essential for the 
complete elimination of whatever al Qaeda or Taliban pockets of resistance that may have 
remained.  
Here a high tempo with ruthless abandon was the essence of another maneuver tactic 
employed by the Marine Corps in Helmand Province.
357
 Another attribute of this combined 
arms approach of the air campaign is that the civilian casualties were minimal. By 
accomplishing the control of indiscriminate bombings, the Marines sought to win over a 
portion of the Afghanistan civilians to their side. This was also done by providing food 
supplies and infrastructure development to the Afghani populace. It eventually won over 
civilian loyalty. This fact alone of employing maneuver warfare’s “soft side” came from not 
only the lessons learned by the CAP program but also from the Marine Corps DNA found in 
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FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual since the Taliban’s morale would also be negatively 
affected when they realized their own people were now against them.
358
  
The major functions of the Marine MAGTF were to provide support for the air 
operations by destroying as many Taliban and al-Qaeda military facilities and camps as 
possible. Also they were there to support the Northern Alliance who was working in 
conjunction with U.S. Special Forces and U.S. Marines. The three carrier strike groups 
employed in the air campaign were: The Enterprise Strike Group- from the Arabian Sea; Carl 
Vinson Strike Group- from the Arabian Sea; and the Theodore Roosevelt Strike Group- from 
the Mediterranean Sea. The Kitty Hawk and John Stennis Strike Groups were at hand when it 
came to providing combined air support as well. In the initial stages of the attack, there was 
wide application of cruise missiles fired into Afghanistan. These sea borne attacks helped in 
launching surprise ground attacks on the unsuspecting Talibani targets by Marine special 
operators. Eighty eight cruise missiles were used in the first ten days of the attack. While the 
Marines were better suited to utilize rapid maneuver warfare strikes that quickly finished the 
adversary, the ground warfare in Operation Enduring Freedom took longer than expected. It 
was referred to as a marathon rather than a sprint by Brigadier General James N. Mattis in the 
beginnings of OEF.
359
 Operation Enduring Freedom had earlier been known as Operation 
Swift Freedom. The realization that freedom would not be as swift as anticipated might have 
been the reason for the change in mission names. This operation would last for some time as 
numerous missions were carried out in the longest war of record for the United States.  
A key decision combined the 15
th
 MEU (SOC) and the 26
th
 MEU (SOC) which 
resulted into the formation of Task Force 58. The Task Force 58 played a big role in the 
eventual downfall of the Taliban. Task Force 58 was made up of two infantry battalions, 1
st
 
Battalion, 1
st
 Marine Regiment and 3
rd
 Battalion; two helicopter squadrons (HMM -165 and 
HMM-365) and two logistic support groups that entailed MSSG 15 and MSSG 26. They 
numbered about twenty five hundred Marines and sailors. Additionally, there was an 
Australian Special Air Service Squadron and a U.S. Naval Construction Battalion (NMCB 
133). The Task Force headquarters was on the USS Peleliu, with a forward Observation Post 
(OP) coupled with a jump Command Post (CP). The headquarters was made up of thirty two 
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personnel. This was a small number of people who enabled the missions to be carried out with 
agility and precision. Unlike the conditions in Northern Afghanistan where the Marine Corps 
had allies, the Marines in southern Afghanistan had no such backing. This meant they could 
make no advancement until they received permission to fly over Pakistan. This fact affected 
the strategic tempo of Marine Corps maneuver against the Taliban.
360
  
The Marines did not view the sea as a stumbling block to their operations but rather 
looked at it beneficently as maneuver space. They used it as a geographical advantage, such 
that the enemy would never be able to decide the location of the assault. This would throw the 
adversary into a dilemma as to whether to defend the coast or proceed inland. This was 
maneuver warfare 101 in action. At the same time, it gave the Marine Corps the freedom to 
choose where, when and how to attack. Entry into Afghanistan was of course opposed by the 
Taliban, making it essential for the entry to be carried out with violent force. Forcible entry 
strategy owes its foundation to the maneuver warfare. The principles that were applied in 
operating this maritime maneuver were:  
1. Complete focus on operational objectives, 
2. Viewing the sea as a maneuver space, 
3. Quick generation of tempo and momentum, 
4. Being conversant with both parties’ strengths and weaknesses, 
5. Concentration on deception and intelligence, 
6. Merging of all organic joint and combined assets in order to give or refuse battle.
361
  
 
Another aspect of the application of maneuver warfare by the Marine Corps focused 
on the need to shape the battlefield and all operators within it. It is important to note that the 
Marines had gained a meaningful amount of local support. Pashtun tribes, though few, held 
common views with the Marine Corps towards the Taliban. This inspired their attack against 
the Kandahar Taliban faction. On November 14
th
 Kandahar was basically the spiritual base of 
the Taliban; but by November 15
th
, they began withdrawing from Kandahar. The Pashtun 
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allies paved the way; the U.S. Marines launched a major offensive. Charlie Company, 
Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/1 left the USS Peleliu to make an amphibious landing on 
Afghanistan soil. The long flight was sustained through nocturnal aerial refueling. This was 
risky but aided in the surprise nature of the Marines shaping the battle space. The flight was 
450 miles, from the USS Peleliu to Objective Rhino over Pakistani airspace.
362
 Calculated 
risks in seeking soft gaps paid off for the Marines in this effort.  
Although “official” Pakistani approval did not exist, a de facto agreement had been 
reached between the Marine Corps and the Pakistani Marine forces that provided the 
necessary support for this operation. The U.S. Marines were given Pakistani Marine support in 
these operations. As this operation unfolded, the Pakistani Marines would surround the airstrip 
and provide maximum security. However, the internal politics of Pakistan was a sensitive 
issue. The government could not announce their alliance with the U.S. Marine Corps and 
denied such allegations when confronted by the journalists. In prepositioning the necessary 
logistical tail required many trips and eventual sea landings took place. The Marines took to a 
cycle of hiding their logistical support in the sand dunes during the day and bringing in ships 
with more supplies only at night. Without the aid of the Pakistani government the operation’s 
success would have been hard to achieve. Pakistan eventually granted the Marines’ access to a 
small fishing village where supplies could be offloaded. The Amphibious Ready Group made 
use of more than thirteen Landing Craft Air Cushioned, (LCAC); as well as, four Landing 
Craft Utility ships (LCU) used to ferry troops and supplies during these amphibious landings. 
Upon landing, trucks would carry the supplies to the airfield. Only two trucks could travel in a 
night. The Marines had to limit the number of active warfighters to a minimum, until 
Operations Rhino was to step off.
363
  
Task Force-58 chose the village of Shamsi to be the Forward Arming and Refueling 
Point (FARP). It became an important refueling center for Marine aviation from the ships, 
enroute to Camp Rhino. Until then, the Taliban thought they had Pakistani backing. The 
Marine Corps thought this as well since maneuver warfare requires one to have full 
knowledge of the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. The Marine Corps cut right through 
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what the Taliban saw as their core strength base. They won over the Pakistani government 
which made the operation smoother than it would have been under the current circumstances. 
The Taliban and al-Qaeda meanwhile went through their operations normally, counting on the 
lack of Pakistani support for the Marines hoping to make any Marine attack feeble. The 
Taliban were deceived into a false sense of security and were greatly surprised when they 
were eventually attacked.
364
 Deception is a major principle of maneuver warfare and its 
integration with surprise yielded the desired results for the Marines. Eventually a number of 
CH-53Es made it ashore in the company of AH-1W Cobras and UH-1 Hueys. The helicopters 
from the 15
th
 MEU (SOC) landed two hundred U.S. Marines to establish the Forward 
Operating Base at an abandoned airfield fifty five miles to the south of Kandahar. They 
secured the airstrip with no resistance. Once Operation Rhino became Camp Rhino, the very 
first assault came shortly; two Marine Cobras encountered three al Qaeda / Taliban armored 
vehicles. The attack left two of the armored vehicles destroyed and scores of Taliban fighters 
dead. In one week one thousand Marines were in the AOR at their new FOB, Camp Rhino.
365
 
The Marines using maneuver warfare tactics were always on the alert, never ignoring 
even the most minor signals offered by their foe during an operation. Maneuver warfare works 
best with a team being able to pick out gaps in the enemy’s deployment and exploiting it to 
their advantage. This was exemplified on December 6
th
 when flashes were seen in the 
northern horizon. The Marines were later informed by a recce Naval P-3s that enemy vehicles 
were indeed getting loaded for some intended action. BLT 1/1 assaulted the enemy with 
81mm mortar fires. This piece of information proved vital in the Marines operation, such that 
knowing the enemy had planned to surprise attack the Marines, instead the roles were 
reversed! The Marines were to ensure there was no re-occurrence of the same enemy activity. 
A Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) was therefore deployed to explore the site, and they found 
nothing substantial.
366
  
To all appearances, the day seemed to have ended with this assault but that was not to 
be the case. A Lockheed P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft had spotted a convoy of six 
vehicles making their way towards a Marine roadblock on Route 1. This Marine post was 
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being manned by units from Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (LAR), Combined 
Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) and Marine Force Reconnaissance platoon. The vehicles came to a 
halt at the roadblock. One of the vehicles sped towards the wire that blocked the road. It only 
stopped when it got trapped by the wire. By then the Marines had opened fire on the vehicle 
and it soon burst into flames. An enemy who tried to escape from the burning truck was cut 
down by a Marine sniper. The explosion that followed scattered the other occupants of the 
vehicle on the road. The P-3 observers worked closely with a Forward Air Controller (FAC) 
guiding fire for CAS aircraft. One hundred and twenty of the al-Qaeda militiamen died and 
movement on Route 1 by the al Qaeda ended for the enemy.
367
 This incident showed an 
excellent application of the maneuver warfare. The units in Task Force 58 did not work on a 
designed schedule. They received a mission type order so as to go and interdict the road. 
Knowing commanders intent that is exactly what they did. An aside benefit of this action also 
rid the terrorists of many of its ardent followers and possible future recruits.
368
  
 Maneuver warfare needed an assessment of the current situation and forming 
immediate judgments based on them. The rapid airstrike that followed threw the Taliban into 
massive confusion from which they did not recover. In the end they had heavy casualties and 
in addition, all their vehicles were destroyed. If the Taliban could replace their troops with 
ease, they would not be able to replace the lost vehicles with ease. This frustrated their efforts 
and the resistance dwindled with time. This incident is an example of military success 
obtained through rapid deployment and good intelligence gathering. 
369
 
The airport in Kandahar city was taken over by the Marines in mid-December 2001. 
This was done by the LAR Company from the 15
th
 MEU (SOC). The operation was named 
Task Force Sledgehammer. At dawn, helicopters from the 15
th
 and 26
th
 MEU (SOC) carried 
reinforcements into the airport. These helicopters carried the 6
th
 Marines, India Company, 3
rd
 
Battalion. The surrounding area was explored for unexploded devices and booby traps. The 
Taliban / al Qaeda army had been cunning enough to carpet the runways with mines and 
miscellaneous metal pieces. A few planes were lost to this tactic, much as the Marines tried as 
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possible to avoid such accidents.
370
 The intent of capturing the airport meant cutting off 
communication between the northern and southern Taliban, which would be detrimental to 
their operations. It also meant that the al-Qaeda was cut off from their supplies and 
reinforcement as well. In this application of maneuver warfare where the Marines took hold of 
a location which was critical to the Taliban a soft spot in the enemy’s position created a gap 
that would splinter the enemy’s forces and start the process of isolation of enemy combatants. 
Also with no apparent threat to the Kandahar Airport, it became easy for the Marines to 
penetrate deeper into southern Afghanistan.
371
 
In January 2002 a platoon from Alpha Company joined the 3
rd
 Battalion, 6
th
 Marines 
BLT attached to the 26
th
 MEU. They concentrated their operations within Kandahar province 
as before, seeking to bring the area under total control. There was no relaxation with the 
patrols and the recons were still conducted to ensure the enemy had been subdued. Some 
prisoners of war were captured by the Marines. They were questioned by Marine Interrogator 
Translators, the 202
nd
 Military Intelligence Battalion, the CIA, the Drugs Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and MI-5 British Intelligence. They 
sought to know more about the prisoners and garner any useful information from them. 
General Mattis allowed full access to the prisoners on the grounds that any useful information 
gathered would be shared by all.
372
 Moreover, “alarm type” information which included 
pending attacks and actionable intelligence was to be made known to General Mattis 
immediately. Meanwhile, a team of specialists under Lieutenant Commander Runkle were 
sent to support a team from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in scouring of the 
Karnak Farm, which served as an al-Qaeda training ground. The farm became one of the 
several Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) missions that Task Force 58 had carried out 
alongside Task Force K-Bar.
373
 The team found a large number of files that contained 
reference and training manuals along with paperwork that would be essential sources of 
intelligence for the operation. The task force also carried out the Sensitive Site Exploitation 
missions in a place that was suspected to have ties with chemical and biological warfare 
research. A special Chemical Biological Inspection Site Team (CBIST) was dispatched to 
                                                          
370
 Lowrey, “From the Sea,” 107. 
371
 MCDP 1.1. 
 
372
 Mattis, Telephonic Interview with author. 
 
373
 Lowrey, “From the Sea,” 42. 
167 
 
provide support for the Australian Task Force 64. These units together with the Marine 
security elements were deployed in the Dewaluk region where they searched eight villages. 
The elements did not find anything substantial during that particular mission. However, in the 
early days of January 2002, Task Force 58 and Task Force K-Bar were sent on a mission to 
clear a number of caves in the Zhawar Kili area. Contrary to all expectations, the mission took 
twelve days instead of a few hours. The caves were found to be holding a large amount of 
intelligence together with ammunition and explosives.
374
 
On January 19
th
, the 26
th
 MEU handed over the responsibility of the airport to units on the 
101
st
 Airborne Division, Task Force Rakkasan. On February 5
th
 General Mattis’ team 
proceeded to exit Afghanistan. The three months Task Force 58 had spent ashore, had been of 
great importance to the war effort. Maneuver type actions of demonstrable importance by this 
Task Force were: 
1. Sealing off of the western escape routes that lay along the Highway 1, 
2. Securing the U.S Embassy in Kabul, 
3. Securing a special operations facility in Khowst, 
4. Capturing the Kandahar International Airport, 
5. Putting up a short time holding facility that served as detention grounds for enemy 
prisoners, 
6. Carrying out successful Sensitive Sites Exploitation missions (SSE),  
7. Taliban’s hold of Kandahar had slackened, 
8. Many of the Taliban fighters had withdrawn from the city and surrounding regions.375 
The Marines redeployed to Afghanistan when Taliban insurgency again became 
apparent. Helmand province and its constituent districts offered the Taliban a haven for their 
renewed operations. In March 2008, the 24
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit was dispatched to 
Afghanistan in order to support the 2
nd
 Battalion, 6
th
 Marines who had already redeployed in 
Afghanistan. They were supposed to conduct operations that would eliminate or neutralize the 
Taliban threat in volatile Helmand Province. The Marines began their patrol in the areas 
which had been occupied by the Taliban. The Marines made their way to the south of the 
province, and into Garmser and Nawa districts which were inhabited extensively by the 
Taliban. Their advancement into these districts came sooner than the Taliban anticipated. The 
Marines spread out into the villages of the lush farming districts so as to stay put and establish 
a Marine Corps presence. The Marines gave this operation a different strategical maneuver 
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approach. Their first priority was to ensure that there were no civilian casualties. In the other 
operations, they had come to pursue and eliminate the Taliban but this would not be the case 
in this operation. New rules of engagement (ROE) were the commander’s intent on this 
redeployment. They received strict orders that required them to withdraw from an engagement 
with the Taliban and reconnect later if civilian lives were at risk. Although the Taliban fired at 
them, the Marines did not respond with fire unless it was ROE compliant. The response was 
the same when they encountered roadside bombs. The Marines aimed at winning civilian 
confidence and assuring them that they would be safe in Marine Corps hands. The Marine 
Corps intent with maneuver in mind was to erase the picture that had been painted in the 
civilian minds that Americans were responsible for all the violence and destruction. This was 
the beginning of General Mattis’ Distributive Operations which were an adaptation from the 
original CAP applications of the Vietnam War.
376
 
In a predawn attack, the Marines proceeded to the town of Dahaneh. This town had 
been under Taliban control for an extended period. The launch of this mission was aimed at 
securing the area for the important upcoming elections. The Marines were flown into 
Dahaneh, where they were then dispatched behind the enemy lines. The Taliban / al Qaeda 
insurgents responded to the assault with heavy fire from mortars, small arms and the rocket 
propelled grenades, the standard insurgent tools that have grown synonymous with these 
militia forces. The Marines returned the fire and engaged with combined air support and with 
helicopters flying overhead dropping numerous flares to mark the enemy forces. The intent for 
the Marine Corps in this action at Dahaneh was the hope that they would manage to isolate the 
insurgents from the civilian population.
377
 
They hoped to confine the enemy to the mountains and forests areas so that they would 
leave the civilians to participate peacefully in the Afghanistan presidential elections. The 
Taliban had sworn to do everything in their power to disrupt the elections. The battle raged on 
for an extended period. Between seven to ten Taliban militiamen were left dead after the 
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assault. The battle was slowed down by the insurgents who had resorted to firing rounds from 
the rooftops. However, this was neutralized by the airstrikes that were called in by the 
Marines. At the onset of the action, nearly one hundred civilians fled the town, leaving the 
attacking troops confident that the remaining Afghani’s in the town would only be insurgents. 
 Great care was being taken to eliminate any occurrence of civilian casualties. This is 
because capturing of Dahaneh was secondarily aimed at winning the civilian’s hearts and 
minds. The Taliban had levied heavy taxes at Dahaneh’s checkpoints because it had been an 
important trade route in the region north of the Helmand province. These taxes, together with 
funds garnered from the drug business formed the major source of finances for the Taliban. 
The mission was therefore conducted in a bid to reclaim the important market center from the 
Taliban and hand it over for civilian use.
378
 
A large quantity of opium was seized by the Marines in this operation, alongside of a 
large cache of weapons. The insurgents had made Dahaneh a home, such that they even 
rejected their earlier strategy of shooting and running. In this battle, they stood their ground 
and fought back. This fact points to the level of importance attached to Dahaneh by the 
militants. Dahaneh was a Taliban-center of gravity. By attacking and ejecting them from the 
town, the Marine’s action further demystified the strength of the Taliban. The Taliban forces 
in Dahaneh were deprived of their supply lines and would stand out from the civilians, 
therefore exposing them to Marine Corps forces.
379
  
In the post engagement time frame, the first ever patrol was mounted in the town 
following the retreat of the insurgents. A contingent of Afghan soldiers and female Marines 
(FET’s) set out to find civilians who might have gone into hiding within the town when the 
attack began. There were no civilian casualties in the assault. The response of the Marines had 
been strictly proportional so that any civilians in the compounds would not be harmed. By 
these actions of a subdued yet intentional ROE the aspects of maneuver warfare achieved the 
intended intent of pacification in Dahaneh.
380
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The U.S. Marines took over Sangin,
381
 a district to the north of Helmand province, 
from the British in mid-October. Sangin was one of the most violent places in Afghanistan. It 
was a major Taliban stronghold and their attacks reflected as much. The Taliban had not taken 
the presence of the Marine and Coalition troops in Sangin lightly. Sangin is where the 
insurgents’ activities obtained another major source of their funding. Sangin is a lush valley in 
which opium and heroin was processed. The lucrative drug business ultimately funded their 
battles. It was also the last of such havens in Helmand as all the others had been disrupted by 
the U.S. Marine and Coalition forces.
382
  
Sangin was also situated at a major choke point where all the drugs were funneled. 
Weapons and fighters also made this their juncture for their movements to other provinces. 
When the 3
rd
 Battalion, 5
th
 Marine Regiment took over Sangin, they planned to give it a more 
aggressive approach than before. The British had been more lenient in their approach, losing 
almost a third of their troops which had been deployed in the area. The withdrawal of course 
raised a lot of worries as to whether the Marine Corps would be able to finish a task in which 
the British had encountered difficulties in their operation. It was then announced that the 
British withdrawal was an action that was taken in order to put the British focus into central 
Helmand province while the Marine Corps took care of the north and south.  
The first action of the Marines was to shut down a dozen of the twenty two patrol 
bases the British had constructed throughout the Sangin district. This clearly indicated that 
they never intended to employ the British neighborhood policing tactics. These bases had been 
aimed at improving the security situation in the districts. However, the British ended up 
deploying most of their troops to the bases leaving the other parts of this AOR to the Taliban. 
The British FOB’s were closed down in order to free the maneuver forces which would then 
pursue the enemy without the fear of the bases being attacked and or captured.
383
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The initial intent shifted for the Marines in Sangin. The Marines conducted many 
patrols in the area and were very aggressive during these patrols. They would respond to the 
Taliban with heavy gunfire instead of retreating to their bases, as the British had done. The 
Taliban in Sangin were a different bread of insurgents. They did not wait to be attacked; 
instead they came looking for the Marines. The Marine Corps resorted to employing small 
unit maneuver warfare as their modus operandi, owing to the fact that their numbers were far 
too small to take on the Taliban in a major combat. The small units would take advantage of 
their numbers to involve the Taliban in maneuvers that would entrap them. The Taliban never 
stayed long while engaging in combat with the Marines. They knew this was an invitation for 
air strikes that would earn them unwanted casualties. They eventually adopted a “shoot and 
scoot” strategy against the Marine warfighters. They would attack, drop their weapons and 
then flee. The Marines, instead of seeking cover when the Taliban ambushed, counterattacked 
the Taliban forces.
384
 The Marine snipers would then take full advantage of this confusion and 
eliminate the insurgents. Perhaps the most effective weapons utilized by the Taliban were the 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). These were always hidden in the most unimaginable 
places in the district. The Taliban fired at the Marines when they had planted these IEDs in the 
space between them. They sometimes directed fire at the Marines which was meant to act as 
bait and lure them into these minefields. However, the Marine Corps ability to out think or 
cycle faster through the OODA process eliminated, if not lessened the Taliban threats. The 
Marines maneuvered to fix these Taliban units so that other squads of Marines would attack 
the insurgents from a direction they least expected.
385
 
Operation Moshtarak
386
 was launched to deal with civilian needs as part of a strategy 
of counterinsurgency (COIN). This operation took place in the Nad Ali district, of the Marjah 
region which had been in insurgents control for many years. This region is infamous for its 
multi-hundred million dollar narcotics business. The growing of opium is limited not only to 
the Taliban, but also to the civilians and senior government officials who have stakes in this 
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business model. This operation had no hint of surprise in it. This is because the Coalition 
forces had made the people’s safety and reduction of collateral damage their first priority.387 
 Leaflets were air-dropped to the civilians to inform them of the upcoming offensive 
and to also warn them against hosting the insurgents. Local elders convened meetings with the 
Coalition forces so that they would be updated on their plans and be informed on what to do 
once the offensive started. Female Marines (FET) also went from one compound to another, 
trying to get the Afghan women to tell them their major needs and as well as garner 
information on the Taliban.
388
 Operation Moshtarak, meaning “Together” in the Afghanistan 
Dali language, saw the integration of a large Afghan force within the coalition units. The 
Afghans to all appearances led the operation. This integration of the Afghan force was meant 
to do away with the reservations that the Afghan people had about the coalition forces, 
viewing them as invaders. In these operations, the Coalition forces defeated the Taliban on the 
battleground, and then left a small number of the troops to guard the area. The moment the 
Taliban noticed that the coalition forces were depleted after the offensive; they would come 
back and retake these areas. After this they would spread propaganda that they had in fact 
defeated the coalition forces. This was evidenced during Operation Anaconda,
389
 now a lesson 
learned. Going forward for the Marine Corps, the tactic of clear, hold and build was brought 
into play.
390
  
The Marines did not want a repeat of the Taliban resettlement once the clearance 
operations were over. They sought to merge the military missions with the socio-political 
operations in the Marjah area. Order was not supposed to be temporary, as long as the Afghan 
military were in place. Rather the Marines wanted to restore order and governance that would 
be there in the long term. That is why the Afghan forces were to be inserted in these 
operations. The withdrawal of the Coalition forces would not create an administrational 
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vacuum. The Marines also aimed at making the civilians their friends. Hopefully the civilians 
would then give them information concerning the Taliban who were in their midst. Moreover, 
they would tell them where the Taliban had already planted their Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) and other items of intelligence value.  
391
  
The Coalition offensive had begun with numerous British and American airstrikes. 
This went on for some time before the ground troops became engaged in this effort. The 
Moshtarak offensive, which brought together over fifteen thousand NATO forces, to fight 
alongside a large number of Afghanistan forces is a prime example of applying the Boydian 
OODA process.
392
 This was to be the largest military assault ever launched by NATO on the 
Afghanistan soil. This assault was the first experiment of the strategy that NATO had adopted 
in which success was not to be determined by the number of Taliban casualties (a typical 
attritionist mind set). Still, NATO officials had warned that there was a strong likelihood that 
the operation would result in the highest insurgent casualties ever seen in Afghanistan. This 
operation was meant to break the Taliban’s back.393  
The ground combat had been preceded by RAF Tornados. They flew over central 
Helmand Valley where combat was expected to take place. The region below was scanned 
with target pods from helicopters that aimed at getting intelligence and looking for anything 
that pointed to Taliban locations or activity. This intelligence was sent to mission headquarters 
at the Kandahar airfield; and once there, analysts would sift through it. Both the U.S. and 
British spy planes were integrated into the order of battle. These sophisticated aircraft sought 
to jam and disrupt the communication between Taliban commanders. The first of the Taliban 
casualties came from an unmanned Predator aircraft and Marine AH-64 Apache attack 
helicopters. These were directed at insurgents who had been in the process of laying roadside 
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Improvised Explosive Devices and putting anti-aircraft guns into place. These air strikes 
resulted in the death of eleven of the Taliban.
394
  
The initial attacks began immediately following the air strikes. The U.S. Marines 
proceeded to capture a number of canal crossings situated to the south of Nad Ali. Nad Ali is 
one of the most densely populated regions in the Helmand Valley. The first Marine Chinooks 
made their landing at around 0225. The night sky was lit up by their infra-red flares which 
were visible to the pilots but not to the naked eye. The RAF pilots had been provided with 
night vision equipment which had been given to them by Marine Corps’ Harrier AV-8B jet 
pilots. At 0400, the operation entered a critical phase as Marine helicopters filled with 
coalition soldiers, Afghan forces and Marines made their landing in the Taliban-dominated 
area of Showal, Chah-e-Anjir region. As soon as the helicopters landed, the soldiers and 
Marines scrambled out to their positions. The “break-in” was underway. As the British forces 
went about capturing their designated areas, a one thousand-man force consisting of Marines 
and Afghan National Army were dispatched in Marjah.
395
  
In Marjah, just like Dahaneh, the Taliban were expected to stand and fight instead of 
their usual retreating after their initial assault. This resistance again meant that the number of 
casualties would be high on both sides. In the next one and a half hours, more and more 
Marines arrived in the CH-53 Super Stallion transport helicopters. Daylight saw additional 
troops arriving into the area by land maneuver. They made use of makeshift mobile bridges to 
get across rivulets and irrigation canals. Meanwhile, the heavily armored MRAP trucks were 
plowing away at the mines, making a safe path through which the troops could enter the city. 
The Marines immediately secured many of their objectives.
396
 They encountered very little 
resistance, in some cases none at all. The operation had taken quite some time to plan, about 
two months in the making. This had been followed by rigorous shaping operations that 
ensured that the strikes were carried out with the greatest of speed when the attack was finally 
launched. The operation took place as planned, with each of the Afghani soldiers or Marines 
keeping in mind that the operation was not aimed at the annihilation of the Taliban, but rather 
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to secure the province for the local population; a pacification technique in line with FMFRP 
12-15 Small Wars Manual.
397
 The most encouraging aspect of the operation was that some of 
the captured Taliban had an epiphany. They showed signs of wishing to be reconciled with the 
local community instead of remaining with the insurgency.
398
 
In the latter parts of the operation, the Marines took another tactic to counter-insurgency 
(COIN) in Helmand. Borrowing heavily from Combined Action Platoons (CAP) in Vietnam, 
the Marines embarked on a long-term mission that saw them living next to the Afghan 
fighters. The major tenets behind this stratagem were: 
1. To live and interact with the Afghan populace, 
2. To form a liaison with the local forces, 
3. To establish a rift between the local populace and the insurgents with the help of the 
local troops.
399
 
General James Mattis encouraged the adoption of this strategy. He maintained that if these 
cohesive small contingents, which had undergone vast training that did not stop at fire and 
maneuver lived with the people, victory could be assured. He linked this to Iraq where the 
Marines had noted that al-Qaeda had been brought down to its knees the moment the people 
of Al- Anbar province withdrew their support of al-Qaeda.
400
 However, the fact that the 
Marines had established a rapport with the local populace alone did not make them immune to 
ambushes. The insurgent ambushes were still laid despite these relationships. There was 
widespread corruption that at times prompted the local forces to shift loyalty away from the 
Marines. This posed a great threat that required the Marines to maintain high levels of 
                                                          
397
 Small Wars Manual. 
 
398
 Senate Committee, Armed Services, “Operation Moshtarak.”   
Also see: Rob Johnson, The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 267-268 and 287. 
 
399
 Combined Action Platoons of Vietnam have been reintroduced in Afghanistan under the guidance of 
Gen. Conway and Gen. Mattis they have been renamed” Distributed Operations” This is a recent development 
that is being tried as a COIN initiative. For the most part it is still a classified endeavor of the Combat 
Development Group and the Warfighting Lab at MCHQ Quantico. It can be considered a combination of the 
Marine Corps Raider Battalions of WWII mixed with the Marine Corps CAP of the Vietnam War. Add in the 
lessons learned from Small War Manual, FMFM-1, MCDP-1 and The Three Block War Concept with smaller 
numbers per se reducing the BLT to the CLT (Company Landing Team). See Conclusions for further discussion 
of D.O. 
 
400
 Conway and Mattis, interviews with the author. 
176 
 
alertness. This strategy was an employment of the CAP-style maneuver warfare as a method 
of counterinsurgency.
401
  
The Marines spent very little time in their forward operating bases (FOBs). Rather, 
they spent the bulk of their time interacting with members of the community. The 
community’s trust had to be earned and this was not going to be possible if the Marines stuck 
to the safety presented within the FOBs. The Marines lived without air-conditioning systems, 
television and internet connection, or food served at the dining facilities in order to unite with 
the community. These Marines dined on the same food as the locals and experienced the lack 
of amenities just as the locals did. The Afghans would ultimately develop a feeling for the 
Marines and recognize that the real trouble lay with the Taliban and not the Marines.
402
  
The Marines mounted patrols in the regions they lived in, up to three patrols every day. 
The frequency of these patrols outdid that of all other forces deployed in the area. This 
ensured maximum security and further enhanced the Afghans’ belief that the Marines were in 
truth concerned with their security.  
A case in point for the successes of the Marines’ interaction with the people was in 
Garmsir. When the 24
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in Garmsir in 2008, the area was 
racked with the frequent insurgent assaults in a bid to capture it. The British in the district, 
backed by the surge of 24
th
 MEU, finally achieved a semblance of stability and put the district 
under the jurisdiction of the Coalition forces. The British handed over the responsibility of the 
district to the 2
nd
 Battalion, 8
th
 Marines in May 2009. There was not much fighting when the 
battalion, also known as “America’s Battalion,” arrived in Garmsir. There was considerable 
insurgent activity in the surrounding districts but Garmsir was a different story, most of the 
activity having been neutralized by the Marine Corps and Afghan national forces. This 
mission was far from over for the Marines. They had meant to pass the baton for all the 
security operations to the Afghan troops and this would definitely take more time.
403
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The “America’s Battalion” had reached Afghanistan while the military operations 
were entering a critical phase of the entire campaign. The previous battalions had focused on 
clearing Garmsir and bringing stability to it. The “America’s Battalion” concerned itself with 
the building and shaping of the district’s future. The battalion succeeded in handing over thirty 
nine of their positions to the Afghan troops, apart from redeploying a hundred million dollars’ 
worth of gear to the Afghans.  
It was obvious that the future of Garmsir leaned heavily of the presence of an Afghan-
led security force. However, the Afghan forces were hardly equipped for such a mission. 
Afghan forces formed a good backing for the Marines patrols but their manpower was barely 
enough to enable them to hold positions without partnering with the Marines.  
The Afghan National Army (ANA) deployed a single battalion, indigenously known as 
a “kandak” to the entire district. Their coverage of the district was extremely thin and hardly 
relevant. The Afghan National Police Force, on the other hand, consisted of about three 
hundred men but was largely marred by corruption, lack of skills and the presence of 
insurgents within this force. The Marines recognized the Afghan Police as Garmsir’s best bet 
for security. They put in place a twenty five-man Police Mentoring Team, and a total of two 
hundred and ten ground combat Marines from Kilo Company, 3
rd 
Battalion 3
rd
 Marines. They 
jointly identified the causes of corruption in the police force and attacked it.
404
 
At the same time they increased the magnitude of the partnered missions and 
operations. Two Marine Corps directed police academies increased the number of Afghan 
Local Police from one hundred and twenty to three hundred and sixty nine patrolmen. The 
number of the Afghan Police Force eventually doubled from the previous three hundred to six 
hundred. A second ANA battalion, 6
th
 Kandak, 1
st
 Brigade, 215
th
 Corps, was deployed to 
Garmsir district from Marjah district. They started operating in the south of Garmsir, backing 
the Afghani 2/1/215 unit that had been deployed to the north of the same district.
405
  
The now strong Afghan National Army spread out into the entire district and carried 
out operations under the watchful eye of their Marine mentors. With time, they segued into 
more independent operations. This largely revamped their confidence and they soon began 
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taking the lead with little Marine supervision. As the Afghan forces became larger, the Afghan 
citizens started experiencing their positive impact on security.  
Their confidence in the capabilities of their forces was further displayed when, 
following several tips, thirty two improvised explosive devices were located and destroyed 
while ten caches of weapons and other insurgent paraphernalia was recovered. The people 
here were so impressed by the Marines’ efforts to get closer to them that they put the Marines 
in the “know” concerning the insurgents’ acts of violence which included destroying 
footbridges in their village, occupying their houses without their consent, planting Improvised 
Explosive Devices in their fields and stealing their property and food.
406
  
As to these facts, Colonel Peter Petronzio, the commanding officer of the 24
th
 Marine 
Expeditionary Unit, observed and noted that the Taliban lacked the means to fight their own 
war. They resorted to stealing from and intimidating the Afghan civilians yet still maintain 
that they were there to help the same people. Since the Marines’ stay in Garmsir, the Afghan 
citizens have showered them with gifts of gratitude and information. They have also presented 
the sick and injured among them to the Marines for medical care. These actions point to 
increased trust for the Marines and support for their presence in the area. The Marines held a 
lot of conversations with the Afghan citizens, seeking to know what they needed most and 
what troubled them. In the conversations, the Afghans blamed all their problems on the 
Taliban, a display of their shift in perspectives. Security was first in priority and they asked 
the Marines to provide them with this.
407
  
The people of Garmsir, in a move to give their government more credence, 
participated in the free district community council elections. The elections were overseen by 
the Afghans and recorded no incidents. The government had made very little sense to the 
people of Garmsir before the elections had been held. Most areas lacked representation. They 
had a serious water deficiency and an economy that was headed on a downward trend. The 
lack of education and the desire for medical services were a negative for the civilians. The 
government now offered all these services to the people. With such security and coherent 
administration, Garmsir’s economy has been on an upward trend over the years. The economy 
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was previously strained with most of the civilians being fully dependent on opium and 
subsistence farming. With security assured, most of the Afghans went back to the business 
centers like the Safar Bazaar. Both the buyers and the sellers conducted their transactions in 
safety, business was beginning to prosper. The number of shops also went from two hundred 
to four hundred in a matter of months. The shops remained opened for most of the day. This 
was different in comparison to when the insurgents reigned; now there was no intimidation of 
the shop owners.
408
 
Most of schools had been closed down and education for girls had been completely 
banned. The Marines’ Female Engagement Teams (FET)409 had done a great deal to create 
awareness of the rights of the women in the district. Though the Islamic law is restrictive for 
women, such extreme Taliban measures as refusing the movement of women were done away 
with. The same was done in encouraging the education of girls and boys in general. This 
would influence the future decisions of the village regarding national governance. The 
Afghans realized the implications of these advances and now began to turn away from the 
Taliban. 
Today, Garmsir is the paragon of freedom in Afghanistan. Twelve schools have since 
been built and opened to the community in a period of just seven months. People shop for 
their needs openly and without fear of intimidation. District security forces are always on call 
wherever the need for security arises. Life in this district is normal today. The Marines still 
stay on for follow-up activities, but the bulk of the security operations rest on the shoulders of 
the Afghan forces. Garmsir is a success story of the U.S. Marines’ approach to 
counterinsurgency.
410
 Its effect spread to most of Helmand province.  
This maneuver warfare tactic proved effective in a country that had grown used to 
warfare and crime. Maneuver warfare employed throughout Operation Enduring Freedom by 
the Marines either in combat or civil operations, proved to be an effective tool of the modern 
day Marine Corps Way of War.  
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In closing this chapter a recent posting of an After Action Report (AAR) of Operation 
Apache Snow II by Bravo Company, 1
st
 Battalion 9
th
 Marines launched an interdiction 
operation near the Bari Gul Bazaar in Nad Ali District, Helmand province, Afghanistan, Dec. 
4, 2013. Approximately 96 Marines, sailors and Afghan personnel engaged Taliban forces 
during the 14-hour operation, which included nearly four hours of sustained combat with 
insurgents in and around this bazaar. Apache Snow II was designed to deny Taliban forces free 
movement in the area and strike against their ability to gather armaments. A transcription of 
this video report which was conducted by 1
st
 Lt. James Salka, Platoon Commander, Bravo 
Company, 1/9, Washingtonville, NY; Sgt Steven Pendleton, Squad Leader, Bravo Company, 
1/9, Knoxville, TN is an excellent example of the use of maneuver warfare tactics used in this 
Marine operation. The following AAR as told by Lt. Salka focuses on the current maneuver 
warfare doctrine and tenets employed by Marines today in the battlespace. The bracketed, 
underlined italicized print [Italics] will further support the thesis of this paper:  
 “.. So obviously the mission was to [disrupt the enemy within that area].  That was 
outside of Ariel.  So we did a partnered heliborne raid.  Since we hit the deck, obviously it was 
still dark.  We started to make movement to the north with [our] Afghan partners in the lead to 
kind of push up and talk to some people.  And it started to get a little bit light out.  We 
established our security perimeter with machine guns, snipers, as well as mortars and then we 
pushed our south element from compound to compound. The atmospherics in the area at that 
time -- there's a lot of motorbikes driving around along the peripheries as there usually is prior to 
an attack.  So [there was] a lot of movement.  
Air was reporting what was going on around us.  Some families, women, children started 
to kind of flee the area.  Once we started to cross this big, open, muddy field from about half-way 
through, that's when it began, they opened up on us with machine gun fire from a couple of 
different compounds so at that point the security element [Marines] started to suppress to allow 
them to run for cover. During this contact, I was in the middle of that field with the assault 
element so we got pinned down for a second and then we made the call once we had some good 
suppression from machine guns as well as snipers.  
They had positive identification on several enemy fires around us so once they started to 
engage those targets that would alleviate a little bit of pressure off of (sic) us and we were able to 
kind of bound back to a compound for some cover.  We got the vibe right off the bat that we 
were going to get hit so everyone's head was on a swivel and then when it happens, of course you 
don't know where it's going to come from, then at that point it came from about three or four 
different locations, pretty accurate rounds.  One Marine got struck in his Kevlar when we were in 
that field so they pinpointed us pretty good.  Instincts just kick in at that point for all the Marines.  
[They did exactly what they were trained to do]. As we were taking contact, I just want to make 
sure that everything is in place to help those guys out.  
Obviously I was pinned down there so couldn't do too much to assist myself as well as 
them, but the Marines who were in those security positions already knew what they had to do 
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[commanders intent]and they immediately reacted to engage the enemy to alleviate that pressure 
off of (sic) us so we could bound back. Once [we] bounded back, I was able to start the battle 
attack.  I had six different elements moving all over the battlefield [seeking gaps], just making 
sure I had positive communication with all of them over the radio or connecting fires so we could 
keep those Marines safe, which were in the open.  Marines are amazing.   
Once we took contact, they immediately snapped to and did what they were supposed to 
do.  Like I said, one Marine got shot in the Kevlar, rounds are bouncing off guys' protective 
armor, then of course that one Marine got struck and we took a casualty at that point.  They 
immediately responded with what they were supposed to do.  Marines ran out into the open, 
dragged him to safety while other Marines were suppressing, immediately given a quick task. 
The guys were already sweeping the LZ proving first and then getting that casualty ready 
for extract.  So they made my job easy cause they knew exactly what they needed to do. [It was] 
definitely a big difference with the amount of guys that we have on the deck, Afghans as well as 
Marine forces.  
Once we land, [we definitely have the element of surprise] right off the bat but obviously 
everyone is going to wake up and start to amass around our position and we don't have those 
vehicles to provide that cover.  So kind of moving from compound to compound we expose 
ourselves to a pretty good amount of risk every single time.  So we don't have that cover that the 
vehicles would provide. [It does give us some advantages in the fact that they don't know exactly 
where all of us are so which allows our geometries of fire as long as we're tracking where 
everyone is, to kind of isolate their positions and then neutralize the enemy] which obviously we 
did plenty that day.  
Sustaining casualties is always a concern of mine as well as all the Marines on the deck.  
With those Afghans, we've been partnered with them a couple of time[s], we fought alongside 
them so we know how each other work and they are in the lead.  So they'll be pushing at those 
compounds first every single time ... the locals, and the locals are pretty scared once the rounds 
start flying.  So they hunker down. [They understand we're there for security]but between 
linguists and the Afghans themselves, it's no problem dealing with the locals and communicating 
our intent to them because the Marines are definitely feeling it, but again kind of the preparations 
that go into it is the physical side as well.  
So they're well prepared, take a break inside compounds, [take that tactical pause, set the 
conditions if you will and move only when we have fires]. The Marines [made it a little bit easy 
for me just their initiative, being able to act on their own accord, knowing the end state]. I had to 
report up to higher as well as push down my commands to my subordinates so the two radio 
piece and just battle tracking on the map so I know exactly where everyone is, so then we can 
have fires which ultimately support us.  
Overall, there was probably like a three hour chunk of time that we were under some 
pretty heavy fire and then about twenty minutes, thirty minutes of that was real heavy fire.  So 
we're taking medium machine gun fire, small arms fire, RPG's grenade launchers, and again 
those are some real accurate rounds at the time we seem to be pinned down inside of a 
compound.  
During this season especially it’s a little bit muddier out as it gets colder going into the 
rainy season.  So that also adds some difficulty for the Marines as we cross these fields getting 
slowed down and bogged down in the mud.  The Marines did their job 100 percent.  The second 
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we took contact, they immediately kicked in and reacted.  I was just impressed at how good the 
Marines did that day and their actions saved that Marine's life..”  
Stg. Pendelton completed the AAR as follows:  
“.. [We pushed into the first compound that was available for us to push into.  Once we 
were there we find out where the compound was that we needed to be so we kept pushing, kept 
pushing more north].  We went into the compound, talked to a couple of individuals who gave us 
some good information.  Then we started pushing across about 450 meters in open terrain.  
Once we crossed across there we were about 200 meters in and started catching good 
sporadic fire.  It's a pretty good rush.  It's pretty good to have.  [It] calms you down at the same 
time.  If you're used to it, it will calm you down.  It will make everything go a little bit smoother 
(sic) because most people can operate better when they're under pressure.  
Our objective was mainly to try to get information, clear the compounds, get information 
from individuals and see if they could help us out through any Intel throughout the village of 
insurgence.  We caught contact with the security element.  [Usually they would take most of the 
firepower off of (sic) us so we can continue the clear]. [But we were getting hit from three 
different directions so we had to continue and help the security out].  
Going to the compound, my first step is to just make sure everyone gets to that next 
compound alive.  Once we get over there, we support the ATF 444, let them do their clear piece, 
they do whatever they need to do to try to get kind of Intel and then we get ready.  
We sit in a ... firewall over there just in case we do catch contact.  It's different.  [You 
don't really know what to expect when you go in there].  It could be booby-trapped or if there's 
ID's everywhere or narcotics or anything.  And if that would be the case, we'd call up our support 
element and they'd come in there and take care of it. It's a lot different because you've never 
really seen the terrain when we work up the terrain model.  Hopefully get as much knowledge we 
can about the place before we land and you don't really know if you're going to land in the right 
spot or not.  So once you land, you're trying to get everything ready, trying to figure out where 
you're at, trying to get the grids.  Once you get the grids, find out where you're at, it's kind of 
simple but there would be no lume [illumination] on that last mission.  It was hard to see where 
you were going..”411 
Summing up this U.S. Marine / Afghani assault exhibited the following doctrinal aspects 
of a Marine Corps Way of War:  
1. Commanders intent,  
2. Mission type orders,  
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3. Recce pull, 
4. Shaping the battle space prior to and during (Schwerpunkt) this operation.  
This has been, for the most part, how the tenets of Small Wars, FMFM 1 (Gray) and 
MCDP 1 (Krulak) Warfighting doctrine(s) have been successfully executed by the Marine Corps 
in their actions, missions and operations conducted in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  
General John Kelly completes this maneuver warfare discussion when he stated in our 
interview: 
 “..a few of us that have done pretty well ….that are maneuverists…..  The point of this is 
the Marine Corps from a very early age, certainly since Gray, had been taught to be problem 
solvers and not to be limited by or confined by doctrine, if you will.  Every Marine I know is a 
problem solver.  And the Marines I know, which are a lot, don't fall back on "this is the [only] 
way you do it."  Actually the Marine mentality -- the way we think about war, I believe, is light 
infantry.  That's the way we think about war.  We may ride the war in V-22's and helicopters and 
we may call air strikes by Harriers, but our mentality is light infantry in all of that and all that that 
has meant throughout Marine Corps history.  
 We can fight and fight very well without our vehicles.  So the light infantry mentality -- 
John English's book on infantry is just superb in the way it lays this out.  But if you have the light 
infantry mentality, even if you're in tanks and ... armored vehicles, you're still thinking light 
infantry…..back to the [rear door] thing.  Avoid the surfaces, locate the gaps.  Get in behind 
them.  
 I used to say to the lieutenants, look, if you're standing at a bar and someone brushes by 
and touches your fanny, what do you do?  Well, you're going to look.  It could be a beautiful girl 
who's kind of coming onto you.  It could be a handsome guy who's coming on to you.  Or it 
could be just an accidental brush-by.  But you're going to turn and look.  That's what light 
infantry tactics is.  Get in their rear and make their front lines irrelevant. … 
 Jim Mattis and myself and some others, Joe Dunford and others, managed to actually 
have the opportunity to do it [practice maneuver warfare operationally].  It minimized the 
casualties on both sides which is always important I think even for the enemy.  And at the end of 
the day we showed the world what Al Gray forced us into was a good thing……..even the PFC's, 
they've never been to the schools and everything, but when we went from heavy conventional 
warfare in the attack and then immediately dropped the helmets and flak jackets and started 
helping people rebuild the countryside and then as it turned violent it rolled right into 
counterinsurgency tactics.  You look at what we did in terms of civilian casualties where we lived 
in Afghanistan….. Minimal civilian casualties….  You look at the other side, heavy civilian 
casualties because even in COIN, they never got away from the big punch, the big crushing use 
of fire power. They're attritionists.  
 Jim Mattis, myself, we said we don't want to know how many of them we're killing.  We 
want to know how many of them are waving to us as we drive by.  That's what's important to us.  
184 
 
That's why Mattis and Kelly never flew in helicopters.  We'd drive down the roads and you can 
tell how the people are reacting to you and over time -- it took three years -- it took two of -- my 
tours were over a six year period -- but if they were looking down when you drove by, or if they 
were waving at you when you drove by, you knew you had them when they started waving.  We 
never flew.  Very seldom!  ….  I remember reading about the criticism of the Vietnam generals -- 
they always flew so they never knew what the guys were putting up with on the ground.  They 
flew over the battlefield but they didn't know the battlefield..”412 
 The Marine Corps Way of War especially in Afghanistan put into practice a Marine 
Corps centric evolution directed from its primary resource, its DNA and the further guidance 
from the military history archives of other successful Marine Corps warriors. The only caveat 
is the advice of Col. John Boyd that this was just the starting point in this evolution of the 
Marine Corps future. The Marine Corps evolution has been true to form in regard to Col. John 
Boyd’s advice. 
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Chapter 8 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
The United States viewed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a nation providing a socio-
political base that had fostered international terrorism locally and internationally. It was a 
nation that had violated the United Nation’s sanctioned directive to remove all of its perceived 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The question of WMD was later proved to be 
unfounded; and this cause for invading Iraq albeit argumentative, does not hold any 
significance for this work’s focus on the operational art of maneuver warfare as practiced by 
the Marine Corps. These issues as stated eventually led to the invasion of Iraq by a United 
States led NATO coalition to reign in this perceived rogue state. On March 17, 2003 President 
Bush (43) gave Saddam Hussein a forty eight hour ultimatum during which Saddam and his 
sons were to abdicate control of Iraq. Failure to do so would result in a military conflict that 
would begin when the coalition deemed it in their best interest. Saddam Hussein paid no heed 
to this warning. The war began twenty minutes after President George W. Bush’s ultimatum 
expired.
413
  
As per General Frank’s ground combat plan, the Army’s 5th Corps was to cross the 
Iraq- Kuwait border and attack Baghdad from the desert which lay west of Euphrates River. 
The Marine Corps was to attack through the east of the Euphrates River, an area that was 
largely populated. The following message to the U.S. Marines 1
st
 Division (REIN) from 
General Mattis set the tone of what is to be expected from the Marine Corps Way of War: 
1
st
 MARINE DIVISION 
Commanding General’s Message to All Hands: 
“For decades, Saddam Hussein has tortured, imprisoned, raped and murdered the Iraqi 
people; invaded neighboring countries without provocation; and threatened the world with 
weapons of mass destruction. The time has come to end his reign of terror. On your young 
shoulders rest the hopes of mankind. 
When I give you the word, together we will cross the Line of Departure, close with 
those forces that choose to fight, and destroy them. Our fight is not with the Iraqi people, nor 
is it with members of the Iraqi army who choose to surrender. While we will move swiftly and 
aggressively against those who resist, we will treat all others with decency, demonstrating 
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chivalry and soldierly compassion for people who have endured a lifetime under Saddam’s 
oppression. 
Chemical attack, treachery, and use of the innocent as human shields can be expected, 
as can other unethical tactics. Take it all in stride. Be the hunter, not the hunted: never allow 
your units to be caught with its guard down. Use good judgment and act in best interests of 
our Nation. 
You are part of the world’s most feared and trusted force. Engage your brain before 
you engage your weapon. Share your courage with each other as we enter the uncertain terrain 
north of the Line of Departure. Keep faith in your comrades on your left and right and Marine 
Air overhead. Fight with a happy heart and strong spirit. 
For the mission’s sake, our country’s sake, and the sake of the men who carried the 
Division’s colors in the past battles – who fought for life and never lost their nerve carry out 
your mission and keep your honor clean. [You will] demonstrate to the world, there is "No 
Better Friend, No Worse Enemy" than a U.S. Marine.” 
/s / J.N. Mattis 
Major General, U.S. Marines
414
 
The Marines would face six Iraqi divisions which stood guard of this AOR that was 
put into the Marine Corps’ mission orders. The traditional route for any invasion of the area 
went along the Tigris River from Basra proceeding north to Baghdad. Saddam Hussein 
therefore positioned four of his divisions along that route. The fifth of the divisions was 
deployed in the south near Rumalia oil fields while the sixth was based near the capital city of 
Baghdad. A few hours of aerial bombing set the war’s clock ticking, with the First Marine 
Division capturing the oil fields before Saddam could contemplate setting them on fire.
415
 
When the 1
st
 MarDiv captured the Basra airport, the Iraqis were sure that the offensive 
would follow the route along the Tigris as they had anticipated. This was the first instance of 
maneuver warfare deception applied by the Marine Corps. The Marines were then to make an 
advance towards Nasiriya, cross the river in a formation that would result in a parallel advance 
with other friendly forces.
416
 The British were to capture the city of Basra with the U.S. 
Marine Corps’ help. On March 21st, the Coalition began its bombing campaign which targeted 
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Hussein’s palaces and ministries. This image of leadership decapitation was meant to prove to 
the Iraqi people that it would be favorable to rebel against the Ba’athist regime. As the 
American forces advanced towards the Iraqi border, they observed the decomposition of the 
regular Iraqi troops. These troops were already weary and resorted to taking off their uniforms 
and infiltrating into the civilian population.
417
 
Contrary to this, the British faced resistance on their arrival into the outskirts of Basra 
City. The resistance came from regular forces and the Uday led Fedayeen troops. The 
Fedayeen were an extremely loyal Iraqi militia. The British besieged the city, and allowed the 
civilians to leave, as their MI-6 agents within the city did their best to incite a Shia uprising. 
The British wait and see posture took its toll on the coalition as some American commanders 
argued that not advancing into Basra made Saddam look invincible. The British defended their 
course of actions saying that it was done in a bid to minimize civilian casualties.
418
 
The port of Um Qasr situated at the head of the Persian Gulf was then secured by the 
Marines. This was done by the 15
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit in conjunction with the 3
rd
 
Commandos, Royal Marines. The capture of the port made it easy for the arrival of the relief 
supplies that were needed by the Iraqi people. Thus the international aid agencies (NGO’s) 
began streaming these needed supplies through the port and into Iraq.  
The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was made up of a logistical support group, 
an air wing and three basic ground maneuver units.
419
 These units comprised the 1
st
 Marine 
Division (1
st
 MarDiv), a brigade-size force that was part of the 2
nd
 Marine Division named 
Task Force Tarawa, and British forces that were just a bit more than a division. The Marine 
units were made up of both active-duty and reserve forces. Task Force Tarawa and the British 
were deployed in the south of Iraq while the 1
st
 Marine Division was to take Baghdad. I MEF, 
which was the supporting effort, was supposed to keep the Iraqis at bay so that the Army 5
th
 
Corps could make it to Baghdad with the least Iraqi opposition. 
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U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated the objectives of the military 
operations in Iraq are as follows: [The items delineated below will be cited throughout this 
chapter, as they set the political end results that are supported by the Marine Corps doctrine, 
strategy and tactics that were adhered to in Operation Iraqi Freedom]: 
1. Bring the reign of Saddam Hussein to an end. 
2. Identify, separate and destroy Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction. 
3. Seek out, capture and eject terrorists from of Iraq. 
4. Gather information that is pertinent to the terrorist network. 
5. Gather information that relates to the global network of illegal weapons of mass 
destruction. 
6. Put an end to the sanctions and immediately provide the displaced and needy Iraqis 
with relief support. 
7. Secure Iraq’s oil fields and all resources, since they belonged to the people of Iraq.  
8. Create such conditions that would enable the Iraqis to have good government.
420
  
The 1
st
 Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) had captured the gas oil separation plants 
(GOSP), crude oil export facilities and oil wells in the Rumalia oil fields. The oil 
infrastructure had been laced with booby traps but it was made safe by the U.S. Marines and 
British. Oil fire-fighting units arrived into the areas to extinguish any fire that might occur. 
This was a reaction to finding some trenches filled with oil that had been deliberately set 
ablaze by the Iraqi forces. Also some of the deserted oil plants had also not been shut down 
correctly, causing the oil from the wells to overflow into the station tanks. This posed a 
serious threat of fires, if the oil came into contact with the burning wells. This threat was dealt 
with by Marine Combat Engineers. This was one of Rumsfeld’s mission’s objectives of this 
operation.
421
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On the 23
rd
 of March, the Marines were facing resistance at several locations. General 
Mattis had shifted the combat advance of the Marines about one hundred kilometers west and 
laid out an assault on two highways that lay between the Euphrates and Tigris.
422
 This meant 
that the Marines had abandoned the traditional invasion route which the Iraqi fighters had 
been made to believe the Marines would be taking. The soggy landscape in this area could not 
bear the weight of either tanks or artillery; therefore, it was undefended. General Mattis split 
the division into three units; each allocated one thousand vehicles. The Marines began to 
rapidly proceed up the one hundred kilometer stretch towards Baghdad.  
Because the highway infrastructures were so worn out the bridges had to be tested before 
the Marine tanks and heavy equipment made their crossing. This strategy set the Marines’ 
time table back. Yet because the Marine doctrine centered on maneuver warfare; this tactic 
was what was needed in the Marine’s march up to Baghdad. The principles of “when and 
where to engage the enemy, seeking strength against enemy weakness,” had now become a 
Marine Corps warfighting tool.  
Elsewhere in Nasiriya, the Marines engaged the Iraqis in sustained and heavy combat. 
Quickly the Marine Corps’ MAGTF arrived on station to reinforce them. In a blue on blue 
event the MAGTF accidentally struck some of the Marines positions, which increased the 
number of American casualties. This blue on blue miscalculation was not only costly for the 
Marines; many Iraqi civilians died in the attack. This narrowed the probability of the civilians 
participating in overthrow of the Saddam regime.
423
 This was an issue that although avoidable, 
would mar the process of the Marine Corps warfighting agenda based upon the Small Wars 
Manual dictum at this time.
424
 
The Forward Command Element of the Military Coordination and Liaison Command 
(MCLC) reached the north of Iraq, under the command of Marine Corps Major General Pete 
Osman. General Osman convened meetings with some key Iraqi leaders and Kurdish 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
422
 West, Maneuver Warfare. 
 
423
 West and Smith, March Up. 
 
424 Col. John R. Andrews USMC, Battle of An-Nasiriyah (Washington DC: USMC History Div., PCN: 
10600000700, 2004), 32-34. 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Battle_An-
Nasiriyah%20%20PCN%2010600000700_3.pdf. (Accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
190 
 
opposition leaders. He informed them about the U.S. intentions and further explained the 
operational plans the Marines wanted the Kurds to carry out. The MCLC’s presence in that 
area made it stable as they encouraged dialogue and coordinated efforts among the 
organizations that were providing humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq. This occurred in 
the earliest days of the war. It was to lay the frame work for the Marine Corps’ efforts in 
nation building and enemy pacification or “light maneuver warfare.” General Osman stated 
that his mission was three fold: 
“..First, to assist in the deconfliction of military activities [This became a juggling act 
between the Turks who were concerned with possible Kurdish nationalism and the Kurds 
hoping to gain nation status supplying sixty thousand armed troops]. 
 Second, to synchronize humanitarian assistance and military operations [the 
coordination of NGO’s, the coalitions, and the needy Iraqis-(Kurdish and non-Kurdish)].  
Third, assist in the general coordination of relief operations in northern Iraq..”425 
 Because Iraqi Air and Air Defense never materialized the coalition’s air dominance 
amounted to a major force multiplier. This aspect enhanced MAGTF intelligence gathering. It 
could now dispatch slow and vulnerable planes like the E-8C JSTARS close to the battle 
space with the intended possibility of unlimited logistical support of refueling tankers. This 
greatly aided in shaping the battlefield. The JSTARS were fitted with Doppler radars which 
had the ability to detect vital Iraqi ground weapons and movements over an area of hundreds 
of square miles. Intelligence was gathered from other ground sources and merged in order to 
give the precise positions of the Iraqi insurgents who thought themselves well protected from 
the air by the adverse weather conditions. The continued air and ground campaign pressed on, 
despite the harsh weather, with such speed that the Iraqi troops could not handle the F-16’s; 
which would then advance and lay an assault on the targets despite the current poor weather 
conditions. 
426
  
The divisions that were hit the hardest during these assaults were the Hammurabi, Al 
Nida and Medina units. The intended effect of these attacks was that the Iraqi troops stopped 
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fighting as a cohesive force. There was no organized pattern of maneuver within the Iraqi 
forces since they found it hard to deal with the I MEF’s advance. The Marine Corps maneuver 
warfare doctrine was again bringing success by shaping the battlefield, by confusing and 
dividing the enemy, and by eventually enveloping them.
427
 
The I MEF captured a hospital near Nasiriya which had been transformed into 
paramilitary headquarters, staging area and a storage center. Among the items recovered 
within the hospital’s campus were two hundred weapons, Iraqi military uniforms, one tank, 
three thousand chemical protective suits and nerve agent antidote injectors. This pointed to the 
fact that Iraq had possibly been planning a chemical attack that was eliminated by the 
Marines. The Marines worked hard in expanding the cleared channel of Khor Abdullah. The 
channel was opened up in Um Qasr, a distance of sixty yards. In the process of expanding it in 
order to obtain a pathway about two hundred yards wide, the Marines bumped into bottom-
influenced mines. These subsurface mines can be programmed to count the number of hulls 
that pass over them, and when a certain number is reached, depending on the programming, 
they detonate. The Marines combat engineers cleared them from the channel, and made the 
port secure for the arrival of the humanitarian assistance.
428
  
Marines and soldiers from the 3
rd
 Marines’, 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne 
Division engaged the Iraqi regular army, Republican Guard and the Iraqi terror squads. The 
Marines also captured a bridge near the town of Al Handiyah. The bridge had been rigged 
with explosives in a bid to delay the coalition’s advance. The Marines’ 2nd Brigade Combat 
Engineers Team rid the bridge of all explosives and once again preserved the Iraqi 
infrastructure that was now not to be destroyed.
429
  
As per the 1
st
 of April the status report of the Iraqi ground forces was as follows: 
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Regular Army: 
The Iraqi 4
th
 Corps consisted of one armored division and two infantry divisions. Its 
headquarters and major command, control, communications and intelligence facilities had 
suffered massive damage due to the air strikes. Its armor and artillery had also been 
destroyed. It was making its way towards the U.S. Marines with units dispatched near Al 
Kut and Al Hillah and others around Najaf and Karbala. 
The Iraqi 3
rd
 Corps comprised of three divisions; one armored, one mechanized and one 
infantry. Its headquarters based in Nasiriya had been seized. The 51
st
 Mechanized Division 
had been badly destroyed during the battle for Basra. The 11
th
 Infantry Division had also 
been destroyed during an assault in Nasiriya. The 6
th
Armored Division had been hit in an 
air strike following an engagement with the U.S. Marines. 
Republican Guard Forces: 
The Iraqi 2
nd
 Corps of the Republican Guards had their headquarters at Al Hafreia and Al 
Fateh al Mubin Command Center. Most of its facilities had been destroyed by air strikes. 
The Iraqi Medina Division, which had been the major threat for the advance of the 3
rd 
Mechanized Division, was made up of three brigades. These included the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
Armored and 14
th
 Mechanized. Most of its communication facilities, artillery and 
equipment had been hit hard from the air. The unit was perceived to have lost between 
thirty five to sixty five percent of its effectiveness. 
The Iraqi Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division was usually based at Al Husseinia al-Kut. 
However, with the advance of the U.S. Marines, it shifted west to counter the threat. It also 
had its headquarters bombed along with its key communication facilities, artillery and 
other major equipment. Its effectiveness had been reduces by approximately ten to twenty 
percent. 
The Iraqi 2
nd
 Baghdad Infantry Division which was usually based at Maqloob Maontin 
Mosul shifted their attention to the Al Kut area where the U.S. Marines had engaged them 
in serious combat. It suffered the same losses as the other forces as it lost its headquarters, 
key facilities, and artillery to the air strikes. It had lost twenty to forty percent 
effectiveness in the war. 
The Iraqi Hammurabi Mechanized Division had departed Al Tajji region, and units that 
defended the Tikrit region were combating the 3
rd
 Infantry and the U.S. Marines in 
Karbala and Najaf region when participation of the Medina Division became suicidal. 
However, its headquarters and facilities had not been spared either in the onslaught of air 
strikes. Its effectiveness had been reduced by ten to twenty percent.
430
  
The above report showed how the Marines’ attacks had a crippling effect on the Iraqi 
operations. They left a U.S. Marine Corps footprint in all the Iraqi divisions, always aiming at 
their center of gravity and increasing the fog and friction of war for the Iraqis. For the Iraqis 
this usually resulted in the loss of their command and control element i.e. their headquarters 
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and communication facilities. The effect this had was that now the Iraqi’s lack of coordination 
resulted in sporadic attacks. These made them even more vulnerable to the coalition’s fires, 
most of which they could not return due to the destruction of their artillery assets.
431
 
The American forces began to make their way towards the Iraqis main defensive 
positions that lay on the east of the Euphrates. Two Marine Corps regimental combat units 
were positioned on Highway 1, facing Baghdad. The Iraqis had dispatched a division to block 
the road. General Mattis decided to use a side road that saw the Marines crossing the Tigris at 
a spot between the artillery fans of the Iraqi forces.
432
 This was a critical application of 
maneuver warfare. Saddam’s son, Qusay, convened a meeting in Baghdad with the Iraqi 
commander of the region, General Raad Al-Hamdani. The general was advised that the 
military action for the past two weeks by the coalition was a case of strategic deception and 
that the main combat would come from the north of Baghdad. Hamdani was reluctant about 
this intelligence. For him, the Americans were attacking from the south. Hamdani was 
conflicted; he had to obey Qusay’s orders. The coalition forces had now seized the bridges 
over the Euphrates and their tanks were in position.
433
 Hamdani was ordered to reject the 
earlier advice and turn his troops around to counter the American threat. Hamdani chose the 
best brigade out of the Republican Guard for the assault. What ensued was a massive 
slaughter of the Iraqis, while not a single casualty was reported by the Marine Corps. 
Forces from the 3
rd
 Infantry Division arrived at the Baghdad International Airport and 
captured it. They were, however, met with young Iraqi fanatics of the Fadeyeen militia who 
put up stiff resistance. Most of Fadeyeen were killed in the attack. The Marines were tentative 
about the final assault in the city of Baghdad. The question, as to the position of the units of 
the Republic Guard, had bothered them. It then became apparent to Marine Corps command 
that they had been positioned south of the city of Baghdad and that the Marines had by-passed 
many of them enroute to Baghdad. Since the mission against Baghdad could not begin without 
this imminent threat being neutralized, a Marine brigade was deployed south of the city to 
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deal with them.
434
 It turned out that the forces had been hidden among the palm groves to 
deter detection from the air reconnaissance assets. The combined air strikes had not been 
bombing the correct positions. The Marine Corps advance to Baghdad had been extremely 
rapid [a prime maneuver warfare tactic], such that the members of the Medina Division were 
caught by surprise. General Mattis had sent his Marines to attack from a direction which the 
Iraqi division at al-Kut never anticipated. The U.S. Marines were by then attacking from the 
north and the dug in Iraqi tanks were facing the wrong direction; which forced the Medina 
Division to retreat.
435
 
On April 5
th
 Baghdad was in the middle of a surprise armed reconnaissance pull 
referred to as a “Thunder Run.” This tactic came on the orders of General Mattis. The speeds 
at with which these “Thunder Runs” were conducted unhinged the Iraqi army. It created an 
imbalance they never foresaw. The Marines, heavily armed were to press on as far into 
Baghdad as possible. The Marines were met with morning commuter traffic coupled with 
Iraqi forces now dressed in civilian clothes trying to flee. It was not easy identifying the Iraqi 
forces from the civilians. By mid-day the Marines had woven their way through the south-
western suburbs of the city and made it back to the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) 
safely.
436
 
The 1
st
 Marine Expeditionary Force meanwhile did their best to isolate Baghdad. This 
denied the Iraqi insurgents any escape routes or reinforcements. While the U.S. Army’s 5th 
Corps controlled the regional gap between Karbala and Baghdad in the east, the Marines 
controlled the corridor that ran from Salman Park to Baghdad. The Marines’ conducted 
aggressive assaults in a bid to secure the cities that lay on the way into central Baghdad. The 
                                                          
434
 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, “U.S. Generals Divided as War Began,” Leatherneck 
Magazine, MARCH 12, 2006, http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-27452.html. 
(Accessed 27 May 2014). 
 
435
 Mattis, Telephonic interview with the author. 
 
436
 Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Six Week invasion of Iraq, Frontline Documentary, Public 
Broadcasting System, (2003). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/cron/. (Accessed 27 May 
2014). 
195 
 
1
st
 Brigade Combat Team captured a palace that was believed to be the headquarters of the 
Special Republican Guard, further crippling their operations capability.
437
 
In Baghdad, U.S. Army’s 5th Corps was joined by the Marine Corps. They were 
supposed to attack to the east of the city. They advanced expecting fierce resistance that did 
not materialize. The Iraqi Forces had simply drifted away from combat. As has been noted in 
previous sections of this work, the Marines won the day with no KIA’s and WIA’s. The 
employment of a Marine Corps Way of War had eliminated much of the carnage and costs of 
this war.
438
 
The Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) had ordered that raids 
be conducted into Baghdad rather than seize it. The Marine Corps, ready to get back to their 
rapid tempo of combat had sufficient tanks and three regiments poised to comply with the 
mission commander’s intent. Carrying out raids on the already damaged bridge made very 
little sense to the I MEF and 1
st
MarDiv. To them, they had come to liberate Baghdad and had 
no intention of besieging it. The I MEF therefore split Baghdad into 36 zones. In each zone 
they identified “targets of interest.” Three regiments were then deployed across the bridge 
with orders to attack one zone to the next until the all the zones were occupied.
439
  
The air campaigns concentrated on kill box interdiction which involved the perpetual 
bombing of ground targets, close air support, command, control, and intelligence and 
surveillance missions. Planes conducting the intelligence missions made Baghdad their focus 
so that emerging targets were dealt with immediately. A fifth of the air strikes were aimed at 
insuring that the Iraqi forces were not able to launch any aircraft. After the first “Thunder 
Run,” the Marines realized that the Iraqis were unable to deal with attacks from directions that 
were not predetermined by the Iraqi commanders. The Marines now focused on “Thunder 
Runs” that were aimed at the Iraqi rear. This ultimately led to the capturing of Baghdad earlier 
than expected and with minimum casualties. The initial Marine Corps application of the 
MCDP 1 Warfighting manual validated their actions as had been the case in Gulf War I.
440
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The Marines on the other side of Baghdad conducted another “Thunder Run” into the 
city. This time they took a direct route for the palaces, thus throwing the Iraqi defenders into 
further panic. The U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division followed the Marines’ two tank 
battalions. They captured and held three major clover-leafs dubbed- “Moe,” “Larry” and 
“Curly.” This was aimed at keeping the roads secure for the arrival of the Marine logistical 
resupply trucks. The Marines spent that night in one of Hussein’s palaces. In less than a 
month, the U.S. and Coalition forces had reached the geographic heart of the Ba’athist regime. 
These “Thunder Runs” were a successful and effective application of maneuver warfare. The 
combination of the three Marines’ brigades saw the destruction of thirty military vehicles, 
thirty technical vehicles, three T-72 tanks and three armored personnel carriers. The 1
st
 Marine 
Expeditionary Force also eliminated an enemy training camp near Salman Park. This camp, 
based on the intelligence report had been used to train foreign forces by the Iraqis in the 
tactics of terrorism and irregular warfare.  
On April 10-11, the coalition had stripped Baghdad of all its resistance and began their 
movement towards the city of Tikrit. Neither the 5
th
 Corps nor I MEF experienced any Iraqi 
resistance enroute to Tikrit. U.S. intelligence affirmed that most of the Republican Guard had 
been destroyed. There was no doubt that one of the Republican Guard’s brigades together with 
elements of the Special Republican Guard, were in the Tikrit area. Many of the combat units 
of the Iraqi Army had come under heavy air strikes but no substantial ground attack. 
Therefore they remained a threat to the coalition. A good number of the other ten Iraqi regular 
army divisions either surrendered or simply collapsed. The 5
th
 Corps and I MEF only 
encountered a single brigade of the Adnan Division of the Republican Guard which was based 
in Tikrit. What was left of the Adnan Division did not pose a major threat because it had been 
deemed mediocre by coalition intelligence before the bombing raids. It still remains unclear 
why Saddam left the bulk of his army to the north even after it had become obvious that the 
coalition forces were not making an entry through Turkey. These forces were eliminated 
through persistent air strikes. This can be linked to the dilemma that was caused by Saddam 
during the war, leaving him with no idea where the coalition forces would strike next. This 
strategy helped ward off imminent threats to the Marines advance while it exposed the Iraqi 
197 
 
regular forces for air attacks. This faint from the north distracted the Iraqi’s and masked the 
true intent of the invasion.
441
 
Maneuver warfare as practiced by the Marine Corps was applied in this war by the use 
of mission-type orders. This is where a commander stated why the mission was to be carried 
out but did not give the tactical details on how the mission was to be accomplished. General 
Mattis had discussed his plan with the whole division prior to the war. Each Marine had more 
than a basic idea of his intent.
442
 In meetings held before the war, the three regimental 
commanders went over the various selected routes and objectives again and again. Once the 
war started, each commander worked independently. General Mattis or Brigadier General 
John Kelly, his deputy, would often look in on the regiments. The battalions also had 
maneuver warfare independence. The distance between the regiments was tactically too far 
apart. Coupled with the shortage of helicopters and heavy road traffic, centralized control was 
impossible; not that this was a doctrinal option, as the Marines came ready to execute the 
operational art of Generals Gray and Krulak “fighting smarter” doctrine.443  
Operation Iraqi Freedom has been referred to as the “Colonels’ War.” This is due to 
the fact that the regimental commanders and the battalion commanders were the major 
decision makers during the operations. Every night each battalion would gather separately. 
The battalion commander and his sergeant major would then visit their subordinates within the 
battalion. Patrolling was only allowed during security missions or during combat in the open 
terrain. The battalion commanders were to direct movement of their particular companies.
444
  
Decentralized control fostered the furtherance of the Marine Corps Way of War. 
The 1
st
 MarDiv applied maneuver warfare under decentralized control coupled with 
mission-type orders. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a successful application of maneuver 
warfare that saw the Iraqi army rendered ineffective in less than a month. On the 1st of May, 
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President George W. Bush officially announced an end to the military operations in Iraq; 
technically this was the case as in “conventional warfare.” This part of the operation was a 
“mission accomplished” for all intents and purposes. As conventional warfare ceased, the 
internal collapse of Iraq rapidly began to take place. Iraq now experienced what Carl von 
Clausewitz termed a war of national interests.
445
  
The vacuum created by the decapitation of the Ba’athist regime needed to be filled as 
there were many factions vying for political control which would ultimately lead to the rise of 
insurgency and irregular warfare for the Marine Corps. There was little semblance of order 
before the wave of insurgency was tamed. The humanitarian supplies found their way to the 
targeted population and plans for the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and government 
were begun. This operation was credited as being one of the most successful applications of 
“Small War” maneuver warfare exercised by the U.S. Marine Corps since Gulf War I.  
From Conventional to Irregular Warfare: The Marine Corps Gets Away From The 
Basics Found In Their “Small War” DNA. 
Fallujah is a city that is located adjacent to the so-called “Sunni Triangle.” The city is 
densely populated, and it had not been decimated by the coalition’s air campaigns in 2003. By 
2004, Fallujah blossomed into a haven for insurgents, weapon smugglers, criminals and 
foreign terrorists. The coalition troops within Iraq were struggling to contain the insurgents. A 
massacre that was carried out in front of the school situated on Hay Nazzal Street in April 
made the U.S. forces withdraw to the city’s perimeter. The Fallujah leadership requested that 
the Americans remain on the outskirts of the city and let the Iraqis deal with the security 
within the city. This was ignored by the coalition.
446
 
The Iraqi militia refused to cooperate with the United States led coalition. In February, 
resistance fighters attacked an Iraqi police center that was coalition sponsored. The attack was 
well-organized and was carried out in the daytime, leaving twenty three soldiers dead and 
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many prisoners freed. The Iraqi militias openly patrolled the streets of Fallujah but the 
Marines could not rely on these militia actions to be non-sectarian.
447
  
The 1
st
 Marine Expeditionary Force was handed the mission to pacify Fallujah; when 
the 82
nd
 Airborne was rotated out of this zone.  
General Mattis set the tone for this deployment with the following “to All Hands” 
letter; and again the evidence of a Marine Corps Way of War in this letter is more than 
evident: 
March 23, 2004 
Letter to all Hands: 
We are going back in to the brawl. We will be relieving the magnificent Soldiers 
fighting under the 82
nd
 Airborne Division, whose hard won successes in the Sunni Triangle 
have opened opportunities for us to exploit. For the last year, the 82
nd
 Airborne has been 
operating against the heart of the enemy's resistance. It's appropriate that we relieve them.  
 When it's time to move a piano, Marines don't pick up the piano bench- we move the 
piano. So, this is the right place for Marines in this fight, where we can carry on the legacy of 
Chesty Puller in the Banana Wars in the same sort of complex environment that he knew in 
his early years. Shoulder to shoulder with our comrades in the Army, Coalition Forces and 
maturing Iraqi Security Forces, we are going to destroy the enemy with precise firepower 
while diminishing the conditions that create adversarial relationships between us and the Iraqi 
people. This is going to be hard, dangerous work. It is going to require patient, persistent 
presence. Using our individual initiative, courage, moral judgment and battle skills, we will 
build on the 82
nd
 Airborne's victories.  
Our country is counting on us even as our enemies watch and calculate, hoping that 
America does not have warriors strong enough to withstand discomfort and danger. You, my 
fine young men, are going to prove the enemy wrong - dead wrong. You will demonstrate the 
same uncompromising spirit that has always caused the enemy to fear America's Marines.  
The enemy will try to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis. Do not allow the enemy 
that victory. With strong discipline, solid faith, unwavering alertness, and undiminished 
chivalry to the innocent, we will carry out this mission. Remember, I have added, "First, do no 
harm" to our passwords of "No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy." Keep your honor clean as 
we gain information about the enemy from the Iraqi people. Then, armed with that 
information and working in conjunction with fledging Iraqi Security Forces, we will move 
precisely against the enemy elements and crush them without harming the innocent. 
This is our test, our Guadalcanal, our Chosin Reservoir, our Hue City. Fight with a 
happy heart and keep faith in your comrades and your unit. We must be under no illusions 
about the nature of the enemy and the dangers that lie ahead. Stay alert, take it all in stride, 
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remain sturdy, and share your courage with each other and the world. You are going to write 
history, my fine young Sailors and Marines, so write it well. 
Semper Fidelis,  
J.M. Mattis, Major General U.S. Marines
448
 
I MEF immediately continued to impose the coalition’s will over the residents of 
Fallujah, who were against all foreign occupation in the region. Major General Mattis already 
had laid out a plan on how to deal with the Fallujah threat in what he termed as a “handover” 
ceremony.
449
 This would have the Marines establish friendly contacts with the Iraqis while at 
the same time giving those Iraqi’s who wanted to fight just that opportunity to die for the 
beliefs. A recollection of this by General Mattis provides a clear picture of this situation: 
  “..I got the order on November 10th that we were going back in, this time to 
replace the 82nd Airborne Division and would be in al Anbar Province.  I lost only two 
men killed by enemy fire down, al Kut.  And those were probably killed by criminals to 
tell you the truth, not even real enemy.  So we had managed to stay friendly one month 
longer, one week longer, one day longer, one hour longer than some of the distrustful 
Arabs thought we could and it had paid off…… 
  Going back in to al Anbar was very different and I sent in my Assistant Division 
Commander, John Kelly, and he came back and he said it's going to be difficult but he 
said we could turn al Anbar around.  And so we went back in and there was a young 
Army major named Adam Souk and he identified a tribe out in the west, the Al-DhaFeer 
tribe….. which had risen up against us. And at the start of the meeting with the Sheiks 
….. We keep telling the Sheiks we know you're fighting against us, that you're in bed 
with the wrong people.  You’re going to rue the day they hooked up with the Al Qaeda.  
  Day by day we keep fighting and talking and fighting and talking and this goes 
on.  But Adam Souk has identified the Al-DhaFeer Tribe and then a Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel, Terry Alpert out at Al Kine where a lot of Sunnis ... due to the Sunni - Shia 
fighting and they are willing to work with the Marines.  They realize now the Marines are 
their best hope as Sunnis in a country dominated by Shia.   
It still takes us [along time] of intense fighting but what happens is, again, the 
enemy makes ... what you and I would call a [gross blunder]... and the killing of children, 
young boys, and the killing of a Sheik who wasn't even on our side, by the way.  He was 
clearly not on our side but he also hated Al Qaeda and by the time they were done they'd 
made enough mistakes that eventually they turned in 2005..”450  
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Just two days after their arrival, the Marines were engaged in fierce street battles with 
the Iraqis in the al-Askari neighborhood of Fallujah. This battle went on for hours and it left 
one Marine dead and seven others wounded. Fifteen Iraqis died in the assault. The Marines 
then mounted a crackdown of the entire city; and this aggressive invasion of Fallujah by the 
Marines narrowed its inhabitants’ options to three possibilities: 
1. Abandon their earlier reservations and surrender to this foreign occupation.  
2. Leave their homes or put up a resistance. (Some of them opted to leave, fanatically 
clinging to their hatred for the foreign occupation.)  
3. However, some put up a resistance and lost their lives in that course of action.
451
  
The more the inhabitants died, the more the remaining Iraqis became emboldened in 
their attacks against the Marines. General Mattis frankly offered the following on this subject: 
“..al Anbar it was almost uniquely designed for Marines because we explained to 
them hey, number one, if you want to fight for honor, we're eager to pay for honor.  
Bring it on.  We will kill every one of you and you will regret it.  But number two, we 
know what it's like to be a minority, trust us.  As U.S. Military we're a minority and 
we can teach you how to survive and keep your ethos if you want to listen.  And 
eventually I go back there and guys come up and hug me and say, remember me, you 
put me Abu Ghrab prison.  I said yeah, I told you it would turn out [that] we're really 
your friends.  And it worked.  So that's kind of the path it eventually took ….. This is 
going to sound like modesty now.  Any Marine who had been brought up by Puller 
and Zinni and Al Gray and Van Riper who had lance corporals like I had and NCOs 
like I had, any of us could have done this.  I simply was at the right place at the right 
time,  
 
I could see how they [al Qaeda] had screwed it up…….pretty soon I didn't care how 
brave the enemy was or how many guns they had or how short they cut their hair, 
they were going to die because they had dumb generals..”452 
  
Just about the same time as the incident just mentioned another incident occurred in 
Palestine, which further fanned the flames of resistance within Fallujah. Israeli troops had 
publicly assassinated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who was the spiritual leader of Hamas. He had 
been hit by a missile fired from an Israeli attack helicopter. Six people in his entourage also 
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died in the assault. This incident, which was referred to by the media as targeted assassination 
angered Muslims throughout the world. Muslin clerics issued a fatwah for Jihad against any 
foreign occupation in Iraq as a result. They held the notion that all these foreign occupiers 
were allied to the Israelis and would sooner or later unleash violence on them as part of their 
hidden agenda. The United States in particular was especially believed to be working hand in 
hand with the Israeli forces. This coupled with the abuses being reported about prisoner 
treatment at Abu Ghrab, as well as the other civilian killings of innocent Iraqi civilian’s 
further added fuel to this fire. These negative feelings towards the U.S. Marines were only 
worsened after these incidents. This led to the Marines conducting even more house-to -house 
search operations. The Marines sealed off all the entrances to the city with tanks and armored 
vehicles in a bid to stop more resistance forces trying to join the fight for Fallujah. Graffiti in 
praise of the resistance sprung up on the walls of the buildings while Muslim clerics publicly 
echoed their support for the resistance.
453
  
There were hospitals, schools, and electricity power stations being built throughout 
Iraqi yet Fallujah would have none of it. It seemed at this point that the Marines were never 
going to win the affection of these people. They decided to put an end to the friendly contacts 
and use maximum force to flush out the terrorists. It is in this spirit that the launching of 
Operation Vigilant Resolve became necessary. The Marines, wanted to finish what they had 
begun. Vigilant Resolve was to restore some semblance of order in Fallujah.
454
  
Elements of the 1
st
 Battalion, 5
th
 Marine Regiment assaulted Fallujah’s industrial 
center, while 2
nd
 Battalion, 1
st
 Marines proceeded south through the northwestern urban 
district. They encountered serious resistance and by April 10
th
, the battle had reached its peak. 
The move to abandon the original war plan and wage a retaliatory war did not sit well 
with General Mattis. He felt that such a move would give the insurgents what they wanted and 
the Marines would never win. The Marines were deployed to the city either way. As the battle 
for the city surged on, Al Jazeera released very negative propaganda. By an unfortunate twist 
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of fate, there was an uprising in the south of Baghdad that was not even pertinent to the 
Marines presence in Iraq. This was the Shiite rebellion; but these riots were used to put 
Operation Vigilant Resolve into a negative light. To compound matters, the Marines’ 
logistical supply of fuel, ammunition, and water was also steadily decreasing, making it 
difficult to keep up with the tempo of this battle.  With the above events reaching a critical 
mass President Bush called Operation Vigilant Resolve to a premature end.
455
 
Generally, Operation Vigilant Resolve had been approached with so much passion that 
did not give Marine Corps’ “Small War” logic its due place for this mission. The troops 
wanted revenge. This led them to make decisions that were misinformed and whose results 
proved fatal to the battle plan. The earlier battle plans were abandoned for new ones that were 
aimed at making Fallujah an example as quickly as possible.
456
  
The lessons learned from Operation Vigilant Resolve, would lead to the success of the 
future operations in Fallujah and other Iraqi missions. Among the lessons learned from 
Operation Vigilant Resolve were: 
 1. Information operations (IO) were a great determinant of success in today’s 
battlefield, and their effect on every lethal or non-lethal decision called for deep consideration. 
 2. Commanders ought to seriously think about the consequences of their decisions and 
always bear it in mind that failure to make a decision is in itself a decision. 
 3. The doctrine must be followed to the letter; because that is the reason it was 
promulgated. 
 4. Keen eyes must always be maintained on the logistic support.  
 5. When battling with a host nation in a counter insurgency (COIN), there is need to 
start the battle together, to stick together and finish the combat together.  
 6. The young leaders in brigades, battalions and regiments have a remarkable ability to 
fight jointly with such superior effectiveness in the current situations of the battlefield. Senior 
leaders must, therefore, support them in their maneuvers.
457
 
The Fallujah Brigade which had been put in place to aid in the security of the city 
turned out to be a terrible mistake. The leadership of this brigade was in total concert with the 
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insurgents. The brigade became an enemy within, as they shifted their loyalty from the 
coalition forces to the insurgents, allowing them to gain more traction and to flourish. This 
proved to the Marines that Iraqi forces were completely unable to control the city. If, any 
order was to be achieved, it would not be obtained from the Iraqi leadership of the city.
458
 
The Return to the Marine Corps’ DNA 
A second operation was put in place to remedy this situation. The insurgents who 
thought that by the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines, they were now free to go about their 
business as usual. This was not to be the case. This time the operation was carefully planned 
with no saber rattling for the insurgents’ blood. Fallujah was packed with the insurgents. In 
effect it became a target rich environment for the Marines. A special operation was initiated. 
This time the media did not give it as much coverage as they previously had done during 
Vigilant Resolve. An IO Threshold was therefore determined.  
An IO Threshold is a non-doctrinal term which simply refers to the boundary below 
which the media’s attention is caught and above which has little value to the media. The 
employment of this concept played a very significant role in this subsequent operation. Below 
are two positions on the work of the media and the war in Iraq. Both offer magnitude of 
intended media manipulation:  
“..I say to you: that we are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking 
place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts 
and minds of our Umma. Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005.. 
 
If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a "D" or a "D-plus" as a country as 
to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today. Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 27 March 2006..”459 
 
The violence in Fallujah escalated. This insurgency was rapidly spreading to other 
regions in Iraq. It had made its presence known in Mosel, to the east of Baghdad and to the 
southern Sunni regions. The Sunni rebels were in an advantageous position for disrupting the 
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coalition troops’ vital supply route into Baghdad. Recapturing Fallujah was the only option 
available.  
The preference for retaking Fallujah was to be left solely to the U.S. Marine Corps. 
The supplies in Iraq were therefore increased twofold. The storage of diesel fuel rose from the 
7,000,000 gallons up to 15,000,000 gallons. The same was done for water and ammunition. 
There was mass involvement of the subordinate commanders throughout the Marine Corps in 
the drafting of this new battle plan. This operation code-named Phantom Fury was 
launched.
460
  
There was some concern raised over the fact that the launching of the operation almost 
coincided with the beginning of the elections. With the complete support of the entire 
command structure, there were several options that presented themselves. The special 
commands gave important real-time intelligence while Iraqi battalions were recruited, 
equipped and trained. The 1
st
 Cavalry’s Blackjack Brigade’s Combat Team did not leave as 
early as planned. One of the United Kingdom’s battalions was dispatched to the southeast of 
Fallujah. This was done in a bid to free more Marines for the looming 2
nd
 Battle for 
Fallujah.
461
 The coalition managed to win over not only Prime Minister Allawi but also the 
confidence of the fledgling Iraqi government. Winning over Prime Minister Allawi led to 
making the upcoming operation easier. This was done by: 
Doing away with the ineffective Fallujah Brigade,  
Putting into place a 24-hour curfew, 
Prohibiting the possession of arms in Fallujah. 
These actions fanned the flames of success of the operation which had by then been 
renamed Operation New Dawn which was aimed at winning the Iraqi leaders’ support The 
Iraqis had named it Operation al-Fajr which translates to “Daybreak” hence the name 
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Operation New Dawn. This name came from a passage in the Quran that talked of the 
returning of the evil people to the light of Allah through His grace.
462
  
The Marines prepared for the up-coming operation. The team work that was exercised 
among the Coalition forces was off the charts. What still caused some doubt was the 
Information Operations. Generally, the forces met most of the standards in the Information 
Operations domain. The deception feints and the psychological operations were carried out 
with great success. Almost ninety percent of the population agreed to leave Fallujah before the 
battle began. The exodus of two hundred thousand people had raised certain humanitarian 
fears.
463
 
The efforts aimed at electronic warfare were just as well executed. The coalition had the 
networks at their disposal; listening whenever there was need and jamming them to prevent 
the insurgent’s exchange of information. The insurgents still held the belief that the Marines 
would not attack, and even if they did, they would never succeed. The prepositioning of 
massive combat power was something that could not be easily concealed, but operational 
security was in full control of the Information Operations efforts. This drove the insurgents 
into a state of confusion before and during the battle. Operation Vigilant Resolve had failed 
because of the negative press that revolved around it, much of it derived from baseless 
propaganda.
464
 Therefore, great care needed to be taken on how this combat mission would be 
carried out regarding the media. The Marines intrinsic trust in their troops left no doubt they 
would adhere to the Marines doctrinal rules of engagement. The command tactical element of 
the battle was now in the hands of the Marine’s operational commanders. The Marines would 
not let the media interfere with the operation until the enemy was defeated.
465
 
The night of November 4
th
 2004 the soldiers, sailors and Marines of the Task Force 
Wolfpack were speeding towards the north in their LAVs, M1A1 Abrams tanks and trucks. 
They were headed towards the “Shark’s Fin” which is a large peninsula which lied west of 
Fallujah. Four Marine infantry battalions with the reserve support of two Army mechanized 
task forces were poised to attack the city from the north. In this particular operation the 
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surprise element of maneuver warfare was impossible to achieve. The rebels knew and had 
prepared for the assault that they perceived as inevitable. Barricades had been put up, IEDs set 
and trenches dug in preparation for the battle. There were in excess of four thousand 
mujahedeen who had made it their priority to fight and die in Fallujah. The actual attack came 
on the 8
th
 of November, with two Marine regiments sweeping through the city. The 
Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) was preceded by the Army’s 2-7 Cavalry to the 
northwest of the city. And, the Army’s 2-2 Infantry Battalion played out an assault to the east 
of the city in association with the Marines’ Regimental Combat Team-7.466 
The integration of MAGTF Close Air Support (CAS) in this operation was one of the 
major aspects of maneuver warfare that stood out. The integration was almost seamless. The 
CAS plan was founded on the Marine Corps C2 basics that involved procedural control and 
unity of command, which was made even more effective with a common map or Grid 
Reference Graphic (GRG). This widened the spectrum of the capability of aviation precision 
weapons and targeting technology. Therefore, a fixed wing CAS was a necessary option for 
the supporting fires in this operation, further emphasizing the urgent need for tactical aviation 
(TacAir) for the Marines.
467
  
The main assault began with the dropping of targeted munitions from the Marine 
Fighter All Weather Squadron 242, F/A-18Ds. The eight GBU 31s joint direct attack 
munitions (JDAM), each which weighed two thousand pounds hit the railroad topped berm 
that lay to the north of Fallujah. These bombs made breaching lanes that the 3
rd
 Battalion 1
st
 
Marines would make excellent use of hours later. In the follow-on battle, as the Marines, 
soldiers and coalition forces engaged in house to house battles in the city, supporting fires 
were endless and precise. The airstrikes were in complete harmony with the ground fires that 
came in rapidly. The penetrating attack went as per commanders’ intent. This was facilitated 
by the Marine Close Air Support (CAS).
468
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The attack utilized in Fallujah was maneuver warfare at its best. The involvement of 
CAS in the history of urban warfare has never been any less complex and demanding. In 
Fallujah, it was made worse by the specter of counterinsurgency and the collateral damage 
that possibly could result. This required that collateral damage was to be kept on the low, or 
no side! Minimal collateral damage was the goal in order to win the favor of the many 
observers of the war and the Iraqi civilians. This was not an easy task. Although risky as to 
collateral civilian damage, there was also the chance for blue on blue incidents. Besides the 
enemy, there were coalition fighters on the ground, which numbered ten battalions in the five 
kilometer square that made up Fallujah. It consisted of many buildings that resembled one 
another in their low heights and brownish-gray hue. The risks were, to all appearances, high; 
but this did not deter the Marines from employing CAS in the 2
nd
 Battle for Fallujah.
469
 
Historically, the tactical strike fighters were the major strong points of the CAS, but 
the employment of these in urban counterinsurgency combat was considered to be 
inappropriate, and generally avoided. The advent of precision ordnance alongside 
sophisticated targeting systems brought CAS to the insurgent forces successfully. This was a 
calculated warfare risk that had to be taken at this juncture in the overall fighting. 
Tactical jets are capable of surgical CAS because, their great speed and high operating 
altitudes reduce their vulnerability to enemy fire. In Fallujah the enemy’s anti-air capability 
was only limited to small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. The new application that was 
presented in this operation was the JDAMs. This ordinance is rarely used in urban warfare, but 
in the event that a group of insurgents were jammed into a building; or coalition artillery and 
other sources of fire support could not neutralize them fast enough, JDAM’s were to be the 
weapons of choice in Fallujah.
470
  
However, there were certain times when it was necessary to resort to the traditional 
attack of an area, with strafing from low-flying aircraft. This way the enemy would either be 
killed or intimidated or both with great success. The Marines’ TacAir, AV 8B Harriers and 
F/A -18d Hornets, had not yet been deployed. When the 2
nd
 Fallujah battle began and the 
Regimental Combat Team 1 was in urgent need for a fixed-wing CAS, the combined forces 
                                                          
469
Allison, “Close Air Support.” 
470
 Ibid. 
 
209 
 
air component commander (CFACC) of CENTCOM was approached. He was in charge of the 
air war in Iraq. The CFACC’s air control agencies together with the combat air operations 
center (CAOC) and air support operations center (ASOC) provided air support in response to 
Marine specific requests.
471
 
The Marine Corps’ perspective was entirely different from that of the U.S. Air Force 
or the Army. The Marines’ readiness to employ CAS into urban warfare boggled the minds of 
the pilots of National Guards F-16s. These pilots were quick to notice the gaping difference 
between the Marine and Army ground units. They reported that the Army never gave them 
clearance to strike and the ASOC being tentative in calling them in. The Marines, on the other 
hand, were quick to request supporting air. No delays were experienced when the Marine 
Direct Air Support center (DASC) was contacted as was the case when the Air force/ Army 
control system was involved. The other TacAir pilots soon joined in and flew CAS missions 
to support the Regimental Team Combat 1. MAGTF had conditioned the ground forces 
successful utilization of non- Marine air support.
472
 
The Marines did not bomb for effect; each bomb was only delivered after a quick 
analysis that left the bomb as the only means to handle the threat. Forward air controllers 
(FACs), air officers and the pilots went to a great extent to ensure either the bombs or 
strafing’s only hit the targets for which they were intended. The issues at hand did not stop 
joint air support; the major task would be to “integrate all the division fires, CAS, artillery and 
mortars” in order to provide support for the ground battle unit’s speedy and rapid penetrating 
attack plan. This plan would insure the quick securing of Fallujah as well as reject the media’s 
“CNN-theater” effect to negatively influence the outcome of this Marine Corps effort.473  
The Marines were given the command role in Operation Phantom Fury In order to 
avoid the traffic jams that sprung up as a result of dual C2 set-ups. Altitude deconflictions 
were very unlikely to work in this type of operation. The Marine Corps was therefore left to 
handle the assault on Fallujah while the CFACC gave their full attention to the regions where 
the insurgent activities were most likely to spring up. The request for unity of command was 
therefore granted, giving the 1
st
 Marine Expeditionary Force a cylinder of airspace around 
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Fallujah which was designated a high-density airspace control zone (HiDACZ). This HiDACZ 
was 25,000 feet high, and spanned a 15-mile radius. There was an additional inner circle, with 
a 5-mile radius, within the 15-mile radius. 
474
 
A “push” fixed wing CAS system was put into place together with a “pull” rotary wing 
element. TacAir would hover around the 5-15 mile orbit while the rotary wing CAS providers 
based in battle positions would respond only when the ground units put in a specific request 
for air assists. The CAS carried out missions between the RCT-1 and RCT-7 to which all the 
ground elements were attached. The operation of the two regiments would be parallel; they 
brought Fallujah into center focus. The success of the CAS also leaned heavily on the Marine 
Corps procedural control. This would involve the presence of many aircraft in a confined 
place at a given time. This allowed the pilots to make their maneuvers without much 
restriction. All they needed to do was stay within the limits of the laid down procedures. The 
Air force would regard this as loss of control but the Marines employment of this aspect led to 
the ultimate success of the CAS in this effort.
475
 
The 1
st 
MarDiv, also known as Task Force Blue Diamond, led this invasion with their 
tanks. The fact that the tanks weighed up to 70 ton did not deter their movement inside the city 
of Fallujah. They rolled into the city, smashing through the barricades and running over 
fanatical insurgents who were suicidal enough to stand their ground. Behind them were four 
more Marine infantry battalions. Tanks with plows and rollers simply made their way through 
the minefields and brought down the barricades to the edge of the city. The insurgents planned 
to destroy the tanks and take an early win. However, the tanks response to the insurgent 
threats was to lay on all the firepower available. The two tanks elements were ordered to make 
an advance further into the city, so that more mobile artillery could be brought into the city. 
The coalition tanks advanced forward into the fight, leaving a gap between them and the 
reinforcing Marine tanks and the Bradley Fighting Vehicles. On seeing this, the insurgents 
tried to lay assaults from behind the coalition tanks, only to be caught unaware by the Marine 
tanks which were rolling in to join the first two waves. The tanks then spread out to the west 
of the city. There was an endless flow of artillery fires into the city. The mass and the speed 
with which the Marines moved through the insurgents into a panic state; their fighting was 
now greatly diminished. If the insurgents engaged the Marines as they approached, or shot as 
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the Marines came into view, the response was artillery and mortar fire that would collapse the 
building around them. If they chose to remain in hiding and wait for the Marines to approach 
them, 60mm mortar shells coupled with Marine .50 caliber and 7.62 mm machine guns were 
directed at their position. The insurgents encountered M1A1 Abrams tanks which would fire 
point blank at them. 40mm grenades, AT4 rockets and Javelin missiles would also be directed 
at the insurgents. 
476
 
Major Doug Zembiec (KIA Fallujah) not only further validates the level of combat but 
also the doctrine and ethos of the Marine Corps Way of War. The following is the citation that 
was written which awarded Major Zembiec “The Lion of Fallujah” the Silver Star:  
Citation: 
The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the Silver Star Medal 
(Posthumously) to Douglas A. Zembiec, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry 
and intrepidity in action against the enemy while serving as a Marine Advisor, Iraq Assistance 
Group, Multi-National Corps, Iraq, in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on 11 May 
2007. Attacking from concealed and fortified positions, an enemy force engaged Major 
Zembiec's assault team, firing crew-served automatic weapons and various small arms. He 
boldly moved forward and immediately directed the bulk of his assault team to take cover. 
Under withering enemy fire, Major Zembiec remained in an exposed, but tactically critical, 
position in order to provide leadership and direct effective suppressive fire on the enemy 
combatant positions with his assault team's machine gun. In doing so, he received the brunt of 
the enemy's fire, was struck and succumbed to his wounds. Emboldened by his actions his 
team and supporting assault force aggressively engaged the enemy combatants. Major 
Zembiec's quick thinking and timely action to re-orient his team's machine gun enabled the 
remaining members of his unit to rapidly and accurately engage the primary source of the 
enemy's fire saving the lives of his comrades. By his bold initiative, undaunted courage, and 
complete dedication to duty, Major Zembiec reflected great credit upon himself and upheld 
the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.* 
Prior to his posthumous award he was also cited for a Bronze Star with a Valor device for the 
following action: 
A Marine patrol was taking heavy fire, and Zembiec’s unit was called in to lead a 
retaliatory assault. Right after arriving, Echo Company rushed toward the enemies, who 
launched a heavy volley of fire toward the new arrivals. Instead of directing from the back, 
Zembiec himself led the men toward the fire, determined to help the trapped patrol. His men 
moved to a roof to counter the insurgents who had been firing down from above. The enemies 
wasted no time and focused their AK-47- and RPG-fire on the Marines on the roof. The 
Marines tried to radio an Abrams tank to fire on the enemy, but the tank didn’t respond. As 
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they continued to call for assistance, Zembiec decided to take matters into his own hands. He 
raced down the stairs and directly into the line of fire, heading toward the tank. He climbed up 
to the hatch even as mortar rounds exploded nearby and bullets ricocheted off the metal. 
Unscathed, he told the tank operators where to fire. The tank made quick work of the enemy, 
and Zembiec ran back to the roof.  
 
A few weeks later, insurgents opened fire on Zembiec’s platoon from three sides, with 
thousands of rounds. Grenades flew back and forth between the enemy and his men with only 
20 feet between them. Zembiec, wounded by shrapnel, moved to a better position to direct the 
counterattack. He then moved from house to house, encouraging and motivating his men and 
repositioning the outnumbered Marines. Even as the battle raged, Zembiec coordinated the 
evacuation of nine injured Marines. 
 
Those who opted to wait until the Marines were on their door step were surrounded by 
the Marines who would not leave until everyone in the house had been killed or captured. If 
any of the insurgents did not care to die they would simply surrender; but for the most part, 
the insurgents were given the opportunity to die for their beliefs, which most opted for.
477
 
After a week, the Marines and soldiers reached the southern end of the city. The 
Marines’ 2nd Recon Battalion alongside the 1st Cavalry Division’s Blackjack Brigade guarded 
the city to the south. The Marine Regimental Combat Teams beat down the enemy in the 
north. The RCT’s pushing them until they found themselves in the hands of the Marines and 
soldiers awaiting them in the south. They were in effect surrounded by the joint forces in a 
classic “Hammer and Anvil” MCWW.  
This first week the insurgents suffered huge losses, but they were not completely 
defeated. A good number of them found refuge in fortified buildings throughout Fallujah. It 
would take seven weeks for the Marines to completely liberate Fallujah. Operation Phantom 
Fury was the largest action of the Marines’ urban warfare encounters since Vietnams’ Battle 
for Hue City. It was a successful operation. The city was set free of insurgents. Moreover, the 
Iraqis’ anti-occupation attitude was transformed into a strong hatred for the al-Qaeda in the 
region.  
Before becoming the 34
th
 Commandant General James Conway led the I MEF in Iraq. 
Gen. Conway stated in our interview that:  
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“..In OIF on our way to Baghdad, we had twenty-three decision points.  And we felt that 
using Boyd, our OODA loop was so much faster than the enemy's that….. Hey, you want to 
change the battlefield?  Go ahead.  We will out-think you, we will out-pace you, we will out-
speed you in terms of our decisions and you won't stand a chance.   
In fact, what we found was that when we used deception, And we wanted to dangle a leg 
out there [as bait] for maybe twelve to sixteen hours; we had to dangle it out there for a couple of 
days before they could digest and start to respond against something.  So we could see that their 
decision cycle was so much slower than ours that we had to adjust, in some ways, to their rhythm 
if we were going to make our deceptions work and pick up the chatter on a radio and those types 
of things.   
Early on, this is lower in the attack, and I think it was probably a little faster once we 
were settled, once we were [static] -- I'll use that term, it's not too strong a term.  But back to your 
basic question, I think -- I said it in some ways earlier, but I think earlier there was resistance 
more than later when you look at the aggregate of what's being proposed and you realize that -- 
some of it is not terribly different, some of it is sufficiently different that we need to understand 
this kind of warfare..”  
On the subject of urban warfighting General Conway stated: 
“..It was tough especially in Ramadi and Fallujah.  I think it's fair to say.  The advantage 
goes over the enemy in urban warfare by and large.  They can pick and choose the timing.  They 
can take advantage of lots of escape routes and narrow files where you can't bring all your power 
to bear; certainly it almost eliminates your ability for air support unless it's really truly precision 
weapons..   
In the early going, the thing that made a difference for us were snipers.  When we had the 
first fight in Fallujah, we got told to pull back and negotiate with the Iraqi leadership.  [They] 
didn't want to do it and within three days we thought of taking the city and the bad guys were 
swimming, they were out of ammunition and it was essentially over.   
It was a bad mistake to do it; it was a worse mistake to stop it in terms of Fallujah and it 
taught the whole nation, I think, a lesson in terms of how the hell you do this.   
I remember when we pulled back and I met with these clowns for the first time, they said, 
"You must move your snipers."  And I said, "Well, that's an interesting way to start the 
conversation.  I've got tanks that have penetrated well down into your streets.  “How about the 
[our] tanks" "We don't care about the tanks but you must move your snipers."  And only then did 
we come to realize that our snipers controlled the battlefield.  As far as they could see they could 
control any guy in a black outfit with an AK [they] dare not move across the street as they tried to 
dash first one killed, the second guy started to go and he gets killed and the third guy ….. He 
didn't have a chance either.   
There were some lessons learned.  It's tough to move around a city.  You don't get a lot of 
maneuver warfare working for you but we learned some things.  Historically there had been the 
belief that tanks are vulnerable to combat in the built up area.  [Marine Corps] tanks were the 
prime mover in the built up areas.  Where you had a house that maybe had eighteen bad guys in it 
and all the avenues were mined and covered, the tank would just blow the hell out of the thing 
and move on.  You had to protect them [the tanks].  You couldn't let them get too far out in front 
of the infantry but protected, that sort of armored pillbox impervious to just about anything the 
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bad guy could throw at them was huge.  I think we probably learned that lesson initially in the 
Najaf.  Someone said that we learned it as early as Nasiriya on the way up but after a time and 
certainly in the second battle of Fallujah tanks were invaluable to us as we went through.  And 
the tank is still the gold standard in the Middle East. Everybody respects a tank.  Tanks are, I 
think, absolutely essential.  They give you this opportunity for maneuver warfare and it's a good 
piece of kit.  
 We [the Marine Corps] might use them differently.  The Army would amass tanks and 
go mano a mano through the Republican Guard. We'd be hard pressed to do that.  We're much 
better using it the way the French intended when they got attacked by the Germans, that's 
disseminating the tanks amongst the infantry and using it. It must be said though that Marines are 
capable of doing anything with them. The fire power of these modern tanks is really incredible.  
And so you combine tanks with Cobras [combined air component] and you got a powerful 
package. You can take on a lot of stuff and do damage with that.  I think tanks are absolutely 
essential.  I've always believe that.  Nothing has changed that thinking..”478 
 In summing up for both Chapter 7 (OEF) and Chapter 8 (OIF) the following is notable 
concerning maneuver warfare. MCWW’s most important tool to the overall warfare setting for 
the Marine Corps is the maneuver doctrines of Gray etal. It can be applied both on the 
traditional / conventional battle field and during urban warfare leading into 4
th
 and 5
th
 
generation irregular applications. And, maneuver warfare when applied in urban warfare; it is 
effective so long as there is good mastery of the urban architecture and war planning 
developments. Maneuver warfare is essential when your ground force is small in number. 
Speed is essential to the success of maneuver warfare. It throws the opposing enemy into 
shock and makes them resort to actions that are retrogressive to their defense. A good number 
of insurgent leaders when interviewed admitted to making the wrong decisions when the 
advance of the Marines came quicker than they had expected. What followed were actions that 
would make them more vulnerable to the Marine’s fire. 
In seeking to complete this work on OIF I asked General Mattis to offer his thoughts on 
how the successful finalization occurred that led to getting control of Fallujah: 
Q: As Vigilant Resolve proved to be a disaster, and correct me if I'm wrong, it necessitated 
the second battle of Fallujah. 
A: “..Well, I think the enemy had something to do with necessitating the second battle of 
Fallujah as well.  We were trying to roll back the cycle of violence but by the time we'd 
arrived there, the momentum was carrying it forward and so we had to play the ball 
where it lay.  We at the same time continued right through the worst fighting in Fallujah 
and Ramadi. I would come back every night to my CP and oftentimes have sheiks there. 
I'd have them over for dinner; I knew they were fighting me.  They were sending their 
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boys to fight me.  And we just kept telling them, "You’re lining up with the wrong folks."  
So what we had to do was get through the mud, the blood and the beer but we never lost 
sight of the fact that we would turn al Anbar against Al Qaida.  It certainly threw us off 
track in terms of what we had desired for the timeline but war is one improvisation after 
another, one darn thing after another. 
 We still had out in the western Euphrates River Valley a young Army major, Special 
Forces guy, working with the Abu Neemer tribe.  And if you use the cancer model, we 
were infecting the enemy with that cancer and it just kept happening over the years and 
it's rotated in and out.  A lot of people took credit for it when it finally happened but in 
fact it started in the spring of 2004 with a young Army major named Adam Souk.  But I 
would just say it was just normal adaptations to the enemy situation.  As maneuver 
warfare teaches you, you're up against an enemy with an independent will.  So your plan 
is nothing more than Hagel's dialectic.  You have a thesis.  The enemy countered for 
something so you have an antithesis. Out of that you come up with a new synthesis.  And 
all that really is, is your new thesis and you just keep playing the ball forward in the give 
and take and the heave and ho of warfare..” 
Q: Sounds like John Boyd’s OODA Cycling Loop in disguise. 
A: “..Well, Boyd's thinking is very, very prevalent in the Marine Corps, but you're absolutely 
right..”479  
Maneuver warfare from Gray, Wyly, Boyd and Sun Tzu and the rest of its trappings on 
up to and including FET’s and Distributive Operations as the Marine Corps modus operandi 
has therefore proved essential in their past and now in Marine Corps contemporary combat 
efforts. 
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9 Conclusions:  
I. Revolution in Military affairs: 
The United States Marine Corps did not experience what could be termed a Revolution 
in Military Affairs in its doctrinalization of maneuver warfare during the Gray Commandancy. 
Sir Michael Howard has defined a RMA as:  
“For a major RMA to have occurred there must have taken place a military turning 
point in the history of mankind.”480  
Needless to say there are few examples of developments of this magnitude. The 
introduction of the equestrian spur that would enable the use of heavy cavalry, the 
introduction of gun powder, the rifled musket, the use of electronic communications 
equipment, the introduction of mechanized armored vehicles and the development of airpower 
as an element of combined arms set the standard for inclusion into the RMA pantheon.  
The United States Marine Corps from its inception to its position today as a major 
military force can be seen unofficially as well as officially practicing maneuver type warfare. 
In the near recent past the concepts that were institutionalized by the Marine Corps can be 
traced in part to its roots, including what has been termed a German Way of War.
481
 Initially 
during the Marine Corps’ “evolution,” Bewegungskrieg tactics did not sit well within the 
hierarchy of the cadre that made up the Marine Corps’ leadership. This included both officer 
and noncommissioned officer. At first, the “maneuverists” influence was not positive when it 
came to “evolving” Marine Corps fighting traditions.  
In brief, one of the messengers or proponents of the use of the modern German tactic 
managed to alienate a large part of the Marine Corps warrior population. Yet, some inroads 
were made that eventually led to the official institutional adherence of this military doctrine 
within the current Marine Corps.
482
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However this change was much more an evolution and not a revolution. The ethos and 
military ethic that is part and parcel of the Marine Corps had unified ad hoc ways of 
warfighting both in its conventional attritional doctrine, as well as nonconventional maneuver 
warfare. It also combined with aspects of the Asian Way of War philosophy of Sun Tzu.  
Even a designated sub prime mover of this concept, General Al Gray stated that 
“maneuver warfare is not new per se.”483 And, Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor noted that 
in adopting / adapting the maneuver warfare doctrine, the Marine Corps was returning to its 
roots in warfighting learned during the Banana Wars, but shelved during World War II, Korea 
and to some extent the war in Vietnam. The reemergence of the stated concept of maneuver 
warfare by General Gray was a reflection of the Marines’ experience in Vietnam and the 
demoralizing effect of Beirut and its aftermath.
484
 
The term that was bandied about in the press during this time frame was 
“Reformer(s).”485 This is a misnomer of the highest magnitude, because it eventually was 
applied to those within the Marine Corps seeking serious revisions as to how the Marine 
Corps would fight future battles. In an interview, Marine General John Kelly set the 
“Reformer” name aside and stated that the correct term is and should have been 
“maneuverist”, and those who would be opposed to the maneuver warfare concept 
“traditionalists.” Using these new designations it is apparent that the gap in understanding is 
considerably narrowed within the Marine Corps family thanks to the Kelly interjection of 
correct terms.
486
 
The history of the U.S. Marine Corps is replete with examples of maneuver warfare. It 
existed during the attacks at Trenton and Princeton during a bleak time in the American War 
of Independence, to the successful amphibious landing in Nassau, the Bahamas during this 
same conflict. It was practiced by Lt. Presley N. O’Bannon during his attack on Tripoli, and 
through to the Marine amphibious landings during the Spanish American War at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba in 1898. It also has been suggested that the Marine efforts at Belleau Wood had a 
                                                          
483
 Gray, In person interview with the author. 
 
484
 Trainor email correspondence with the author. 
 
485
 Walter, Isaacson, “The Winds of Reform,” Time Magazine, (Mar. 07, 1983). 
 
486
 Kelly, In person interview with the author. 
 
218 
 
maneuverist element because the NCO’s in the wheat fields were using mission type orders. 
Perfecting the amphibious landing techniques by Major “Pete” Ellis and the then Lieutenant 
Victor “Brute” Krulak that were the bread and butter of the Marines in the Pacific Campaign 
in World War II, and the break out at the Chosin Reservoir by the Marine Corp during the 
Korean action, onto Hue City in Vietnam. All witnessed the Marine Corps application of 
maneuver warfare. And I am more than certain that in Grenada, the Gulf War, Somalia, OEF 
and OIF maneuver warfare was heavily in evidence. 
This conclusion is best supported by General Jim Mattis when he stated:  
“..in its own way the Marine Corps had always allowed a great deal of freedom to tactical 
commanders but at least now we had a better framework for what we were doing and it was 
maneuver warfare's tenets. And so actually it was more of an upgrading of tactical proficiency 
and operational art.  It was not really replacing something..”487 
II: Colonel Michael Wyly (USMC) “The Prime Mover”:  
This doctrinalization of maneuver warfare as it occurred within the U.S. Marine Corps 
would not have happened without Colonel Mike Wyly’s efforts in response to his experiences 
in Vietnam. While doing this research, it became most evident to me that there was one prime 
mover that can be attributed with this Marine Corps maneuver warfare evolution. This 
“Marine Corps Evolution” only happens as we know it today because of a Marine officer with 
a vision and the determination to make it happen. 
It started with Wyly in Vietnam when he lost one of his two best Lieutenants, Chip 
Pilkington, after a fire fight in the An Hoa Basin. The death of this young and promising 
Marine left Wyly in a conflicted state, and he vowed then and there that he would find a better 
way to fight wars for the Marine Corps. Colonel Wyly shared the following:  
“..A unique feature of my personal story is that that I became personally dedicated to 
making change in our Corps years before I met John Boyd. After two tours in Vietnam I made 
a pledge to myself that were I to remain in the Marine Corps, I would commit myself to 
making us as powerful a fighting force as I could, not just for the strength of our nation, but 
for the sake of the wonderful young combat Marines I had come to know and who had given 
so much, and, for the sake of their successors, who would serve our country in the next war.  
“The next war,” I presumed, would be waged against the Soviet Union. I did not rule 
out more wars “by proxy”, such as the North Vietnamese fought for their Soviet supporters. In 
either scenario, significant reform was imperative.  
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When I made the decision to dedicate the rest of my career to change and reform, I had 
to come to terms with the fact that doing so might well stifle or end my career. I was a Marine 
major, “fresh caught”, and it was 1973. I would sustain my career as long as possible “for the 
greater good of our Corps”; however, I had to be ready to “hang it up” as a Marine Corps 
major if the demands of my commitment were to lead to that..”488 
Sub-Prime Movers: 
1. Jim Webb (USMC): The other young Marine lieutenant of note in Wyly’s company was 
Jim Webb. Wyly and Webb have to this day remained very close friends. After his time in 
Vietnam, Webb became a successful writer, Secretary of the Navy and Senator from Virginia. 
Because of his actions in Vietnam, Webb became the recipient of the Navy Cross, the nation’s 
second highest award for valor in combat; and was also the recipient of two Silver Star 
awards.
489
 It was his company commander, Wyly, who nominated Webb for the Medal of 
Honor; and it must be noted that Wyly shared his vision with this like-minded protégé on 
numerous occasions. Webb would eventually provide the bureaucratic gravitas to restructure 
the leadership of the Marine Corps (to shake off the negative stigma of Vietnam and Beirut) 
by seeking a “warrior type” Marine to be the 29th Commandant. General Al Gray, who was 
not nominated for this position, was to be SECNAV Jim Webb’s choice. 
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United States Naval Service. 
 
220 
 
2. Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor (USMC): Lt. General Bernard Trainor is responsible for 
appointing Wyly onto the faculty of the Marine Corps University hierarchy where he 
eventually introduced maneuver warfare into the curricula. Prior to this however, General 
Trainor was aware of Wyly’s value to Marine Corps educational systems as he stated in the 
following email:  
“..When I was at the Ed. Ctr., I sought to have the faculties at Command & Staff 
College (CSC) and Amphibious Warfighting School (AWS) broaden the students minds by 
having them think outside the box. However, I was mindful that my job was to educate the 
students in the nitty gritty of their profession as Marines. This was particularly needed at 
AWS. 
 At CSC I emphasized command responsibility, the importance of clear commander’s 
guidance and then of letting subordinates get on with the job. Inherent in the teaching was 
adaptability and initiative at all levels of command. It came out of my studies of WWII battles 
where troops would end up in the wrong place with no comm to higher command. Some troop 
leaders handled it well. Many were left floundering for direction.  
Mike Wyly and his Socratic pedagogy, was [like] a breath of fresh air on the faculty of 
AWS. I became (and remained) his ardent supporter. I encouraged his innovative thinking at 
AWS and his unique understanding of mission orders and subordinate freedom of action. I 
tried to shield him thereafter from those who were critical of his independent mind..”490 
  
 Without General Trainor’s behind the scenes efforts, Colonel Wyly would not have 
had the protection in place to further this endeavor. 
3. William (Bill) Lind: a political player who insinuated himself into the process by initially 
courting Wyly. Lind’s bona fides are his Ivy League education with emphasis on German 
history; and the gravitas of two senatorial administrative positions (Sen. Taft of Ohio and Sen. 
Hart of Colorado) during this post-Vietnam military reorganization period. The following 
excerpt from the Lind interview provides the motivation for his entry into the Process:
491
 
BL:  “..It starts with Senator Robert Taft, Jr. in Ohio..” 
TP:  Why did he get into it? 
BL: “..Basically I [Lind] led him into it. Taft understood that the job of the committee 
[Armed Services] was to look at the governance of the country, an independent look at 
what the services were doing and whether it made sense…. whether what we are doing 
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makes sense not just about are we wasting money, not just about getting contracts for 
the state [Ohio] and your district but independently looking at it and saying does this 
make sense for the militarily or is the military missing something and that starts with 
Taft..” 
TP: Well it starts with you who convinced Taft. 
BL: “..Right.  Essentially the point is Taft is open to it ….. and then Gary Hart was on the 
committee for 2 years 1974-1976 with Taft and when Taft was defeated, Hart knowing 
I was politically conservative asked me to come with him to continue the work I was 
doing with Taft to the point where we put out a second edition of the Taft White Paper 
as a Taft/Hart paper; and then eventually by the late 1970’s Gary Hart and a few other 
members of congress were giving speeches on the floor [of the Senate] talking about 
maneuver warfare doctrine ……and that’s important in terms of the Marine Corps’ 
interest in this [maneuver warfare] because of the Marine Corp sensitivity to the hill 
[Congress, both houses]..” 
BL:  “..Hart was genuinely interested in new ideas and he was genuinely interested in 
governing the country.  So Hart/Taft both were people who were actually interested in 
governing the country but there was a political calculation as well.  Politically the 
country was moving to the right particularly in military stuff at this point.  The Cold 
War is still very much under way and Hart is looking for a 3
rd
 way where he can be 
pro-military without sounding like John Tower, he is looking for a 3
rd
 way between the 
Kennedy liberal anti defense people and John Tower’s ‘give the Pentagon anything 
they want’ and military reform …. So there is a political calculus in that for him [Hart] 
as well..” 
TP: By 1976 you have gotten maneuver warfare on the front burner. 
BL: “..Yes..” 
TP: Do you personally think it is more effective as a fighting tool in terms of carnage, in 
terms of wounded in action? 
BL: “..What maneuver warfare?  Oh yeah! Obviously yes it enormously lowers casualties. 
The Panzer divisions of WW II changed the operational mobility differential but the 
point is it brings men to it quickly; it isn’t an endless, bottomless bloodbath that was 
always one of my motivations for this thing [maneuver warfare] to attrition warfare 
[which] always struck me as morally appalling. Also what you have is a marriage of 
people looking for something different after Vietnam with me being able to point out 
there is a different model which they were not aware of because the German military 
lost their war; it’s not just different tactically as fighting power will point out, it is 
different in everything, it’s a different military culture. It’s worked extremely well..”492 
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4. Colonel John Boyd USAF (ret.): Colonel John Boyd is the non-Marine who entered into the 
intellectual and philosophical heart and soul of this evolutionary process. As a maverick 
within the Defense Department, his sole aim was to “reform the military and it’s spending.”493 
He eventually found his way to the U.S. Marine Corps as it has going through the post-
Vietnam adjustments of downsizing while reviewing their raison d’etre of being the Force in 
Readiness for the country. He brought Wyly into the Boydian ranks while he was teaching the 
young Marine officers the intricacies of OODA Loop, Patterns of Conflict and his Discourse 
on Winning and Losing as they apply to maneuver warfare.
494
 Boyd is also a student of Asian 
military philosophy. Wyly introduces him to General Al Gray who took an immediate liking 
to Boyd and his military philosophy. At the time of Boyd’s death well over 300 Marines 
attended his burial, placing their Marine Corps iconic Eagle Globe and Anchor (EGA) devices 
on his coffin as an acknowledgement of thanks for all he had done in their military education. 
(See OODA Loop Chart at the end of this chapter)
495
 
5. General Alfred M. Gray: The “mustang” Marine responsible for endorsing the process 
within the Marine Corps, from the II MEF level, and on to the Commandants level, Gray was 
eventually responsible for institutionalizing this process Marine Corps wide. General Gray is 
brought into this development by Colonel Wyly’s plan to “ambush him” at the Officers Club 
at Camp Lejeune.
496
 Wyly had sent Captain Bill Woods to lead the ambush; accompanied by 
Captain G.I. Wilson, a classmate of Woods from The Basic School. These two junior Marine 
officers get General Gray’s attention and Maneuver Warfare gets a protector and future 
benefactor. Mike Wyly was also responsible for introducing General Gray to Jim Webb. 
Webb as Secretary of the Navy would eventually push through the promotion of General Gray 
into the commandancy of the Marine Corps.
497
 At this juncture Gen. Gray institutionalizes 
maneuver warfare or “fighting smarter” by issuing FMFM-1 Warfighting and also by creating 
the Marine Corps University. Colonel Wyly writes the syllabi and curricula inculcating 
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maneuver warfare and Boydian philosophy into the courses offered by the Marine Corps 
University.
498
 
6. The Apostles: the young “Captains and Majors” who laid the pipe and carried the work load 
for this evolution: G.I. Wilson, Bill Woods, John Schmidt and Bruce Gudmundsson. These 
were the writers and planners who actually put pen to paper; from putting together the Gray 
Maneuver Warfare Handbook (unpublished but privately distributed to the rest of these 
adherents),
499
 to the actual writing FMFM-1 Warfighting by then Captain John Schmidt.
500
 
7. The Practitioners: These were those Marines [just a few of the many Marines given below] 
who successfully employed maneuver warfare as a Marine Corps Way of War: Maj. Gen. Ray 
Smith, Gen. James Conway, Gen. Jim Jones, Gen. Charles Krulak, Gen. James Mattis, Gen. 
Tony Zinni, Gen. John Kelly, Gen. Joe Dunford, Maj. Gen. Mike Myatt, and Lt. Gen. Bill 
Keys.  
 With the exception of this last group, the shakers and movers listed in this cabal of 
“maneuverists” all are directly connected to Colonel Mike Wyly in some significant way. It 
was Wyly who brought them all together in various developmental stages to devise a better 
way to fight wars on behalf of the nation and the Marine Corps. None of these individual 
members of this famous, or “infamous” evolutionary group could have knit this together to get 
the same end results that we see today on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Some might 
think that coincidence or “good luck” was responsible; but neither is the case. With his vision 
Wyly was the real luck: “Opportunity meeting preparation: this will create the space for an 
idea whose time had come.” 
If this were to be visualized, the idea of a wagon wheel (instead of the Wyly analogy 
of a shot gun blast) would be more appropriate.
501
 Mike Wyly would be at the hub, and each 
spoke would be those mentioned above. If there is a “father’ of a Marine Corps Way of War 
the honor belongs to Colonel of Marines Mike Wyly. 
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III Abandonment of an American Way of War: 
Marine Corps attritional warfare is mostly over except where specifically selected as a 
strategy. With the continued use and development of fighting smarter techniques garnered 
from the Marine Corps University’s schools of maneuver warfare, the U.S. Marine Corps can 
take full advantage of the options regarding strategy and tactics. Attrition is therefore still a 
choice, not “THE” choice.  
This was made clear by the statement from General James Conway, 34
th
 CMC: “..I 
want all my options open going into battle and if need be attrition is an option..”502 
This was amplified by General James Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
in November of 2011 at Camp Lawton, Herat, Afghanistan, when he stated that: 
 “..While the Marines, willing and able to operate from dug in positions [attritional 
defensive - offensive doctrine] are uniquely equipped and trained to do much more..”503 
The schools within the Marine Corps are exposing young Marine Officers to programs 
that are not just rote memorization of static facts. Bruce Gudmundsson currently teaches the 
Harvard case method approach that develops the needed skills for critical decision making at 
The Basic School and the Marine Corps University. These cases prepare these Marines to 
assume leadership qualities that are part and parcel of decentralized command needed in the 
practice of maneuver warfare and the Marine Corps Way of War. 
IV. Why the Marine Corps Was Able to Doctrinalize Maneuver Warfare: 
The U.S. Marine Corps, as an organization, has some special characteristics that 
militated in favor of the Marine Corps ability to make change when change was needed. The 
basic advantages that General Gray enjoyed as pre-existing in the Corps were the following: 
1. A common cause and sense of mission in which all Marines strongly believe in. 
2. The instinct for physical survival together with the likelihood of being faced with 
possible death. 
3. All Marines have common training which gives them common reference points and 
common language. 
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4. Esprit de Corps that binds Marines together and motivates them to work together. 
5. Our first identity as Marines is to be a Marine. 
6. Every Marine has to be qualified as a rifleman. Every Marine is a fighter. 
7. Marines feel stronger about their traditions than any other service. 
8. Marines carry a sense responsibility for the Marines who came before them. 
9. Marines make the most detailed and specifically significant demands on our Marines 
in terms of iron disciple and precise standards. 
10. Marines have a reputation for innovation. 
11. Marines are extremely flexible. 
12. Marines are by our nature expeditionary.504 
 
This was the legacy that Commandant Gray parlayed to institutionalize Maneuver Warfare 
within the Marine Corps. Without this institutional buy-in, by a rather small force, there is no 
change.  
Much has been written concerning the negatives of this means of prosecuting warfare by 
the Marine Corps. Yet all questioned only attested to the fact that one of the messengers was 
the cause of the negative sentiments encountered by the Marine Corps “maneuverists.” 
General Mattis offered the following to support the overall acceptance of maneuver warfare’s 
institutionalization:  
“..I'm rather a student of history -- I saw the logic to it, it made sense to me.  People like Tony 
Zinni who at the time was a regimental commander, and Van Riper -- everywhere I went I ran 
into people above me who were strong advocates.  And among the younger officers it was easy 
to embrace.  The changes weren't that severe because in its way the Marine Corps had always 
allowed a great deal of freedom to tactical commanders but at least now we had a better 
framework for what we were doing and it was maneuver warfare's tenets.  And so actually it was 
more of an upgrading of tactical proficiency and operational art.  It was not really replacing 
something.  It was almost like you'd come out of high school and now you were going to college, 
if you know what I mean..” 505 
  
Another critical opinion concerning the maneuver warfare landscape was offered by retired 
General Bernard Trainor:  
“..The Marine Corps was not hostile to the ideas behind Maneuver Warfare and the 
Boydian concepts. Bill Lind was the source of friction. He publicly criticized Marine 
leadership and ascribed to it a calcified commitment to attrition warfare where it did not exist 
to the degree he claimed.  
 
The Marine Corps had a well-deserved reputation for innovative thinking and took 
umbrage at Bill Lind’s charges. Matters were exacerbated when he consciously or 
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unconsciously undercut the leadership by encouraging company grade officers to become 
“Young Turks.” Resentment to Lind and his works was the unintended consequence.  
 
As a Marine, I deplored Lind’s deportment. As for his concepts, I welcomed the free 
thought and debate his advocacy brought to the table as refreshing and healthy. I applauded 
the critical thinking aspect of Maneuver Warfare; the freedom of thought that it engendered 
and the greater freedom of action for subordinate under mission orders that it embraced. But I 
considered his Maneuver Warfare a sub-set of war fighting options whose essence was already 
resident within Marine concepts of warfare. 
  
This was minus a key element -There was so much attention to Boyd’s getting inside the 
enemy‘s OODA loop that little was being paid to killing him. It could be interpreted as over 
time the term Maneuver Warfare took on mystical proportions. This I found potentially 
dangerous if it was to become the keystone of the way to fight. To me, Maneuver Warfare was 
heavily influenced by Jomini’s “scientific / art” of warfare with its decisive battle philosophy 
and by its subsequent German army derivative. I believed the Boyd-Lind concept 
maneuvering the enemy into defeat without the Jomini and German “decisive battle.”  
 
A point I made to Bill Lind from the sidelines years ago was that you can’t maneuver 
an enemy into defeat. At some point he has to be actually beaten - and concede it. (I make the 
same argument to victory through airpower advocates). My basic problem was that Maneuver 
Warfare was a prescriptive formula based on the assumption that attack was the only way to 
go; the enemy was of an equal genre to self, the object of an engagement was the complete 
capitulation of the enemy and the environment, terrain etc. were incidental. But I held/hold 
that wars are largely sui generis and don’t fit such a constant mold.  
 
Paradoxically it calls for subordinate freedom of action within a framework of dogma. 
It turned out that Desert Storm did fit the mold, but even without Maneuver Warfare, the 
USA/USMC operational plans would have been what they were, but were credited as 
examples of maneuver warfare. I fought in Korea as a rifle platoon leader and upon reflection 
can state with confidence that Maneuver Warfare would have had no place during the Outpost 
War phase of the Korean War short of another Inchon style landing. The enemy had too much 
defense in depth.  
 
I commanded two battalions on Vietnam tours and Maneuver Warfare would not have 
worked there either; it was not the Maneuver Warfare ordained conventional war. Iraqi 
Freedom I (OIF), started out as Maneuver Warfare at its best, but came-a-cropper early when 
the enemy did not turn out to be the Republican Guard, but the Fedayeen on our flanks. The 
following eight years of Iraqi Freedom II saw no Maneuver Warfare option and became a war 
of attrition, so detested by Bill Lind.  
 
The German model Maneuver Warfare in World War II was also found wanting 
because of its essentially narrow application to offensive action against peer enemy on 
accommodating terrain. The German’s were at a loss when offense failed them and they had 
to revert to the defense. Even then they held to their doctrine in the form of the counter 
offensive, e.g. Kursk, Caen, the Ardennes and Tunisia. In all cases they failed. Kesselring 
fighting in Italy had the good sense to fight a war of attrition after his counterstrike failed at 
Salerno.  
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The totem of Maneuver Warfare is alive in the Marine Corps, but hopefully with a far 
more mature understanding of the principles that it should have embodied. We have legions of 
officers who have seen the elephant, are battle wise and realize that there is no magic recipe. 
Fighting and success in battle involves myriad non-military factors. I think today’s Marine 
culture has at least benefited and internalized Lind’s mantra of mission orders and has 
incorporated the best of Maneuver Warfare in two words, adapt and innovate..”  
 
General Trainor also offered an outside opinion from an anonymous Marine that 
further explains the Marine Corps experience viz. maneuver warfare and institutionalization: 
 
 “..To this day there is deeply held antagonism towards Lind on the part of an earlier 
[Marine Corps leadership] generation. When I received your e-mail I mentioned it in 
correspondence to a friend of long standing. He is a retired [Marine] colonel of eighty seven 
years; an infantry veteran of three wars who had a reputation for brilliance and was a top 
planner when on active duty. He was not involved in Lind/ Maneuver Warfare brouhaha.  
 
He replied that he considered the Maneuver Warfare exercise as an empty vessel that 
didn't focus on maneuver or any other fundamental facet/principle/practice of warfare. He felt 
that Bill Lind had set up a straw man that represented many if not most of the poor examples 
of leadership, tactics and strategy and implied that the straw man was representative of the 
Marine Corps of that time.  
 
He [Lind] then cast into the empty vessel of Maneuver Warfare all the acknowledged 
good practices of leadership, tactics and strategy and labeled them Maneuver Warfare. He 
then contrasted existing conditions with the contents of the once empty vessel that was filled 
with all the sound practices accepted by serious students of the art.  
 
My friend thought the exercise was at the core a fraud, but nonetheless, was most 
useful because it prompted a whole generation of Marines to think seriously about the art of 
war..”506  
 
V. Removing The Impediment For Inclusion Of Maneuver Warfare Doctrine: 
It may appear that the US Marine Corps’ evolution into a maneuver warfare doctrine was 
straight forward. This is not the case. The issues in this regard tend to be judgmental from 
within the Marine Corps and only centering on the how, and the when of maneuver warfare 
becoming inculcated. Maneuver warfare as applied to Marine Corps combat has not failed in 
practice and or application on the battlefield.  
Failure of a MCWW based on maneuver doctrine seems to be in the eyes of some of 
the original apostles. They were known as “Gray’s Bubbas.” Failure has also been recognized 
by some of the current junior officers. The center of this discontent is still Bill Lind. Lind has 
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a condescending demeanor and uniquely negative and caustic pedagogical style. It was 
reported that if you did not “get it,” Lind would castigate the officer on the spot. The blow 
back from within the Marine Corps towards Lind’s approach was less than kind and yet 
truthful. (How could Lind who never served a day in uniform tell a Marine battle-hardened 
veteran how to do his job?) They despised him, his arrogance, and his demeanor and to some 
extent the vast depth of his tactical maneuver knowledge. 
This internal friction in regards to Bill Lind is finally eliminated when General Charles 
Krulak, 31
st
 Commandant, and strong proponent of FMFM-1 Warfighting pronounces Lind 
persona non grata at all Marine Corps facilities. At this juncture the internal strife and 
acrimony connected with the evolution and further adaption of conceptual maneuver warfare 
within the Marine Corps stopped. Lind still continues his attack on the leadership of the 
Marine Corps. He still writes articles condemning the triumph of “Careerism” over the proper 
implementation of maneuver warfare doctrine. If this was a concrete fact, how do Marine 
Generals such as, Conway, Kelly, Dunford and Mattis lead Marines using maneuver warfare 
in battle today? How did they ever rise to these leadership roles as practicing “maneuverists”? 
In his work Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies,
507
 U.S. Navy Captain Terry C. 
Pierce used the case study method to analyze and conclude that the work of the Marine Corps’ 
evolutionists reflected a process that was negative and / or not wanted by the rank and file before 
its inculcation as Marine Corps doctrine. This is clearly not the case. Based on this research and 
primary interviewees statements including that of General Al Gray and General Bernard “Mick” 
Trainor, maneuver warfare tenets were in evidence throughout the history of the Marine Corps. It 
was made official doctrine with the issuance of FMFM1 Warfighting. General John Kelly 
confirms the notion that once the impediment for acceptance was removed, the Marine  
Corps was able to assimilate the doctrinalization of maneuver warfare or the Marine Corps 
Way of War: “..Some get it, some think they get it, and some will never get it is the reality. 
Once the commandant says it is so that ends the argument and you then get on with it..”508 
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VI. Boyd’s Forward Looking Advice:  
 
 Colonel John Boyd’s guidance to General Al Gray’s query of “What’s next?” sets the 
tone for the future of Marine Corps Way of War. His response was simply put: “This is just the 
beginning!” 
 Because of Boyd’s death in early 1997, it is my opinion that the continued criticism from 
Lind etal., of how the Marine Corps furthers this evolution is unfounded, and somewhat anti-
Boydian in its spirit and nature.  
John Boyd would be the first to acknowledge that the philosophical basis of this 
evolution will always be ongoing and developmental. It is just like the OODA Loop’s orientation 
process. It is as dynamic and as fluid as the situations it may come up against in any of the battle 
spaces. It is a dynamic, free thinking experience, not a static doctrine! 
It is more than apparent that the U.S. Marine Corps has not abandoned its progress where 
maneuver warfare is concerned. It has adapted it into its own ongoing dynamic and versatile 
operational art of warfare that is also agile and flexible. The Marine Corps Way of War critics 
have not given the institution it due justice of evolving a Marine Corps Way of War. 
 I can only speculate on how John Boyd would further the development of his philosophy. 
I think based upon the OODA Loop Cycling Process that Boyd would have joined Commandant 
Conway and Generals Kelly and Dunford, and Mattis and continued the evolution based upon the 
Marine Corps DNA born at Princeton New Jersey 1777; and still evolving today in Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan. 
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APPENDIX: BOYD”S OODA LOOP CYCLING CHART: 
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APPENDIX: Comparison of a Five Paragraph Orders and Mission Type Orders 
Five Paragraph Order: 
1. Situation: 
 a. Enemy Forces 
 b. Friendly Forces 
 c. Attachments/Detachments 
 d. Commanders Evaluation (Optional). 
2. Mission: A statement of the issuing unit’s mission, emphasizing seizure of terrain 
objectives. 
3. Execution: 
 a. Concept of operations. Summary of scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. 
 b. Subordinate missions. (Usually given in terms of terrain). 
c. Coordinating instructions. 
4. Service support. 
5. Command and Signal 
 a. Signal Instructions 
 b. Command Post, location of commander. 
Mission Type Order: 
1. Situation: 
a. Enemy Forces 
 b. Friendly Forces 
 c. Attachments/Detachments 
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 d. Commanders Intent: (Required) a clear statement of the next higher 
commander’s operational intent 
2. Mission: A clear statement of the operational intent of the issuing Commander, orienting 
on the enemy situation. 
3. Execution: 
 a. Concept of operations. (Designation of focus of main effort [Schwerpunkt], initial 
axis of advance, and any limiting restrictions). 
 b. Subordinate missions. (Given in terms of operational scheme, rather than 
terrain). 
 c. Coordinating instructions. 
4. Service support. 
5. Command and Signal 
 a. Signal instructions 
 b. Command posts, location of commander. 
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APPENDIX: General questions asked of interviewees 
I. Primary questions asked of all interviewees. 
Dear Interviewee, 
I have taken the liberty of sending some question to you before our interview. This is not an 
assignment but rather a frame of reference as to where I am going with my work. 
Thank you again...........Tony Piscitelli 
Questions Maneuver Warfare:  
1. Is the Marine Corps today the Corps that you enlisted in it? What position did you take to 
facilitate both a personal change as well as a "corporate" or military change re maneuver 
warfare for our Corps? 
2. What were your initial thoughts or concerns about moving in the direction to maneuver 
warfare re the Marine Corps? 
 
3. How did you personally become involved in this evolution into maneuver warfare? 
 
4. We're you exposed to Col. John Boyd.....your reactions? Bill Lind? Martin von Creveld?  
5. How have you used Boyd’s OODA Loop in the USMC development of maneuver warfare, 
in the battle space? 
5. Do you feel that the Corps has developed its’ own version of maneuver warfare? Please 
focus on your own experiences. 
 
6. What were the major changes that you had to work through as the Corps adopted (or 
adapted) its own version of maneuver warfare? 
7. What were your personal battle space experiences in the use of maneuver warfare? 
8. How have the tenants of maneuver warfare helped in winning in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
How did it provide for the Marines at the tip of the spear? 
235 
 
9. In the following works from the Commandant’s Reading List (First to Fight Krulak; Brute 
Coram; Chesty Hoffman) there are many, many references as to how the Corps successfully 
operated before the institutionalization of maneuver warfare …. Not taking anything away 
from Gen Gray’s initiatives, did the DNA of the Marine Corps have the intellectual and 
practical genetic mapping to set the stage for the maneuver warfare reforms? 
10. Can you share any particular examples of USMC maneuver warfare that either promotes 
or possibly detracts from its incorporation in to USMC strategy and tactics? 
11. Are you familiar with the term 4
th
 Generation Warfare as developed by Col Hammes in his 
book Sling and the Stone – your thoughts on this concept vs. USMC participation in the 
“small wars” and on into today “low intensity wars… or Long Wars”? 
12. Gulf War I was the real first test of the USMC and it application of maneuver warfare: 
how were you affected by the use of maneuver warfare as it was applied buy the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
MarDiv’s? 
13. Why did Al Gray want to replace Gen. Boomer and what were your feelings at this time re 
this request to Schwarzkopf?  
14. When the 1
st
 MarDiv’s command post was deep into the Republican Guard’s position 
during Desert Storm …Was this maneuver warfare running away?  
15. How would you catoragize maneuver warfare as it is applied by the Corps during your 
time and on into today? 
16. How does maneuver warfare compliment the Corps: “First to Fight” or “Force in 
Readiness” objectives? 
17. What kind of leadership did Gen. Gray exhibit and why? 
18. What were the influences that were exerted on Gen. Gray that helped shape this leadership 
model? 
19. What was Gen. Gray’s intent when he assumed command of the USMC? 
20. Why did Gen. Gray move in the direction of operational decision making and maneuver 
warfare. And, how did he adopt it to the strengths and weaknesses of the USMC? 
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21. What external events did Gen Gray use to determine what the future USMC would 
become? 
 
22. What was his leadership experiences as well as those who were around him (pro and con)? 
 
23. Who had Gen. Gray chosen as his leadership team? And have they continued beyond the 
tenure of Gen. Gray to implement his evolution of the USMC? 
 
24. What was Gen. Gray’s personal experience that motivated him to lead this transformation 
of the USMC? 
 
25. What were the actual changes required to accomplish this transformation? 
 
26. What were the operational tools required to effect this transformation? 
 
 27. Why was Gen. Gray able to make these changes; that effected this internal evolutional 
transformation of the USMC? 
 
II. Additional Questions directly for Gen. Gray and Col. Mike Wyly: 
 A. On the surface, the USMC looks, sounds and acts similar to all other periods of its 
development and national history. Every Marine has taken the same oath to defend the country 
and the Constitution, yet there has been an evident transformational evolution of The Corps on 
and off the battlefield. How did this come about?  
B. What was the motivation behind this change?  
C. What were the actual events that sparked this change for The Corps? And why did 
they occur?  
D. What was necessary in the Corps for these changes to be accomplished? 
E. How were the changes identified and implemented? And, by who?  
F. What were the reactions from all echelons’ within the Corps regarding these 
changes?  
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G. Who were the implementers of this change? And how were they brought into the 
“inner circle”?  
 
H. Who were the opposition and why did they oppose the RMA? 
I. What are the innovations that you put into USMC Doctrine that further puts the 
Corps on a different level than the rest of the other branches of the US military? 
J. When, why and how did you realize the Corps needed to transform?  
K. What keeps the Corps moving in the direction that you set it on?  
L. Is there room for further transformation for the Corps? Are there still items in your 
estimation that did not get accomplished during your tenure that are vital for the future of the 
Corps? 
M. What are the legacy institutions that you created with this transformation, and how 
do they continue to keep the Corps on the cutting edge of Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics 
readiness?  
N. Is there still resistance within the Corps regarding this transformation?  
O. From your entry into the USMC – what actually changed under your leadership? 
P. Why did you and your cadre feel there was a need for the transformation?  
Q. How did this cadre come together to effect the changes of your plan for the Corps?  
R. Have the other services emulated your ideas at the levels of doctrine, strategy and 
tactics?  
S. Would there effectiveness of today in Iraq and Afghanistan be realized without 
these transformational modifications? 
T. What is your legacy in respect to the Corps, the military in general and the nation as 
a whole?  
U. Why were these particular aspect chosen over other changes that could have been 
implemented?  
V. Having been in the Corps since the Korean War what were the factors that lead you 
to think about transformation and in particular the changes you implemented. And have they 
worked out to your expectations? 
W. What was the resistance, or if you will the internal friction in implementing the 
transformation? 
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